Goss v. Robinson

Full title: Darrell L. Goss, Plaintiff, v. Kanzora Robinson; Maria Leggins, Division…

Court: United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

Date published: Feb 28, 2023

2:22-cv-00104-BHH-MGB (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2023)

Opinion

2:22-cv-00104-BHH-MGB

02-28-2023

Darrell L. Goss, Plaintiff, v. Kanzora Robinson; Maria Leggins, Division Director, Defendants.

MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Darrell L. Goss (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 31); and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 40); Plaintiff's Motion to Stay (Dkt. No. 38); and Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate (Dkt. No. 39). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. Under this authority, the undersigned is authorized: (1) to review Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and submit a recommendation to the District Judge; (2) to review the Plaintiff's non-dispositive motions (Dkt. Nos. 38; 39; 40) and issue a final ruling on them. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 31). The undersigned further denies Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 40); Plaintiff's Motion to Stay (Dkt. No. 38); and Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate (Dkt. No. 39).

BACKGROUND

This civil action arises from certain restrictions placed on Plaintiff's communications with his alleged common law wife, Sasha Gaskins (“Gaskins”), while they are both inmates housed within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). SCDC has a written policy, SCDC Policy PS 10.08, (“the SCDC policy”) governing inmate-to-inmate correspondence. (Dkt. No. 31-7.) This policy generally bans such correspondence, but it makes an exception for inmates that are, inter alia, “immediate family members.” (Id. at 3.) The SCDC policy requires that inmates prove their relationship to qualify for the family members exception. (Id.) Specifically, “[t]he inmate's relative screen may be used to confirm the relationship; however, if the screen does not confirm the relationship, the requesting inmate will be required to prove the relationship in some other manner.” (Id.)

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that since October 7, 2021, Defendant Agency Mailroom Coordinator Kanzora Robinson has denied Plaintiff's request to correspond with Gaskins as his common law wife. (Dkt. No. 28 at 6-7.) Plaintiff alleges that Robinson has improperly required Plaintiff to prove his common law marriage to Gaskins “by providing documentation (such as joint tax returns, joint bank accounts, etc) prior to July 24, 2019 showing both names, rather than requiring them to prove their common law relationship by mutual assent.” (Id.) Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that since November 19, 2021, Defendant Division Director of Visitation of Drug Testing, Maria Leggins, has denied Plaintiff's request to add Gaskins' name to Plaintiff's SCDC Inmate Relative Screen as Plaintiff's common law wife, so that he can be approved to correspond with her. (Id. at 7-9.) Plaintiff alleges that Leggins has improperly required Plaintiff to prove his common law marriage to Gaskins “by providing documentation (such as joint tax returns, joint bank accounts, etc) prior to July 24, 2019 showing both names, rather than requiring them to prove their common law relationship by mutual assent.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants' requirement of documentation to prove Plaintiff's common law marriage is “contrary to the State of South Carolina's common law marriage statute.” (Id. at 6-9.)

Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for allegedly obstructing his correspondence attempts. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He “seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to have the Court instruct the Defendants to recognize his common law marital status to Sasha Gaskins in accordance with state law, and to approve inmate-correspondence between the two.” (Id. at 9.) He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff filed this action on January 12, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) On September 16, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 31.) On September 19, 2022, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the Motion. (Dkt. No. 32.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on October 11, 2022 (Dkt. No. 34), to which Defendants replied (Dkt. No. 35). On December 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Stay and Motion to Consolidate. (Dkt. Nos. 38; 39.) These Motions involve another case Plaintiff filed in this Court, Goss v. Morley et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-2469-BHH. Defendants filed responses in opposition to both Motions (Dkt. Nos. 41; 42), to which Plaintiff did not file a reply. On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike, seeking to strike the res judicata argument raised in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 40.) Defendants filed a response in opposition (Dkt. No. 43), and Plaintiff did not file a reply.

The Motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants have moved for the dismissal of this action pursuant to Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They submit several exhibits in support of their Motion, which the undersigned considers, below. “When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the [12(b)(6)] motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 26061 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the original). Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Pub'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When a court considers the motion, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).

Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars any §1983 claims for money damages against Defendants in their official capacities; (2) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (3) Plaintiff cannot establish any constitutional violations; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 31-1.) In his response brief, Plaintiff clarifies that he does not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, only injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 34 at 2-3.) Plaintiff further argues that “res judicata does not bar his claims against Defendants in their official capacities and is not applicable to Defendant Leggins in her individual capacity.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (Id. at 4.)

Before analyzing Plaintiff's claims and Defendants' arguments for dismissal, the undersigned first considers the evidence in the record most relevant to the issues at hand.

A. Evidence

1. Inmate Requests and Grievances

The record includes numerous inmate requests and grievances submitted by Plaintiff, requesting to correspond with Gaskins and/or add her to his relative screen. The record also includes inmate requests from Gaskins, requesting to correspond with Plaintiff and/or add him to her relative screen.

On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an inmate request to “Central Classification/Headquarters,” stating that he is attaching “documentation (affidavit) showing that” Gaskins is his common law wife and requesting that she be added to his “relative screen list so [he] can be approved to correspond with her.” (Id. at 18.) The “disposition by staff member” states, inter alia, that “you have to show proof that the 2 of you lived together before you came to prison. Also you can write visitation.” (Id.) An August 13, 2019 Memorandum from the Agency Mailroom Office is addressed to Plaintiff from Shontate Morley¹and states his request to correspond with Gaskins is “disapproved” because “your wife is not listed on your SCDC OMS/Relative list.” (Id. at 14.)

1 Morley was a named defendant in Goss v. Morley et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-2469-BHH.

Gaskins submitted an inmate request on August 15, 2019, asking for “the steps” to add her “husband” on her relative screen. (Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2.) The response to this request states, “You would need to contact Alice Mascio at Central Visitation on the kiosk under visitation. She will be able to give you the steps on getting him added.” (Id.) The record includes an “Internal Inmate Search,” dated May 12, 2020 that shows the relatives listed for Gaskins. (Dkt. No. 34-5 at 2) With an “entry date” of September 11, 2019, “Darrell Goss” is listed as Gaskins' “common-law husband.” (Id.) The record lists Plaintiff's address as a private residence. (Id.)

On September 19, 2019, Plaintiff directed an inmate request to “Shontate Morley/Agency Mailroom Coordinator,” stating that he is “providing you with proof (my affidavit) that” Gaskins is his common law wife and requesting permission to correspond with her. (Id. at 9.) The affidavit is notarized, signed by Plaintiff, and dated June 13, 2019. (Id. at 10.) It states, “On May 9, 2018, me and Sasha Gaskins entered into a mutual agreement of marriage. Therefore, Sasha is my common-law wife and I'm her husband pursuant to South Carolina law (§ 20-1-360).” (Id.) A September 26, 2019 Memorandum from the Agency Mailroom Office is addressed to Goss from Shontate Morley and states his request to correspond with Gaskins is “disapproved” because “you do not have your wife listed on your SCDC OMS/Relative list.” (Id. at 53.)

On November 30, 2019, Gaskins submitted an inmate request asking for permission to correspond with Goss and stating that he is on her relative screen. (Id. at 4.) The response to this request states the request is being denied “because you are not listed on Darrell Goss's SCDC OMS/Relative list.” (Id.)

An October 7, 2021 Memorandum from the Agency Mailroom Office is addressed to Plaintiff from Defendant Robinson and references his request to correspond with Gaskins. Robinson states, “South Carolina no longer recognizes common-law-marriage. Therefore, I am not granting you permission to correspond currently. You will need to provide documentation dated prior to July 24, 2019 showing both names (joint tax returns, joint bank accounts, etc.) to verify the relationship for your request to be reconsidered.” (Dkt. No. 34-3 at 2.)

Plaintiff submitted an inmate request to “Visitation” on November 6, 2021, asking to add Gaskins as his wife to his “SCDC Inmate Relative Screen” and explaining that he is listed as Gaskins' husband on her “relative screen.” (Dkt. No. 34-1 at 2.) Defendant Leggins responded to this request on November 19, 2021, stating verbatim

Inmate Goss, Your request is denied at this time. I am showing that your admission date to SCDC was on 3/3/2009. You advised that you were single and living with your mother. The records show that Inmate Gaskins admission date to SCDC was on 4/1/2011. Inmate Gaskins advised that she was single and living with her mother. An employee updated the relative screen for Inmate Gaskins on 9/11/2019 with your name as her Commo Law Spouse but failed to provide documentation to my office. Common Law marriage was abolished by the South Carolina Supreme Court on July 24, 2019. Anyone common law married before that date is still considered common law married. The definition of a Common Law Marriage is: Individuals (couple) that live together; Share Total Financial Responsibility; and Everyday portray yourselves to the public as husband/wife or husband/husband or wife/wife. Please note that if you are already legally married/common law married, you cannot marry someone else by common law marriage without first obtaining a divorce. The second marriage is void (whether by common law or by marriage license). Unless someone can provide me with documentation dated before 7/24/2019 (lease agreement showing both names/joint bank accounts showing both names/joint loans showing both names/joint tax returns showing both names), the updated information does not meet the criteria of a Common Law Marriage. I will have to update Inmate Gaskins information with NOT COMMON LAW (must verify etc.). regret that this response was not favorable. Thanks. Maria Leggins, Division Director (Visitation and Inmate Drug Testing).

(Id.) The record shows that Leggins updated Gaskins' relative screen on November 19, 2021, with an entry that “Darrell Goss (IM)” is “not related” to Gaskins. (Dkt. No. 34-6 at 2-3.)

2. Specific Allegations and Affidavit Evidence

Because Plaintiff's allegations are specific to each Defendant, the undersigned considers them in turn, along with the relevant affidavit evidence provided by Defendants.

a. Defendant Robinson

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Agency Mailroom Coordinator Robinson violated his constitutional rights since October 7, 2021: (1) “by her action in wrongfully denying Plaintiff's . . . request for approval to inmate-to-inmate correspond with his common law wife”; (2)“by her action in preventing him from being approve[d] for inmate-to-inmate correspond with his wife”; and (3) “by her inaction in failing to recognize or acknowledge Plaintiff's . . . common law marital status to Sasha Gaskins in accordance with the state of South Carolina's marriage law.” (Dkt. No. 28 at 6-7.)

In her affidavit, Robinson avers that she is “charged with the responsibility of enforcing” SCDC policies and references SCDC Policy PS 10.08. (Dkt. No. 31-3 at 1-2.) She avers that SCDC has denied Plaintiff's requests to correspond with Gaskins “due to the inmates' not having each other listed in their information.” (Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).) She explains,

SCDC uses two different systems to verify an inmate's relationship. The SCDC internal inmate search for Mr. Goss has a ‘no wife' entry dated 2/20/12. We then check for an inmate's relatives in the SCDC Offender Management System (OMS); Mr. Goss does not have Sasha Gaskins listed as an immediate family member on his OMS Relative Screen.

(Id.) Robinson further avers

As the agency's Mail Room Coordinator, I do not have the ability to add, edit, or delete any information pertaining to an inmate's family member(s) or their marital status in the Offender Management System. From my understanding, the only employees who can do this are employees who initially enter this information at R&E or Visitation and Classification.

(Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).)

b. Defendant Leggins

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the Division Director of Visitation and Inmate Drug Testing, Leggins, violated his constitutional rights since November 19, 2021: (1) “by her action in wrongfully denying Plaintiff's . . . request to add his common law wife['s] . . . name to his SCDC Inmate Relative Screen so that he can be approve[d] to inmate-to-inmate correspond with her”; (2) “by her action in preventing him from being approve[d] for inmate-to-inmate correspond with his wife”; and (3) “by her inaction in failing to recognize or acknowledge Plaintiff's . . . common law marital status to Sasha Gaskins in accordance with the state of South Carolina's marriage law.” (Dkt. No. 28 at 8-9.)

In her affidavit, Leggins avers that she has served as SCDC's Division Director of Visitation and Inmate Drug Testing since April 1, 2020, and in that position she is responsible for, inter alia, “updating and modifying an Inmate's relative screen when appropriate documentation has been submitted for [her] review.” (Dkt. No. 31-4 at 1.) Leggins avers that after she received Plaintiff's request to add Gaskins' name to his relative screen, she investigated the issue and determined the following:

I/M Goss' admission date to SCDC was 3/3/2009 at which time he advised SCDC that he was single and living with his mother; I/M Gaskins' admission date to SCDC was 4/1/2011 and she also advised SCDC that she was single and living with her mother; On 9/11/2019, a SCDC employee updated I/M Gaskins' Relative Screen listing I/M Goss as her ‘Commo[n] Law Spouse' but failed to provide any documentation to support this change.

(Id. at 2.)

Leggins avers that after she responded to Plaintiff's inmate request on November 19, 2021, advising him “of the above findings relative to his request” and stating she needed documentation proving his common law marriage to Gaskins, she “received nothing further from him or I/M Gaskins as far as documentation proving their common law marriage.” (Id.) Leggins avers that as a result, she “updated I/M Gaskins' Relative Screen to reflect that I/M Goss was not a relative.” (Id.) She avers that “As of the signing of this Affidavit, I have received nothing from I/M Goss or I/M Gaskins, or anyone else, providing me with any proof of their common law marriage, whether by legal documents, banking records, tax forms, or any other proof of ‘mutual assent.'” (Id. at 2 3.) According to Leggins,

While I do have the authority to update and modify an Inmate's Relative Screen, I have to have some proof of relationship between the Inmate and another individual. Otherwise, it would create havoc, serious institutional security concerns, and render the Inmate-to-Inmate Correspondence policy meaningless if Inmates were essentially allowed to create their own ‘Relatives' list. If I/M Goss and/or I/M Gaskins were to provide the requested proof of their common law marriage before July 24, 2019, I could have the information verified through SCDC Office of General Counsel and, if acceptable to Legal, I would update both Inmates' Relative Screens to reflect their common law marriage. Although he has been informed of my request for further documentation to prove his relationship with Inmate Gaskins, to date I have received nothing further from Mr. Goss. I do not monitor inmate-to-inmate correspondence, nor do I, in my role as Division Director of Vistation and Inmate Drug Testing, restrict inmate-to-inmate correspondence.

(Id. at 3.)

Having considered Plaintiff's allegations and the pertinent evidence, the undersigned turns to Defendants' arguments for dismissal.²

2 Because Plaintiff has clarified he does not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the undersigned does not address Defendants' argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars any §1983 claims for money damages against them in their official capacities.

B. Doctrine of Res Judicata

As noted above, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims in this action are barred under the doctrine of res judicata because he previously “brought an identical action” in this Court. (Dkt. No. 31-1 at 7.) More specifically, Defendants assert that in Goss v. Morley, Case No. 2:19-cv-2469-BHH (“Morley”), Plaintiff claimed “that SCDC officials were denying him due process and his First Amendment right to correspond with his alleged common-law-wife, Inmate Gaskins.” (Id.)

“Res judicata precludes the assertion of a claim after a judgment on the merits in a prior suit by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991). Res judicata applies when there is: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior lawsuit; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and later suits; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits. Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2004). Whether a prior federal court judgment precludes litigation of claims in a subsequent federal court action between the same parties is determined by federal common law. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law.”).

1. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Res Judicata Argument (Dkt. No. 40)

Before considering whether Plaintiff's current claims are barred under the res judicata doctrine, the undersigned first addresses Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. In a separate Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to strike “Defendants' defense of res judicata as insufficient because at the time of their pleading, res judicata was inapplicable as there was no final judgment in the prior suit [Morley] until October 12, 2022, when the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied rehearing.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 1.) Here, the pleading at issue is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on September 16, 2022. (Dkt. No. 31.) Plaintiff asserts his Motion should be granted pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.)

Rule 12(f) allows the court to strike pleadings of “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) motions to strike “are generally viewed with disfavor ‘because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.'” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1380, 647 (2d ed. 1990)). Whether to grant a motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is within the sound discretion of the court. Palmetto Pharm. LLC v. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP, No. 2:11-cv-00807-SB-JDA, 2012 WL 6025756, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2012) (citation omitted); Xerox Corp. v. ImaTek, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 241, 243 (D. Md. 2003).

