Governale v. Northwest Com. Hospital

11 Citing cases

  1. Plaza Bank v. Kappel

    334 Ill. App. 3d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 13 times
    Evaluating whether confirmation of sale should be reversed for lack of prosecution

    Azran does not challenge the validity of the judgment of foreclosure nor does he contend that the judicial sale in any way failed to comply with the requirements of either the judgment of foreclosure or section 15-1507 of the Foreclosure Law. Azran's sole argument on appeal is that the judicial sale was invalid because, at the time of the sale, entry of the order dismissing the cause for want of prosecution had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to confirm the sale as required by section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law. 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2000). Citing Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital, 147 Ill. App. 3d 590 (1986), in support, Azran argues that "once a case is dismissed, the [trial] court is without power to make another order." Azran argues that "[i]f the [trial] court is without power to make another order, than [sic] it cannot confirm the sale and the sale is invalid, if held, as in this instance, at a time when the case has been dismissed.

  2. Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

    708 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2013)   Cited 109 times
    Holding that Yassan did not allege a separate fraud—like "Chase deceiving Yassan about what he was signing—that induced him to sign the agreement

    Such action operates to nullify the order of dismissal and revests the trial court with jurisdiction.Governale v. Nw. Cmty. Hosp., 147 Ill.App.3d 590, 101 Ill.Dec. 5, 497 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 (1986) (quotations and citations omitted). Chase, the party in whose favor dismissal was entered, certainly conducted itself in a manner inconsistent with the order of dismissal for want of prosecution.

  3. People v. Cooper

    132 Ill. 2d 347 (Ill. 1989)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that "a sexually dangerous person remains under the jurisdiction of the court which initially committed him until that court expressly finds that he is not sexually dangerous"

    A court interpreting this unambiguous order must look only at the words of the order, not at the record or the judge's later statements about his intent. ( Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 590, 593.) Furthermore, defendant continues, he should have been able to rely on the express conditions of the order, and should not have been bound to comply with the order after the time period expressly stated in the order.

  4. Primus v. McKenna

    2015 Ill. App. 133713 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    In considering this argument, we observe "[t]he intention of the court is determined by the order entered, and where the language of the order is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to construction." Won v. Grant Park 2, L.L.C., 2013 IL App (1st) 122523, ¶ 33; see Comdisco, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 285 Ill. App. 3d 796, 799 (1996); Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital, 147 Ill. App. 3d 590, 593 (1986). Where the language of an order is ambiguous, however, it is subject to construction.

  5. Illinois Bone & Joint Institute v. Kime

    396 Ill. App. 3d 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 16 times
    In Kime, the court specifically concluded that "[t]here is no rule of appellate practice which allows a party to appeal as a matter of right on an interlocutory basis from an order granting a § 2-1301(e) motion."

    We have also considered whether IBJI's case could have been reinstated by Kerne's conduct on November 29, 2005, due to the doctrine of revestment. Revestment is an equitable principle discussed in authority cited in IBJI's response brief and taken up by Kime in his reply brief and at oral arguments. See Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital, 147 Ill. App. 3d 590, 596 (1986); Gentile v. Hansen, 131 Ill. App. 3d 250, 254 (1984). Revestment refers to the trial court reacquiring subject matter jurisdiction over a cause after the court has lost jurisdiction due to its entry of a final judgment order and the passage of 30 days. Gentile, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 254; 735 ILCS 2-1401 (West 2004).

  6. Wierzbicki v. Gleason

    388 Ill. App. 3d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Stating any order entered while a trial court is divested of jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal is void

