Such evidence is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact whether “(1) plaintiff[ ] and defendant ... were acutely aware of the need for further representation[concerning the subject of the alleged malpractice,] i.e., they had a mutual understanding to that effect[ ], and (2) plaintiff[was] under the impression that defendant ... was actively addressing [its] legal needs” with respect to the subject of the alleged malpractice ( Williamson, 9 N.Y.3d at 10, 840 N.Y.S.2d 730, 872 N.E.2d 842). Consequently, the doctrine of continuous representation does not apply, and Supreme Court erred in denying the motion ( see Gotay v. Breitbart, 12 N.Y.3d 894, 884 N.Y.S.2d 677, 912 N.E.2d 1056; see generally Young v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 91 N.Y.2d 291, 295–297, 670 N.Y.S.2d 169, 693 N.E.2d 196). Defendant's remaining contentions are moot in light of our determination.
The fact that defendant law firm was engaged, pursuant to a separate retainer, to defend the plaintiffs in the action by the State of New York, nearly a year after its representation ended with respect to the drafting of the contractual agreements, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether" (1) plaintiff[] and defendant . . . were acutely aware of the need for further representation [concerning the subject of the alleged malpractice,] i.e., they had a mutual understanding to that effect[ ], and (2) plaintiff [was] under the impression that defendant . . . was actively addressing [its] legal needs" with respect to the subject of the alleged malpractice (Williamson, 9 NY3d at 10). Consequently, the doctrine of continuous representation does not apply, and defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted (see generally Gotay v Brietbart, 12 NY3d 894 [2009 ]).