The record in Morley shows that Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on August 9, 2022, and thereafter denied Plaintiff's motion for rehearing on October 20, 2022. Case No. 2:19-cv-2469-BHH, Dkt. Nos. 198; 198-1. There is no basis to strike Defendants' res judicata argument under Rule 12(f), and the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 40).

2. Application of Res Judicata Doctrine

Upon review, the undersigned cannot find that dismissal based on res judicata is appropriate here, where the claims at issue in this action arose after the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims in Morley. This Court recently considered “what the relevant time period should be for claims that ‘could have been brought' for claims-preclusion purposes.” Busha v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, No. 6:18-cv-2337-DCC-KDW, 2020 WL 6218803, at *5 (D.S.C. May 18, 2020), adopted in part sub nom. Busha v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 2020 WL 5793357 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2020). The Court summarized the relevant case law as follows:

The undersigned is not aware of a case in which the Fourth Circuit has clearly considered what the relevant time period should be for claims that “could have been brought” for claims-preclusion purposes. E.g. Clodfelter v. Republic of Sudan, 720 F.3d 199, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2013) (declining to “decide whether the relevant time period for a newly articulated claim to satisfy the exception to res judicata is the point at which the complaint is filed in the previous case ... or the entire pendency of that case” because it found “res judicata should not apply ... for three independent reasons”). Nonetheless, several published Fourth Circuit decisions suggest that the better rule is to apply claim preclusion only to those matters that had taken place by the time the complaint in the first matter was filed. See Young-Henderson v. Spartanburg Area Mental Health Ctr., 945 F.2d 770, 774 (4th Cir. 1991) (“While we doubt that the [rule that two causes of action are the same if they arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions] was intended to preclude claims that could not have been brought at the time the first complaint was filed,

we need not reach that issue ....”); Id. at 774 n.3 (“ ‘Most cases assume that an action need include only the portions of the claim due at the time of commencing that action.'”) (citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Claim Preclusion § 4409)). The Fourth Circuit has also found res judicata inapplicable to acts occurring after the first suit has been filed because “a plaintiff need not ‘expand its suit in order to add a claim that it could not have asserted at the time suit was commenced.'” Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 554 n.2 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting NBN Broad., Inc. v. Sheridan Broad. Networks, Inc., 105 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1997)). Further, commentators Wright and Miller posit that “[t]he better rule is that a claim for damages need include only matters arising out of injuries inflicted before the action is filed.” Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4409 Claim Preclusion-Continuing and Renewed Conduct. Further, the commentators indicate that “an action need include only the portions of the claim due at the time of commencing that action, frequently observing that the opportunity to file a supplemental complaint is not an obligation.” Id. ([collecting cases]).

Id. Upon consideration of, inter alia, the above case law, and the “nonmandatory nature of supplementing a pleading to include events that took place subsequent to the filing of litigation,” the Court found that res judicata should not apply to foreclose consideration of claims that arose after the Busha plaintiff's prior case had commenced. Id.

Here, Plaintiff's claims are based on conduct that arose only after his prior case was dismissed; namely these Defendants' rejections of his requests to correspond with Gaskins and/or add her to his relative screen due to Plaintiff's inability to verify his common law marriage.³Notably, in the prior action, Plaintiff failed to produce “any evidence to show that he requested the required change from the Visitation and Classification authorities at SCDC.” Morley, Dkt. No. 189 at 8. Unlike in this action, the “operative facts” in Morley did not include an appeal to and rejection by SCDC personnel with the authority to add Gaskins to Plaintiff's inmate relative screen. Pueschel, 369 F.3d at 355 (“The determination of whether two suits arise out of the same cause of action, however, does not turn on whether the claims asserted are identical. Rather, it turns on whether the suits and the claims asserted therein ‘arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions or the same core of operative facts.'” (quoting In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996))). Further, in the prior action, it was noted that to the extent SCDC officials did not believe Plaintiff and Gaskins qualified as common law spouses “and this is the basis for the continued denial of Plaintiffs' communication requests, this position has not been clearly communicated to [them].” Morley, Dkt. No. 180 at 21 n.5. Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Defendants denied his requests unequivocally on the basis that he had not verified his status as Gaskins' common law husband. (Dkt. No. 34-1 at 2; 34-3 at 2.) Indeed, Plaintiff's claims in this action center on Defendants' alleged refusal to allow him to prove his common law marriage to Gaskins “by mutual assent” rather than by documentation.

