From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Goss v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Mar 27, 2024
C/A 4:24-1032-MGL-TER (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2024)

Opinion

C/A 4:24-1032-MGL-TER

03-27-2024

Jamie Goss, #294885, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, China Wuhan Government, United State Joe Biden, Governor Henry D. McMaster, SCDC Director Bryon P. Stirling, Honorable Seal William Henry, Jr., Circuit Court Judge, Honorable R. Ferrell Cothron, Jr., Circuit Court Judge, Honorable H. Bruce Williams, Appeal Court Judge, Honorable John D. Vinson, Appeal Court Judge, Honorable Stephanie P. McDonald, Appeal Court Judge, Honorable James E. Lockemy, Appeal Court Judge, Honorable Jenny A. Kitching, Clerk Court Judge, Honorable Brenda F. Shealy, Supreme Court Clerk, Jake Gadsden, SCDC Deputy Director, Doctor Alden Physician at Ridgeland, Jerry B. Adger, Director Parole Services, Warden Wallace S.C.D.C., Warden Cohen S.C.D.C., A. Link Globel Tel, General Assembly-Legislative, General Counsel, Attorney General William Blicter, Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, Asst. Solicitor Seth Oskin, Ronald W. Hazzard, Chief Public Defender, Melanie Davis, C.D.C. Director of SCDC, Renee N. Elvis, Horry County Clerk of Court, Sallie Beth Todd, Circuit Court Reporter, Police Officer Brian Triux of Horry County, Police Academy South Carolina, S.C.D.C. Director of Medical Defendants.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge

This is a civil action filed by a state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” “is frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).

This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint may be subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, or conjure up questions never squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.1990) (The “special judicial solicitude” with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's action is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff was ordered by the Court to file an Amended Complaint because deficiencies in the original Complaint would result in a summary dismissal if not remedied by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 5). The original complaint was nearly 400 pages of documents with no named Defendant. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and named a plethora of Defendants. (ECF No. 7).

Plaintiff completed only two pages of the complaint form, the first and last pages. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff never pleads the jurisdiction of this court. Plaintiff does not expressly plead a § 1983 action. Plaintiff has been incarcerated in a state prison since 2007. Plaintiff alleges China engaged in a criminal act by starting Covid-19. (ECF No. 7 at 15). Plaintiff begins his handwritten “statement of case” with reference to his “battle with the courts of Horry County began” in the backdrop of the pandemic. (ECF No. 7 at 16). Plaintiff refers to actions by the Horry County court. (ECF No. 7 at 16). Plaintiff desired compassionate release from the state court system. (ECF No. 7 at 20). Plaintiff notes his state appeal was denied and the appeal denial allegedly violated his rights under Roe v. Wade. (ECF No. 7 at 21). Plaintiff has already filed a habeas action in this court in 2014 and a successive habeas action in 2019. See No. 4:14-cv-1299-MGL and 4:19-cv-111-MGL. Then, Plaintiff's own page numbering starts over and there are typed general headings, like “Shortage of Staff, “Lack of Training,” “Inadequate Hygiene and Healthcare,” “Limited Communication,” “Call for Supreme Court Intervention,” and “Emergency Bail. (ECF No. 7 at 23-29). These typed allegations do not appear to be personal to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 7 at 24). There does appear to be a vague allegation as to Plaintiff himself wanting herbal remedies, but Plaintiff does not state for what. (ECF No. 7 at 27). In the prior order, Plaintiff had already been instructed on Fed. R. Civ. Proc. R. 8, related case law, and causal connection case law. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff requests “emergency bail.” (ECF No. 7 at 29). Plaintiff then attaches numerous documents from the state courts from 2021 and 2023.

As to allegations regarding China and Covid-19, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is frivolous. Plaintiff filed a similar action against China in No. 4:24-cv-791-MGL and this action in part may also be duplicative of that pending action. A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, § 1915 “gives courts the authority to ‘pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations[,]' mean[ing] that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. At 32. The present action is comprised of some factual allegations that appear to be legally baseless. See Boyd v. United States, 773 Fed.Appx. 702, 703 (4th Cir. 2019). Claims against China regarding Covid-19 have been held to be plainly frivolous. Edwards v. Country of China, No. 2:20-CV-01579-CMC-MGB, 2021 WL 4483085, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 30, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4483068 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2021). Also, China is immune from the jurisdiction of courts in the United States pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Id. To the extent Plaintiff references the CARES Act, it in part only provided discretionary relief as to BOP prisoners, not state prisoners and cannot form the basis of relief Plaintiff seeks. Bridgeford v. Bohrer, 2022 WL 17740403, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2022).

