Gotay v. Breitbart

2 Citing cases

  1. R. Brooks Associates, Inc. v. Harter Secrest & Emery LLP

    91 A.D.3d 1330 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    Such evidence is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact whether “(1) plaintiff[ ] and defendant ... were acutely aware of the need for further representation[concerning the subject of the alleged malpractice,] i.e., they had a mutual understanding to that effect[ ], and (2) plaintiff[was] under the impression that defendant ... was actively addressing [its] legal needs” with respect to the subject of the alleged malpractice ( Williamson, 9 N.Y.3d at 10, 840 N.Y.S.2d 730, 872 N.E.2d 842). Consequently, the doctrine of continuous representation does not apply, and Supreme Court erred in denying the motion ( see Gotay v. Breitbart, 12 N.Y.3d 894, 884 N.Y.S.2d 677, 912 N.E.2d 1056; see generally Young v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 91 N.Y.2d 291, 295–297, 670 N.Y.S.2d 169, 693 N.E.2d 196). Defendant's remaining contentions are moot in light of our determination.

  2. Bonaparte v. Lifshutz

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 31720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)

    The fact that defendant law firm was engaged, pursuant to a separate retainer, to defend the plaintiffs in the action by the State of New York, nearly a year after its representation ended with respect to the drafting of the contractual agreements, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether" (1) plaintiff[] and defendant . . . were acutely aware of the need for further representation [concerning the subject of the alleged malpractice,] i.e., they had a mutual understanding to that effect[ ], and (2) plaintiff [was] under the impression that defendant . . . was actively addressing [its] legal needs" with respect to the subject of the alleged malpractice (Williamson, 9 NY3d at 10). Consequently, the doctrine of continuous representation does not apply, and defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted (see generally Gotay v Brietbart, 12 NY3d 894 [2009 ]).