Appendix II, entitled "Insurance Requirements," provides that "Vendor shall obtain and maintain in full force, or cause of be obtained in full force, throughout the performance of its obligations under this Agreement, insurance coverage against claims, regardless of when asserted, that may arise out of, or result from, Vendor's operations, the operations of Vendor's Subcontractors, Vendor's Sub-subcontractors, employees, agents and other entity, directly or indirectly, engaged by Vendor, in connection with the Services as described in this Agreement" (id. at 8). Moreover, on these moving papers, it is premature to dismiss the cross claims, as issues of fact exist concerning whether one or more of defendants TCM, the hotel and Hersha were guilty of negligence (see Goya v Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581 [1st Dept 2021]; One Bryant Park v Permasteelisa Cladding Tech., Ltd, 189 A.D.3d 584 [1st Dept 2020]; Martins v Little 40 Worth Assocs.; Inc., 72 A.D.3d 483 [1st Dept 2010]; Correia v Professional Data Mgt., 259 A.D.2d 60 [1st Dept 1999]).

Therefore, the Court cannot determine whether anti-subrogation warrants dismissal of Defendants' contractual indemnity claim. See Goya v. Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 584-85 (N.Y.App.Div. 2021) (“In the absence of proof that [the] insurer will actually be covering the same risk for [both parties], there is no basis at this time to dismiss the indemnification claim on the basis of anti-subrogation.”)

The court correctly denied VRH's motion as to the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The evidence submitted by VRH raised issues of fact about whether it was a statutory agent that possesed supervisory control over plaintiff's work (see Walls v Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d 861, 863-864 [2005]; Goya v Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 583 [1st Dept 2021]). VRH's superintendent described VRH as both a construction manager and a general contractor on the project.

[1] The court correctly denied VRH’s motion as to the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The evidence submitted by VRH raised issues of fact about whether it was a statutory agent that possessed supervisory control over plaintiff’s work (see Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d 861, 863–864, 798 N.Y.S.2d 351, 831 N.E.2d 408 [2005]; Goya v. Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 583, 146 N.Y.S.3d 59 [1st Dept. 2021]).

DFC and DiFama failed to establish, as a matter of law, that they procured liability insurance with a $10,000,000 per-occurrence limit as DFC was contractually obligated to purchase. Additionally, while they procured a primary policy which named defendants as additional insureds, they failed to show that they procured an excess liability policy naming defendants as additional insureds, as required by the contract (seeGoyav. LongwoodHous. Dev. FundCo., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 586, 146 N.Y.S.3d 59 [1st Dept. 2021]). [1] However, the motion court should have granted summary judgment dismissing defendants’ third-party claims for common-law indemnification and contribution asserted against DiFama as barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 11.

DFC and DiFama failed to establish, as a matter of law, that they procured liability insurance with a $10,000,000 per-occurrence limit as DFC was contractually obligated to purchase. Additionally, while they procured a primary policy which named defendants as additional insureds, they failed to show that they procured an excess liability policy naming defendants as additional insureds, as required by the contract (see Goya v Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 586 [1st Dept 2021]).

"Where a plaintiff's injuries are alleged ... to arise from a dangerous condition on the premises, a defendant may be liable under Labor Law § 200 if it either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition" ( Bonkoski v. Condos Bros. Constr. Corp., 216 A.D.3d at 616, 188 N.Y.S.3d 137 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeSaitta v. Marsah Props., LLC, 211 A.D.3d at 1063, 182 N.Y.S.3d 141 ). Here, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they had no authority to supervise or control the work being performed by the defendants’ own employees at the time of the incident (seeState of New York v. Defoe Corp., 149 A.D.3d 889, 890, 49 N.Y.S.3d 897 ). Further, to the extent the plaintiff alleged that the incident was caused by a dangerous condition, the defendants did not address the issues of whether they created or had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition (seeGoya v. Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co. Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 584, 146 N.Y.S.3d 59 ). Accordingly, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200, and thus, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ cross-motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action, without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (seeWinegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d at 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ).

Since its submissions in support of its motion did not demonstrate that the loss was related to operations performed by or on behalf of Falco, Catlin failed, under the circumstances of this case, to establish that LRC was covered as an additional insured under the terms of Falco's insurance policy. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that, at this juncture, there is no basis on which to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to the antisubrogation rule (see Goya v Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 584-585; Kielar v Metro. Museum of Art, 55 A.D.3d 456, 459; Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v Brooklyn Navy Yard Dev. Corp., 52 A.D.3d 821, 822-823).

Peragallo is not entitled to the dismissal of Marshall's cross claims against it for contribution and common-law indemnification, because the evidence that it undertook to transport the pipe organ and that it helped Marshall's assemble the ramp presents issues of fact as to its negligence (see Goya v Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 585 [1st Dept 2021]). However, Marshall's cross claim against Peragallo for contractual indemnification should be dismissed because there is no written contract between these two parties (Higgins, 179 A.D.3d at 511).

. Peragallo is not entitled to the dismissal of Marshall's cross claims against it for contribution and common-law indemnification, because the evidence that it undertook to transport the pipe organ and that it helped Marshall's assemble the ramp presents issues of fact as to its negligence (seeGoya v. Longwood Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 192 A.D.3d 581, 585, 146 N.Y.S.3d 59 [1st Dept. 2021] ). However, Marshall's cross claim against Peragallo for contractual indemnification should be dismissed because there is no written contract between these two parties ( Higgins, 179 A.D.3d at 511, 119 N.Y.S.3d 80 ).