Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps

18 Citing cases

  1. Kirk v. Hilltop Apartments, Lp.

    123 A.3d 554 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times
    In Kirk v. Hilltop Apartments, LP, 225 Md.App. 34, 35 n.1, 123 A.3d 554, 555 n.1 (2015), the Court of Special Appeals stated that, although, under CJ § 4–401(4), the District Court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction over an action for breach of lease, where the amount in controversy exceeds the District Court's statutory maximum, "a party to the proceeding may invoke the right to a jury trial in the circuit court by filing a timely demand for the same."

    That observation, while perhaps applicable to the tenant-based voucher program at issue in Carter, is not relevant to the project-based housing program here, as Kirk's lease—on a standard form issued by HUD four years after Carter was decided—does, in fact, expressly provide for automatic renewal of the lease term.And that is the conclusion that we recently reached in Grady Management, Inc. v. Epps, 218 Md.App. 712, 98 A.3d 457 (2014), a case that also addressed a landlord-tenant dispute involving a project-based federal housing program. Id. at 716 n. 2, 98 A.3d 457.

  2. Hosford v. Chateau Foghorn LP

    229 Md. App. 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times

    [] The circuit court cited Brown v. Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County , 350 Md. 570, 576–84, 714 A.2d 197 (1998) and Grady Management, Inc. v. Epps , 218 Md.App. 712, 98 A.3d 457 (2014), as cases dealing with the relationship between § 8–402.1 and federal regulations governing federally-subsidized housing. The circuit court concluded that neither case provided significant guidance.

  3. Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford

    455 Md. 462 (Md. 2017)   Cited 44 times

    either that an alleged breach is substantial or that it warrants eviction. In analyzing the preemption issue, the circuit court discussed Brown v. Housing Opportunities Commission , 350 Md. 570, 714 A.2d 197 (1998) and Grady Management, Inc. v. Epps , 218 Md.App. 712, 98 A.3d 457 (2014), as cases dealing with the relationship between RP § 8–402.1 and federal regulations governing federally-subsidized housing. However, the circuit court concluded that neither case provided significant guidance, as neither involved an issue of preemption.

  4. Adebusoye v. Prince George's Cnty.

    Case No.: PWG-18-153 (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2019)

    Collateral estoppel is "based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised . . . ." Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps, 98 A.3d 457, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (citation omitted). The doctrine bars relitigation of an issue if a defendant demonstrates that (1) there was "a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation"; (2) "the party against whom the plea is asserted" was "a party or in privity with the party in the prior adjudication"; (3) "the issue decided in the prior litigation [is] identical with the issue presented in the subsequent litigation"; and (4) "the issue actually litigated [was] essential to the judgment in the prior action."

  5. Young v. Ditech Fin., LLC

    Civil Action No. PX 16-3986 (D. Md. Jul. 19, 2017)   Cited 5 times
    Finding noteholder, substitute trustees, and loan servicer were in privity for res judicata purposes

    "Res judicata and collateral estoppel are based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised, or that should have been raised." Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps, 98 A.3d 457, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014). "Res judicata . . . bars a party from relitigating a claim that was decided or could have been decided in an original suit."

  6. Williams v. 21st Mortg. Corp.

    Civil Action No. PX 16-1210 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2017)   Cited 7 times
    Dismissing claims against Doe defendants because the plaintiff "had more than sufficient time to conduct a reasonable inquiry into [their] true identity"

    "Res judicata and collateral estoppel are based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised, or that should have been raised." Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps, 98 A.3d 457, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014).

  7. Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cnty.

    Case No.: PWG-14-3481 (D. Md. Jan. 5, 2017)

    Collateral estoppel is "'based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised . . . .'" Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps, 98 A.3d 457, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (citation omitted). The doctrine bars relitigation of an issue if a defendant demonstrates that (1) "the issue decided in the prior adjudication [was] identical with the one presented in the action in question"; (2) "there [was] a final judgment on the merits"; (3) "the party against whom the plea is asserted [was] a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication"; and (4) "the party against whom the plea is asserted [was] given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue."

  8. Butterworth v. Black

    Case No.: PWG-15-1721 (D. Md. Sep. 6, 2016)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because the state court judgment was on appeal

    Def.'s Reply 3. Collateral estoppel is "'based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised . . . .'" Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps, 98 A.3d 457, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (citation omitted). The doctrine bars relitigation of an issue if a defendant demonstrates that (1) there was "a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation"; (2) "the party against whom the plea is asserted" was "a party or in privity with the party in the prior adjudication"; (3) "the issue decided in the prior litigation [is] identical with the issue presented in the subsequent litigation"; and (4) "the issue actually litigated [was] essential to the judgment in the prior action."

  9. Ashe v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.

    165 F. Supp. 3d 357 (D. Md. 2015)   Cited 6 times   2 Legal Analyses

    “Res judicata and collateral estoppel ‘are based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised, or that should have been raised.’ ” Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps , 218 Md.App. 712, 98 A.3d 457, 472 (2014) (citation omitted). While “[c]ollateral estoppel has often been described as a doctrine absorbed within res judicata ,” it is a separate doctrine that “operates collaterally to preclude relitigation of issues that the same parties already had litigated.”

  10. Graves v. Onewest Bank

    Case No.: PWG-14-1995 (D. Md. May. 20, 2015)   Cited 16 times
    Finding standing lacking where there was no recorded deed because "[w]ithout ownership, Mr. Graves would not suffer any injury from Defendant's actions with regard to the Property."

    Def.'s Mem. 16. "Res judicata and collateral estoppel 'are based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised, or that should have been raised.'" Grady Mgmt., Inc. v. Epps, 98 A.3d 457, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (citation omitted). While "[c]ollateral estoppel has often been described as a doctrine absorbed within res judicata," it is a separate doctrine that "operates collaterally to preclude relitigation of issues that the same parties already had litigated."