Gourley v. Wollam

11 Citing cases

  1. In re Rose

    512 B.R. 790 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that a secured creditor cannot be compelled to foreclose or accept a deed and that to allow such a conveyance would subject the secured creditor to unwanted liabilities and impair its state law rights

    By contrast, the quitclaim scenario makes the lender owner of the property and, under the doctrine of merger, it takes title subject to these interests. See Sanderson v. Hudlett, 832 So.2d 845, 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ( citing Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); accord Washington Furniture Co. v. Potter, 188 N.C. 145, 124 S.E. 122 (1924)). A worse fate awaits the lender if the quitclaimed property is subject to environmental contamination.

  2. In re Anson

    Case No. 8:10-bk-21924-MGW (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sep. 30, 2011)

    Intent can be inferred from the actions of the relevant party.Sanderson v. Hudlett, 832 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (4th DCA 1977)).Westbury Props., Inc. v. Cardillo, 638 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

  3. In re Robert E. Anson and Barbara J. Anson

    457 B.R. 130 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining that the Rooker –Feldman doctrine "establishes the principle that lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to review state court judgments"

    ”); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. S.S. Am. Lancer, 870 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir.1989). FN15. Sanderson v. Hudlett, 832 So.2d 845, 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218, 1220 (4th DCA 1977)). FN16. Westbury Props., Inc. v. Cardillo, 638 So.2d 519, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

  4. Wietzki v. Wietzki

    231 Neb. 551 (Neb. 1989)   Cited 2 times

    Stated another way, an essential prerequisite of a merger is that the party having both legal and equitable interests have the intention that the interests should merge. See, 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages 1258 (1971); Lampert Yards v. Thompson-Wetterling Const. Realty, 302 Minn. 83, 223 N.W.2d 418 (1974); Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218 (Fla. App. 1977). Nebraska agrees.

  5. Tom Riley Law Firm, P.C. v. Padzensky

    430 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1988)   Cited 2 times

    It is the intention of the mortgagee that is controlling.Overland-Wolf, Inc. v. Koory, 183 Neb. 611, 614, 162 N.W.2d 889, 890-91 (1968) (citations omitted); accord Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla.App. 1977); Stimpson v. Pease, 53 Iowa 572, 574, 5 N.W. 760, 762 (1880); Sylvania Sav. Bank Co. v. Turner, 27 Mich. App. 640, 644-45, 183 N.W.2d 894, 896 (1970); Bahrs v. Bastian, 192 Wis. 642, 644, 212 N.W. 292, 293 (1927); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 441(a), at 681-82 (1949) ("merger has been denied even where the conveyance was admittedly made in satisfaction and cancellation of the indebtedness"). Thus, the mortgagee's intent controls.

  6. Sanderson v. Hudlett

    832 So. 2d 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 3 times

    "[A] transfer of the interest of a mortgagor in mortgaged property to a mortgagee generally operates as a merger of the legal and equitable estates which results in a discharge of the mortgage and a satisfaction of the debt." Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). But this is not always and necessarily the result.

  7. Dvorak v. First Family Bank

    639 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    Whether the mortgage is merged and the debt extinguished when the mortgagee accepts a return of the mortgagor's interest in the mortgaged property depends upon the intent of the mortgagee. Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (citing Jackson v. Relf, 26 Fla. 465, 8 So. 184 (1890)). The mortgagee's intention is to be determined "by his declarations at the time, or, in the absence of these, by his interest, as shown in the condition of things then existing, or by the attending circumstances."

  8. C.T.W. Co. v. Rivergrove Apartments

    582 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 5 times

    Key Bank and C.T.W. executed a written document evidencing the intent of the parties to execute an assignment of the mortgage, for the purpose of keeping the mortgage intact. See Ennis v. Finanz Und Kommerz-Union Etabl., 565 So.2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). C.T.W. is therefore entitled to be subrogated to the position of first mortgagee. One who discharges an obligation is usually entitled to subrogation if he is not merely a volunteer.

  9. Ennis v. Finanz Und Kommerz-Union Etabl.

    565 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 2 times

    The presumption is against such a merger. See Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). See also Jackson.

  10. Prigal v. Kearn

    557 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 7 times
    Stating that purchaser of mortgaged property who assumed mortgage obligation "became the principal debtor and the original buyer/borrower acquired the status of a surety"

    The merger results in a discharge of the mortgage and a satisfaction of the debt. However, in Gourley v. Wollam, 348 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), this court citing Jackson v. Relf, 26 Fla. 465, 8 So. 184 (1890) said: When a mortgage on lands and the equity of redemption in the same lands have become united in the same person, ordinarily the mortgage is merged, — in other words, ceases to be an incumbrance, — and the owner will hold the lands with an unincumbered title, if there be no other mortgage or lien.