Opinion
(December Term, 1842.)
1. In an action upon the bond of an administrator, appointed by one of the Courts of this State, the administrator can only be made accountable for the assets found within this State.
2. An administration granted in this State gives no authority to administer goods in another government.
APPEAL from Bailey, J., Fall Term, 1842, of CURRITUCK.
This was an action of debt, brought by the relator of the plaintiff on the bond given by Caroline M. Williams; the defendant, on being appointed by the County Court of Currituck administratrix of Hollowell Williams, deceased. The breach assigned was, in not paying to the relator of the plaintiff the distributive share to which his intestate was entitled, as one of the children of the said Hollowell. It was in evidence that Hollowell Williams had his domicile in Virginia, and died there, but had personal property both in that State and in North Carolina, and that the defendant Caroline took out letters of administration on his estate both in Virginia and in North Carolina. It was further in evidence that the decedent left surviving him six distributees, of whom the intestate of the relator was one. It further appeared that there was in the hands of the administratrix on account of her administration in the State of North Carolina, after the payment of debts, the sum of $1,530.09 1/2, with interest from 25 May, 1837, and a balance on account of her administration in Virginia of $2,515.35, with interest from 7 March, 1837.
The defendants insisted that the action could not be sustained (153) at all, inasmuch as the administration here was merely ancillary to that in the State of Virginia, and that as soon as the debts here were paid, the funds remaining in the hands of the administratrix on account of her administration in North Carolina, if the administration had been committed to two different persons, ought to be paid over to the personal representative in Virginia, to be distributed according to the laws of the country where the decedent had his domicile; and that inasmuch as the personal representative in each State was the same person, by operation of law she held the fund as administratrix in Virginia, the place of her intestate's domicile, to be there distributed according to the laws of that State, and that there was no breach of her administration bond in this State. His Honor overruled the objection. It was then contended by the defendants, that at most, the relator of the plaintiff was entitled to recover in this action only the distributive share, to which his intestate was entitled to the fund remaining in the hands of the said Caroline, on account of her administration in North Carolina. His Honor being of that opinion, refused to give judgment for the whole amount of the distributive share to which the intestate of the relator of the plaintiff was entitled on account of the administration in both States, to wit, the sum of $851.13 1/2, with interest on $419.22 1/2, from 25 August, 1841, and interest on $255.01 from the same time, but was of opinion that he was entitled to recover one-sixth of the fund on account of the administration in North Carolina. And accordingly judgment was entered for the penalty of the bond, to be discharged on the payment of $319.70, with interest on $255.01 from 25 August, 1841, until paid. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.
Kinney, for the plaintiff.
No counsel for the defendant.
The defendant's objection, that the administratrix was accountable in Virginia, the domicile of the intestate, for (154) the whole estate, is not presented by the case, as it comes up; inasmuch as judgment was given for the relator's share of the assets in North Carolina, and the defendants did not appeal. It would, therefore, be improper to give an opinion on that point.
On the other point we think the decision right. Our law intends only to secure the assets, of which it commits administration; and the bond given here must, accordingly, be construed as obliging the administratrix and the sureties to account to the Court of North Carolina for the assets received, or that might have been received, by virtue of the office conferred here. An administration granted in this State, although general in its terms, is necessarily limited to the effects in this State, and gives no authority to administer goods in another government; especially when the domicile of the intestate was abroad. An administrator does not, in this respect, stand on the footing of an executor, who takes probate here of a will of one resident here, as determined in Helme v. Sanders, 10 N.C. 563; who undertakes the duty of collecting the effects, wherever they may be, and whose authority is derived from the will and not merely by act of law. But it is otherwise with an administrator; for at common law, each Bishop or Archbishop could grant administration of such goods only as were within his jurisdiction. And in Raymond v. Watteville, 2 Lee Ex. Rep., 551, Sir George Lee held, upon the authority of previous cases, that, where the same person was the representative in both counties, the Prerogative Court of Canterbury had no jurisdiction over German effects, and could not require an inventory of them, nor, indeed, of those lying in the province of York or in Ireland. Of course, then, it can be no breach of the administration bond not to return an inventory of such goods, or otherwise account for them here. No doubt an administrator may be compelled to account in a Court of Equity, where he may be found, to those entitled to the estate, wherever it may be situate; but that is on the ground of a personal trust, and it is no matter where it was assumed. But that is a different question from that before us; which depends on the (155) consideration that the administration here conferred authority to administer the goods here, and none other; and, therefore, that for the due administration of those goods only is the administration bond a security.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
Cited: Plummer v. Brandon, 40 N.C. 194; Carmichael v. Ray, 40 N.C. 367; Sanders v. Jones, 43 N.C. 248; Charleton v. Sloan, 64 N.C. 705; Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 421; Grant v. Reese, 94 N.C. 730.