    enter, Inc. v. Parkway Bank Trust Co., 327 Ill. App. 3d 143, 149, 763 N.E.2d 360, 396 (2001); People v. Watkins, 325 Ill. App. 3d 13, 17, 757 N.E.2d 117, 120 (2001); People v. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d 864, 868, 731 N.E.2d 883, 886 (2000); In re Marriage of Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d 759, 767, 721 N.E.2d 166, 175 (1999); A.A. Store Fixtures Co. v. Shopiro, 272 Ill. App. 3d 959, 966, 651 N.E.2d 525, 530-31 (1995); Kandalepas v. Economou, 269 Ill. App. 3d 245, 251-52, 645 N.E.2d 543, 548 (1994); In re Marriage of Schauberger, 253 Ill. App. 3d 595, 601-02, 624 N.E.2d 863, 680-81 (1993); Elmore v. Elmore, 219 Ill. App. 3d 61, 64-65, 580 N.E.2d 619, 622 (1991); In re Marriage of Wharrie, 182 Ill. App. 3d 434, 436, 538 N.E.2d 183, 184 (1989); Vulcan Metal Products, Inc. v. Schultz, 180 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71-72, 535 N.E.2d 933, 936 (1989); People v. Hubbard, 170 Ill. App. 3d 572, 576-77, 524 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (1988); Caracci v. Edgar, 160 Ill. App. 3d 892, 897-98, 513 N.E.2d 932, 936 (1987); Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital, 147 Ill. App. 3d 590, 596, 497 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 (1986); In re Marriage of Demond, 142 Ill. App. 3d 134, 137, 491 N.E.2d 501, 504 (1986); In re Marriage of Savas, 139 Ill. App. 3d 68, 73-74, 486 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (1985); People v. Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d 745, 751, 473 N.E.2d 103, 108 (1984); Gentile v. Hansen, 131 Ill. App. 3d 250, 255-56, 475 N.E.2d 894, 898 (1984); People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 241, 456 N.E.2d 11, 14 (1983); Sabatino v. Kozy Kottage Inn, Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 375, 378, 430 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1981); Esin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 75, 81, 424 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (1981); Comet Casualty Co. v. Schneider, 98 Ill. App. 3d 786, 792, 424 N.E.2d 911, 916 (1981); J.D. Court, Inc. v. Investors Unlimited, Inc., 81 Ill. App. 3d 131, 135, 400 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1980); Faust v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical Center, 79 Ill. App. 3d 69, 72, 398 N.E.2d 287, 289-90 (1979); Johnson v. Empire Mutual Insurance Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 780, 783, 388 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (1979); Spears v. Spears, 52 Ill. App. 3d 695, 700,

  7. Comdisco, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.

    285 Ill. App. 3d 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 12 times
    In Comdisco, the appellate court neither denned "substantive disposition" nor explained just how the trial court failed to "rule" on the issue of arbitrability despite entering an order disposing of the motion to compel arbitration and citing for support the plaintiffs arguments against the validity of the arbitration clause.

    Moreover, where the language of the order appealed from is clear and unambiguous, it is generally not subject to construction and cannot be controlled by an alleged intent or purpose not expressed therein. Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital, 147 Ill. App.3d 590, 593, 497 N.E.2d 1318, 1320 (1986). The order in this case unambiguously denies the motion to compel arbitration.

  8. Purcell Wardrope v. Hertz Corp.

    279 Ill. App. 3d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    Generally, the intention of the court is determined only by the order entered, and where the language of the order is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to construction. Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital, 147 Ill. App.3d 590, 497 N.E.2d 1318 (1986). In this case, the orders appealed from should be interpreted in the context of the record of proceedings and the situation which existed at the time of their rendition.

  9. In re Estate of Halas

    209 Ill. App. 3d 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 37 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Stating that only nominal damages are recoverable where the party demonstrates a right to damages but fails to prove them

    Where a court order is clear and unambiguous, the intention of the court is determined only by the order itself and is not subject to construction. ( Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 590, 593, 497 N.E.2d 1318.) The Chuhak order states that notice is required if the "Executor decides to sell, convey * * * any of the shares of stock issued by [the] Chicago Bears."

  10. Belluomini v. Lancome

    207 Ill. App. 3d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 22 times
    In Lancome, the circuit court entered an order stating, in pertinent part, that the "plaintiff's motion to vacate is stricken."

    Generally, the intention of the court is determined only by the order entered, and where the language of the order is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to construction. ( Governale v. Northwest Community Hospital (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 590, 593, 497 N.E.2d 1318.) The order which we must interpret, however, is plainly ambiguous.