Opinion
01 Civ. 6933 (GEL)
March 5, 2003
Stephen Gowins, Stormville, N.Y., pro se.
Susan M. Barbour, Assistant Attorney General (Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General Of The State Fo New York, On Brief) New York, N.Y.,for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Stephen Gowins, a New York State prisoner, brings this action pro se, claiming that defendants, various corrections officials and medical personnel at Green Haven Correctional Facility, violated his rights against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, by failing to provide him with adequate medical care, and by ignoring dangerous physical conditions, specifically, an inappropriate bed and a shower head leaking scalding hot water. Following discovery, defendants have moved for summary judgment. The motion will be granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gowins filed this action on April 25, 2001. Defendants do not dispute that he had previously exhausted his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). After the completion of discovery, including a deposition of Gowins taken on September 5, 2003, defendants filed this motion for summary judgment. According to a scheduling order set by the Court on December 16, 2002, Gowins' opposition to the motion was due on February 7, 2003. Defendants' motion clearly advised plaintiff, as required by Local Rule 56.2, of what was required to oppose the motion. (See Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment.) As of the present date, Gowins has not filed any papers opposing the motion. Accordingly, the motion has been deemed fully submitted. Although Gowins' failure to respond would justify a conclusion that he has abandoned his claims, Powell v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, No. 97 Civ. 2439 (GEL), 2001 WL 262583, at *17,*18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2001), the Court has given independent consideration to defendants' arguments.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
When adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, although "the nonmoving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). The court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is then appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiff "`must produce specific facts indicating' that a genuine factual issue exists."Scotto, 143 F.3d at 114 (quoting Wright v. Coughlin, 132 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "If the evidence [produced by the nonmoving party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252).
II. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
The Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from acting with "deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs" of its prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). That formulation encompasses both a subjective element or state of mind on the part of prison officials — a knowledge of an excessive risk to an inmate's health or safety — and an objective element or physical condition — a "sufficiently serious" medical condition or risk of harm. Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted);see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Gowins claims that defendants denied him adequate medical care by failing to treat a burn on his foot and two cuts to his feet. While these may seem like minor conditions, the Court assumes for the sake of argument, without deciding, that at least in Gowins' situation — he is a paraplegic, and thus faces potential complications from injuries that might be minor for other inmates — the complaints noted by Gowins could be "sufficiently serious" that their conscious disregard could violate the Constitution. Nevertheless, the undisputed factual record demonstrates conclusively that defendants did not show indifference to Gowins' various ailments, but provided him with treatment. In this regard, it is important to realize that even a showing of mis-diagnosis or ineffective treatment — indeed, even medical failure severe enough to amount to malpractice — does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106 n. 14. To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must show that officials deliberately ignored serious risks to his health and safety.
Gowins' medical records, the affidavits of the medical practitioners, and Gowins' own testimony at his deposition establish without contradiction that the defendants did not ignore the injuries of which Gowins complains. With respect to the burn, the records demonstrate that as soon as plaintiff reported the burn to the prison nurse, on August 25, 2000, the nurse promptly reported it to defendant Dr. Koenigsmann, Green Haven's Health Services Director. (Koenigsmann Aff. ¶¶ 5, 15; Barbour Dec. Ex. E at 586.) Dr. Koenigsmann diagnosed the injury as a second degree bum and applied an antibiotic cream and a sterile dressing. The doctor also prescribed a treatment plan to be followed by other medical personnel and by Gowins himself. (Koenigsmann Aff. ¶¶ 17-20.)
The records also document that over time Dr. Koenigsmann continued to review the chart, follow the progress of the injury, authorize podiatry consultation, and Follow up to be sure the recommended treatment was provided. (Id. ¶ 21.) Defendant Dr. Silver, who took primary responsibility for treatment from September 6, 2000, also examined the bum, reviewed the records, and provided treatment, as did the nursing staff. (Barbour Dec. Ex. I at 1474.) While Gowins alleges that his foot developed a green fungus that went untreated, his lay "diagnosis" is at odds with the consistent opinions of the doctors who treated the injury, who responded to his complaints of a green discoloration of the affected area, after examination, by concluding and explaining to the plaintiff that the color was a normal part of the healing process, and that the wound showed no sign of infection. (Id. Ex. E at 583.) Nurses and the consultant podiatrist reported the same conclusions. At one point, the treating physician ordered tests to confirm the presence or absence of infection; the tests were negative. (Id. Ex. I at 1477.)
