Opinion
2:13-cv-00448-JAD-NJK
06-23-2016
Kyle Gotshalk, et al., Plaintiffs v. Peter Hellwig, et al., Defendants
Order Denying Without Prejudice Motion for Default Judgment
[ECF No. 99]
In this securities action, Kyle and Leonard Gotshalk, Clinton Hall, LLC, Richard Maher, and Patrick O'Loughlin sue Peter Hellwig, Anthus Life Corp.,and Stakool Inc., alleging that Hellwig and his alter-ego companies defrauded plaintiffs of their shares and control of defendant-company Stakool. Defaults have been entered against all defendants, and plaintiffs now move for default judgment against them. Because plaintiffs failed to address the Eitel factors in their motion, I deny the motion without prejudice.
ECF No. 4.
ECF Nos. 26, 94.
I find this motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. L.R. 78-1.
Discussion
When the clerk has entered a default against a party, Rules 54(b) and 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the court to enter a default judgment. The Ninth Circuit in Eitel v. McCool set forth seven factors that govern the district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment: (1) potential prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount of money at stake in the action; (5) the potential disputes as to material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong federal policy favoring adjudications on the merits.
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Trustees of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 13 Defined Contribution Pension Trust for S. Nev. v. Tumbleweed Dev., Inc., 2013 WL 143378, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing Eitel).
See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72.
Except for the amount of money at stake and the merits of some of their substantive claims, plaintiffs' motion does not address the Eitel factors. Plaintiffs have thus left me without the guidance and information I need to determine whether a default judgment is warranted. I therefore deny plaintiffs' motion without prejudice to their ability to file a new motion that addresses the Eitel factors and explains why these factors warrant the default judgment that plaintiffs request.
See, e.g., Rimlinger v. Shenyang 245 Factory, 2014 WL 2527147 (D. Nev. June 4, 2014); Neumont Univ., LLC v. Little Bizzy, LLC, 2014 WL 2112938 (D. Nev. May 20, 2014); U.S. S.E.C. v. Brandonisio, 2013 WL 5371626 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2013); Trustees of Teamsters Local 631 Sec. Fund for S. Nev. v. Knox Installation-Dismantling and Services, 2013 WL 4857897 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013). --------
Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for default judgment [ECF No. 99] is DENIED without prejudice.
Dated this 23rd day of June, 2016.
/s/_________
Jennifer A. Dorsey
United States District Judge