Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:12-cv-00430-BAJ-SCR
2013-10-18
KERYN GOYNES v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Keryn Goynes's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR MOTION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY (Doc. 105). Goynes requests that this Court reconsider its earlier Order denying her petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 102) in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) and Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013). (Doc. 105 at pp. 2-6). In the alternative, Goynes requests a certificate of appealability so that she can pursue these arguments, and other arguments raised in her § 2255 petition, on appeal. (Id. at p. 6). For the following reasons, Goynes's Motion is DENIED.
Although Goynes does not style it as such, this Court treats her Motion for Reconsideration as a timely Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Here, Goynes's Motion fails because she has not "clearly establish[ed] either a manifest error of law or fact," or "presented] newly discovered evidence" that calls into question this Court's prior rejection of her habeas petition. See Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990). Quite simply, Goynes's reliance on Alleyne and Peugh is misplaced. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that "any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury." Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. Goynes, however, does not complain that her statutory sentencing provisions were affected by a fact not submitted to the jury. Instead, she complains about the sentencing judge's refusal to grant her request for a downward departure from her advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range based on her acceptance of responsibility. (See Doc. 105 at pp. 1-2; see also Doc. 103 at p. 4-5; Doc. 56 at pp. 3-8). Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Alleyne is not relevant here.
Peugh is equally inapplicable. Peugh held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated when a defendant is sentenced under a version of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines not in effect at the time she committed her offense. See Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2081-83. Here, Goynes has produced no evidence that she was sentenced according to a version of the Sentencing Guidelines not in effect when she committed her bank fraud offenses. (See generally Doc. 105; Doc. 103).
In sum, Goynes has failed to meet the necessary criteria to warrant relief under Rule 59. See Simon, 891 F.2d at 1159. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Goynes's MOTION (Doc. 105) to the extent that it requests reconsideration of its order denying her petition for habeas corpus. Further, this Court DENIES Goynes's Motion (Doc. 105) to the extent that it requests a certificate of appealability because, for reasons explained here and in the Magistrate Judge's Report recommending that her habeas petition be denied (Doc. 93), Goynes has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 18 th day of October, 2013.
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BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA