Opinion
S92A1498.
DECIDED JANUARY 20, 1993.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Etheridge.
Michael R. Hauptman, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Barry I. Mortge, Joseph F. Burford, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, C. A. Benjamin Woolf, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The appellant, Geraldine Grady, appeals from her conviction of the felony murder of Marvin Solomon. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
The crime occurred on March 24, 1990. Grady was indicted on May 25, 1990, and was found guilty and sentenced on January 31, 1991. Grady filed a motion for new trial on February 25, 1991, and the court reporter certified the transcript on April 10, 1991. Grady amended her motion for new trial on October 7, 1991, and again on June 4, 1992. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on June 5, 1992. Grady filed her notice of appeal on June 24, 1992. The appeal was docketed in this Court on September 2, 1992, and was orally argued on November 9, 1992.
1. Contrary to Grady's fifth enumeration of error, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction for felony murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
2. In her first enumeration of error, Grady contends that the trial court violated Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 867-868 ( 414 S.E.2d 463) (1992), by giving a sequential jury charge on murder and voluntary manslaughter. We agree and hold that Grady is entitled to a new trial. First, Grady is correct that the charge given in this case violated Edge. Moreover, because we have held that Edge's disapproval of the sequential jury charge "will be applied to all cases then on direct review or not yet final," Taylor v. State, 262 Ga. 584 (3) ( 422 S.E.2d 430) (1992), and because Grady's case was "not yet final" when this Court decided Edge, the rule announced in Edge applies to the present case. Finally, Grady preserved her right to raise this issue on appeal by reserving her right to object to the jury charges on appeal. Id. For these reasons, we must grant Grady a new trial because of the sequential charge given by the trial court. Id.
3. In Grady's second enumeration of error, she contends that the trial court erred by permitting the state to rebut her good character evidence with evidence of a 22-year-old felony conviction. We find no error. Although the lapse of time may have rendered evidence of the conviction inadmissible as evidence of an independent transaction, Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, (1) (b) ( 410 S.E.2d 423) (1991), we conclude that the rationale for that exclusion, id. at 798-799, does not support the exclusion of the evidence for impeachment purposes. Cf. Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 576 (13) (b) ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986) (a prior conviction over 30 years old was not excludable from evidence as a statutory aggravating circumstance on the ground it was too old to be relevant). The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the conviction. See Emmett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 650, 652 (4) ( 405 S.E.2d 707) (1991).
4. Because of our holding in Division 2, supra, we need not address Grady's remaining enumerations of error.
Judgment reversed. Clarke, C. J., Hunt, P. J., Benham, Fletcher, Sears-Collins, JJ., and Judge Brooks E. Blitch III concur; Hunstein, J., not participating.