Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant Inc.

13 Citing cases

  1. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Cobb County

    681 F.2d 1327 (11th Cir. 1982)   Cited 16 times
    Stating that indemnification "implies a shifting of the entire loss from the party who paid the judgment to the tortfeasor who should in fairness bear it"

    This provision meant that one tortfeasor could implead a second joint tortfeasor without a judgment's having been entered against the former. Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E.2d 412 (1972). In short, a defendant tortfeasor after 1966 has both a substantive right and procedural mechanism to assert contribution claims against joint tortfeasors.

  2. Riordan v. W.J. Bremer, Inc.

    466 F. Supp. 411 (S.D. Ga. 1979)   Cited 15 times
    Stating simply that the rule against impleader in state contribution action "is procedural and not substantive"

    What Bremer argues is that Hammet registered with the Secretary of State to transact business in Georgia which subjects it to suit even though the cause of action arose outside this State. Jurisdiction over Hammet could not be obtained by service under Georgia's Long-Arm statute since no tortious act or omission was committed in this State. Ga. Code Ann. § 24-113.1(b). If the collision had occurred in Georgia, the law permits resort to that statute in a third-party action for contribution. Gosser v. The Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 622-23, 188 S.E.2d 412. No foreign corporation shall have the right to transact business in Georgia without a certificate of authority to do so from the Secretary of State —"except that when another statute of this State requires foreign corporations of a particular class to qualify thereunder to transact business in this State the requirements of such other statute shall govern."

  3. Continental Casualty Co. v. HSI Financial Services, Inc.

    61 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    They posit that, under Georgia law, Sevy's and Henderson's negligence are independent and concurrent causes for the loss and coverage should be provided. Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E.2d 412, 415-16 (1972); Tallman v. Green, 74 Ga. App. 731, 41 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1947). Because we find that the resolution of this appeal involves a question of Georgia law unanswered by precedent of the Supreme Court of Georgia, we respectfully certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia:

  4. Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co.

    540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976)   Cited 55 times
    Applying Georgia law

    The Georgia courts have held that the fact that two persons owe differing degrees of care or differing duties toward the injured party does not prevent them from being joint tortfeasors. Isom v. Schettino, 129 Ga. App. 73, 199 S.E.2d 89 (1973); Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Piller v. Hanger Cab Co., 115 Ga. App. 260, 154 S.E.2d 420 (1967). Although Georgia has not yet directed its attention to the place of strict liability in this scheme, we think that it would view strict liability as simply a different degree of care owed by the manufacturer.

  5. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Cobb County, Ga.

    523 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    Simpson, Third Party Practice in Georgia, 13 Ga.L.Rev. 13, 20 (1978). The author conspicuously omits reference to "active-passive" negligence but relies upon McMichael v. Georgia Power Co., 133 Ga. App. 593, 211 S.E.2d 632 (1974), and Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E.2d 412 (1972), for his conclusion. This Court's reading of those cases convinces the Court that Mr. Simpson was correct in his analysis and that the above test is the one mandated by Ga. Code Ann. § 105-2012, with the exception, also noted by Simpson elsewhere in his article, that contribution may not be had if the tortious act involved moral turpitude.

  6. Union Camp Corp. v. Helmy

    258 Ga. 263 (Ga. 1988)   Cited 28 times

    At the time these decisions in Wilson, Smith, and Mishoe were rendered, there was not, as now, a statutory mechanism through which the named defendant or defendants could join the remaining joint tort-feasors in the plaintiff's action. See, e.g., Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620 ( 188 S.E.2d 412) (1972); Thornhill v. Bullock, 118 Ga. App. 186 (1) ( 162 S.E.2d 886) (1968); Southern R. Co. v. Allen, 88 Ga. App. 435 (3) ( 77 S.E.2d 277) (1953). Thus, the number of joint tort-feasor/defendants in the suit was a matter generally within the discretion of the plaintiff.

  7. Clyde v. Peterson

    502 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 1 times

    74 Ga. App. 731, 734 ( 41 S.E.2d 339) (1947). 125 Ga. App. 620, 624 ( 188 S.E.2d 412) (1972). In Dept. of Transp. v. Blair, the surviving parent of the deceased passenger sued the DOT for negligent maintenance of a stop sign.

  8. Mayor c. of Savannah v. Southern Bulk

    403 S.E.2d 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 3 times

    ]" (Emphasis in original.) Gosser v. The Diplomat Restaurant, 125 Ga. App. 620, 622 (1) ( 188 S.E.2d 412) (1972). "If [SBI] is not retained in this action and [UCC] receives a judgment [against the City,] the evidence of the transaction [whereby SBI allegedly damaged the City's property] will have to be reduplicated in another lawsuit [between the City and SBI]. The purpose of third-party practice is to avoid this very result.

  9. Atlanta Propeller Service, Inc. v. Hoffmann GMBH & Co. KG

    191 Ga. App. 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 11 times

    It is the place where the allegedly tortious act was committed, out of which the right to contribution arose, which governs the application of the Long Arm Statute to a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnity. See Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, 125 Ga. App. 620 ( 188 S.E.2d 412) (1972). Pursuant to Coe Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., supra, the tortious act occurred either where the allegedly negligent act or omission was made (as to the third-party complaint, West Germany) or where the damage was sustained (Mississippi, the site of the forced landing).

  10. Hyde v. Klar

    168 Ga. App. 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 12 times

    In the present case, if a jury could find that the negligent acts of appellants, if any, combined with those of Klar as a joint tortfeasor caused the injuries to plaintiff, the proper action would be to file a third-party action for contribution so that the court and jury could determine in one action the merits of the plaintiff's claim in light of the third-party action for contribution. In Gosser v. The DiplomatRestaurant, 125 Ga. App. 620, 622 ( 188 S.E.2d 412), it was stated: "`Where the applicable state law permits contribution among joint tortfeasors regardless of whether plaintiff has sued them all in the first instance, it is clear that defendant can bring in other joint tortfeasors in order to enforce his claim for contribution. The fact that contribution may not actually be obtained until the original defendant has been cast in judgment and has paid does not prevent impleader; the impleader judgment may be so fashioned as to protect the rights of the other tortfeasors, so that defendant's judgment over against them may not be enforced until the defendant has paid plaintiff's judgment or more than his proportionate share, whichever the law may require.'" In the present case, Hyde's third-party complaint clearly is based upon potential contribution between joint tortfeasors.