This court is not an appeals court for the state courts. Many of Plaintiff's allegations are regarding proceedings in Horry County courts and state appellate courts. Plaintiff filed a third state court post-conviction relief action in 2018 and it was dismissed in 2018.Plaintiff attempted to file a motion for compassionate release in the state courts and was denied in 2021. Plaintiff filed several appeals to the state appellate courts in the 2020s. Plaintiff filed a motion for emergency bond in 2023 in the South Carolina Supreme Court. To the extent Plaintiff's allegations involve claims already pursued in state court, and Plaintiff is attempting to challenge final judgments in prior state court proceedings, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars them. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). To the extent Plaintiff claims any injury caused by errors in state court proceedings, any such state court ruling cannot be reviewed or set aside and such relief cannot be granted by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 413; Feldman, 460 U.S. 462. This prohibition on review of state court proceedings by federal district courts is implicated when a ruling in the plaintiff's favor on his claims in connection with state court proceedings would, necessarily, require the federal court to overrule (or otherwise find invalid) various orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-94 (2005); Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transport., 434 F.3d 712, 719-20 (4th Cir.2006). Because the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is jurisdictional, it may be raised by the court sua sponte. American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). According to the Fourth Circuit, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006).

See generally https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Horry/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx and https://ctrack.sccourts.org/public/caseSearch.do (with search parameters limited by Plaintiff's name). The court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869 at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records); Williams v. Long, No. 07-3459-PWG, 2008 WL 4848362 at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2008) (noting that some courts have found postings on government websites as inherently authentic or self-authenticating).

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to obtain his “freedom” or release from prison by asking for “emergency bail” from a state prison sentence in this civil rights action, he cannot. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 481 (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); and Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 823 (D.S.C. 2008) (release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Plaintiff has already had a habeas action fully adjudicated in this court.

There are many reasons that Plaintiff fails to state a claim as to each individual Defendant named of over thirty Defendants. Plaintiff's statement of the case contains no factual allegations that state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to any of the named defendants. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 565 n. 10. (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiff's focus is on his frustration with the state courts over ten years after he was convicted and that he believes Covid-19 should have resulted in his release before his state sentence was completed. The Court need not engage in an extended discussion of Plaintiff's allegations. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that “abbreviated treatment” is consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of frivolous or “insubstantial claims”)(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). Many Defendants have not been alleged to have committed any personal action against Plaintiff. Many Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff sues solicitors and public defenders that are immune or not acting under color of state law and are subject to summary dismissal. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338-44 (2009); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 470 (4th Cir.2000); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992) (public defender). Many Defendants are not individual persons amendable to suit in a § 1983 action. Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); Preval v. Reno, 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000).

In order to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against any particular state actor, a “causal connection” must exist between the conduct alleged by the plaintiff and the particular defendant named in the suit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159, 166 (1985); Rizzo v. Good, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury resulting from a specific defendant's specific conduct and must show an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977) (for an individual to be liable under § 1983, the Plaintiff must show that the defendant named acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights). Plaintiff here must demonstrate that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 and Harris v. City of Va. Beach, 11 Fed. App'x 212, 215 (4th Cir.2001) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against five defendants when the plaintiff did not allege any of the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his civil rights).

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and this action is subject to summary dismissal.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action with prejudice under § 1915(e) and § 1915A and without issuance and service of process.

It is recommended that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022).

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).


Summaries of

Goss v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Mar 27, 2024
C/A 4:24-1032-MGL-TER (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2024)
Case details for

Goss v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.

Case Details

Full title:Jamie Goss, #294885, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of…

Court:United States District Court, D. South Carolina

Date published: Mar 27, 2024

Citations

C/A 4:24-1032-MGL-TER (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2024)