Summary
In Gould v. Highway Commission, 245 N.C. 350, 95 S.E.2d 910, this Court held that a prisoner not in said special classification was entitled to recovery under the Tort Claims Act.
Summary of this case from Ivey v. North Carolina Prison DepartmentOpinion
Filed 11 January, 1957.
Convicts and Prisoners 3: State 3b — Evidence held sufficient to support findings of the Industrial Commission that death of intestate resulted from negligence of State employees while acting in the scope of their employment in administering corrective measures at the prison, and that intestate was not guilty of contributory negligence, and award of damages under the State Tort Claims Act is upheld.
APPEAL by defendant from Mallard, J., at March Civil Term 1956, of WAKE.
Taylor Mitchell and John H. Rennick for Plaintiff, Appellee.
R. Brookes Peters and Kenneth Wooten, Jr., for Defendant, Appellant.
JOHNSON, J., not sitting.
PARKER, J., dissenting.
Proceeding instituted before North Carolina Industrial Commission under State Tort Claims Act, Article 31 of Chapter 143 of General Statutes, on claim of plaintiff, Geneva Gould, Administratrix of the Estate of Eleanor Rush, deceased, for wrongful death of intestate alleging negligence on the part of defendant's employees while acting within the scope of their employment in administering corrective measures at the Woman's Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina.
The Deputy Hearing Commissioner, passing jurisdictional facts, found facts, "based upon the stipulations and all the competent evidence," summarily stated: (1) That Eleanor Rush, a prisoner in the Women's Prison, in Raleigh, came to her death on 20 August, 1954, by reason of negligence of employees of defendant acting within the scope of their employment and without contributory negligence on her part. G.S. 143-291; (2) and that as a result thereof plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $3,000.00, for which award was made to plaintiff.
Defendant filed certain exceptions to findings of fact and conclusions of law and to the award of the Deputy Hearing Commissioner, and appealed to the Full Commission.
Upon such appeal the Full Commission, by majority vote, amended the Findings of Fact of the Deputy Hearing Commissioner by adding thereto the following Findings of Fact:
"1. That the death of Eleanor Rush resulted and arose exclusively from, and was proximately caused and produced by, the negligence of said defendant's employees above named, while acting within the scope of their authority at the time, place, and in the manner herein described.
"2. That there was no contributory negligence on the part of Eleanor Rush."
And the Full Commission being of opinion that the assignments of error are without merit and should be overruled, adopted the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law of the Deputy Hearing Commissioner, as so amended, and the order based thereon, and affirmed same in all respects.
Defendant appealed therefrom to Superior Court, assigning as error same matters covered by the exceptions theretofore filed to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Award made by the Deputy Hearing Commissioner. And on such appeal the trial Judge overruled each and all of the exceptions, and affirmed the award of the Full Commission.
Defendant appealed from the judgment of Superior Court to Supreme Court purportedly upon same exceptions theretofore filed, as hereinabove set forth, and assigns same as error.
A careful reading of the record and case on appeal, here presented, reveals evidence from which the findings of fact made by the Deputy Hearing Commissioner and by the Full Commission clearly appear, or may be fairly inferred. The conclusions of law follow as a matter of course. Therefore elaboration of the evidence, and discussion of legal principles seem unnecessary.
And while there is a motion in this cause to dismiss the appeal for failure of appellant to comply with our rules as to assignments of error, which motion is not without merit, we have concluded that the appeal should be disposed of as hereinabove indicated — rather than by dismissal.
Hence, after giving due consideration to the record and case on appeal as presented, the judgment from which appeal is taken is
Affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., not sitting.