Gowins does not claim or document any long-term result of the alleged infection. Under all the circumstances, his lay testimony that the wound was infected and untreated cannot create an issue of fact in the face of medical records overwhelmingly demonstrating that the symptoms complained of did not stem from an infection, and that the wound was treated attentively and competently. Even medical malpractice — of which there is no competent evidence here — "does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner."Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106. Thus, even if Gowins could show, as he cannot, that the doctors mis-diagnosed or improperly treated his injury, the record here does not remotely demonstrate the kind of callous disregard of the inmate's needs that is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" and incompatible with "evolving standards of decency" that would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 105-06.
Much the same can be said of the cuts or tears on plaintiff's heel. Once again, far from ignoring Gowins' complaints, the nurse treated the injury, and reported it to Dr. Koenigsmann. who prescribed medication and ordered a podiatry consultation. (Barbour Dec. Ex E at 297; Ex. I at 1477.) Dr. Silver and the nursing staff similarly provided treatment for the injury. (Silver Aff. ¶¶ 76-81, 100-110.) Gowins admitted at his deposition that both the burn and the tear wounds were treated by the prison medical staff. (Barbour Dec. Ex. C. at 90-91, 107-108.) On this record, there is simply no genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants behaved with deliberate disregard or indifference to plaintiff's injuries. They did not.
Gowins also claims that the injury to his foot caused him headaches and night sweats that were ignored by the doctors. This claim fares no better. First, unlike second-degree burns or open wounds to a paralyzed limb, such routine symptoms are not "sufficiently serious" to satisfy the objective portion of the Gamble test. Second, the record makes clear that Gowins suffered such symptoms before the burn injury. (Barbour Dec. Ex. B at 313.) Finally, the prison medical staff did not ignore these symptoms: even before the burn wound, Dr. Silver authorized an MRI to test for potential causes of plaintiff's headaches, and medication was prescribed for them. (Id.)
III. Prison Conditions
A similar combination of objectively harmful conditions and subjectively deliberate indifference on the part of prison authorities is necessary to a finding that dangerous prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991). Gowins' claims in this regard, which refer to a too-short bed and a too-hot leaking shower, also fail.
Gowins claims that the heel injury of which he complains was the result of a bed that was too short for his six-foot five-inch height. But plaintiff was only one inch taller than the bed was long. (Barbour Dec. Ex. H at 1468.) The record contains no evidence that sleeping in a bed of this size is dangerous, even for a paraplegic. Even assuming arguendo that Gowins' heel tears were caused by contact with the metal bed frame, it cannot be inferred that a too-short bed is a seriously dangerous condition; when plaintiff first complained of the bed. in late 1999, he had been using it for five years without injury, and complained only that it was uncomfortable, not dangerous. (Id.) Moreover, as plaintiff admits, defendants responded to his complaints by providing extra pillows that "stopped my foot from getting caught in between the bed and the wall." (Id. Ex. C at 117.) His second heel injury did not recur until more than a year after the first (Silver Aff. ¶ 119), further suggesting that the bed was not particularly dangerous, and by the time of that second injury, the bed had been altered and a new mattress provided to accommodate plaintiffs height. (Barbour Dec. Ex. G at 1449.) There is simply no evidence here that prison officials were less than solicitous of Gowins' needs.
The medical records are at best inconclusive on this front, containing indications that the injury might have resulted from "a variety of mechanisms" and even identifying the lesion as a "bed sore" — a condition to which paraplegics and others confined to beds or wheelchairs are prone. (Barbour Dec. Ex. I at 1477.)
Finally, while scalding shower leaks are potentially serious to any prisoner, and especially to one with a disability affecting both his mobility and sensation, it is undisputed that the heavy use of the showers and occasional vandalism by prisoners make the need for repair chronic, and repairs are made as soon as possible after complaints. Plaintiff himself admits that when the showerheads break, "they come and fix it" (id. Ex. C at 80), and that on the particular occasion when his foot was burned, the showerhead was promptly repaired (id. at 79-80). Defendants have provided a wealth of testimony that they are assiduous in responding to such routine maintenance problems (see, e.g., Muller Aff. ¶¶ 22-23); in opposition, plaintiff offers essentially testimony that amounts to a concession. (Barbour Dec. Ex. C at 80.)
On this record, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would justify a trial of plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff's failure to respond to the motion may well indicate that he too recognizes this, and has abandoned his claims, but even if he has not, defendants' motion must be granted on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and judgment shall issue dismissing the complaint.
SO ORDERED