3 Defendants Robinson and Leggins were not involved in the prior case.

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends res judicata should not apply to foreclose consideration of the merits of Plaintiff's claims in this action.

C. Individual Capacity Claims

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Agency Mailroom Coordinator Robinson violated his constitutional rights since October 7, 2021: (1) “by her action in wrongfully denying Plaintiff's . . . request for approval to inmate-to-inmate correspond with his common law wife”; (2)“by her action in preventing him from being approve[d] for inmate-to-inmate correspond with his wife”; and (3) “by her inaction in failing to recognize or acknowledge Plaintiff's . . . common law marital status to Sasha Gaskins in accordance with the state of South Carolina's marriage law.” (Dkt. No. 28 at 6-7.) Similarly, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that the Division Director of Visitation and Inmate Drug Testing, Leggins, violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights since November 19, 2021: (1) “by her action in wrongfully denying Plaintiff's . . . request to add his common law wife['s] . . . name to his SCDC Inmate Relative Screen so that he can be approve[d] to inmate-to-inmate correspond with her”; (2) “by her action in preventing him from being approve[d] for inmate-to-inmate correspond with his wife”; and (3) “by her inaction in failing to recognize or acknowledge Plaintiff's . . . common law marital status to Sasha Gaskins in accordance with the state of South Carolina's marriage law.” (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff alleges the above conduct violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment and his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.)

1. Standards

a. First Amendment Right to Free Speech

“[T]he First Amendment entitles a prisoner to receive and send mail, subject only to the institution's right to censor letters or withhold delivery if necessary to protect institutional security, and if accompanied by appropriate safeguards.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 547 (1984); see also King v. Holder, No. 5:13-CT-3179-FL, 2014 WL 4701924, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 22, 2014) (“Civil detainees have a First Amendment right of free speech and to send and receive mail.”) aff'd, 591 Fed.Appx. 204 (4th Cir. 2015). “It is well settled that the Constitution allows greater restriction of First Amendment rights in a prison setting.” Temple v. Oconee Cty., No. 6:13-cv-144-JFA-KFM, 2014 WL 4417702, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2014), aff'd, 595 Fed.Appx. 246 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006)); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (“Many of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.”); Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). In Turner v. Safley, the Court found that a prison regulation infringing on an inmate's constitutional rights is valid so long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 482 U.S. at 89. Courts accord “substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 132; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1974).

b. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Relevant here, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the marital relationship, including during incarceration. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2599-600 (2015) (discussing contours of the constitutional right to marriage); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (explaining Due Process Clause provides for a “constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison context”). However, a prison regulation or administrative decision impinging on inmates' constitutional rights can be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 96-99; Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Nigl v. Litscher, 940 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019) (applying Turner test to prison administration ruling barring plaintiff from marrying former prison employee).

c. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause thus directs that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). To establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff “must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination”; once this showing is made, “the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)); see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (asserting that strict scrutiny, not the Turner factors, is the proper standard of review for equal protection challenges to a state prison's policy of racially segregating prisoners for an introductory period following entrance to a new correctional facility). To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must set forth “specific, non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper motive.” Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 584 (4th Cir. 2003). “[M]ere conclusory assertions” of discriminatory intent are insufficient. Id.

d. South Carolina Common Law Marriage

In addition to the above constitutional standards, this case centers on Plaintiff's understanding of common law marriage in South Carolina. Accordingly, the undersigned devotes some explanation here.

South Carolina has recognized common law marriage since at least 1832. See Fryer v. Fryer, 9 S.C. Eq. 85, 92 (1832). Whether a common-law marriage exists is a question of law. Campbell v. Christian, 110 S.E.2d 1, 2 (S.C. 1959). The party seeking to establish the existence of a common law marriage carries the burden of proof. Ex parte Blizzard, 193 S.E. 633, 634 (S.C. 1937). In South Carolina, the legality of common law marriage has traditionally been recognized as an exception to the general requirement to obtain a marriage license, as codified at S.C. Code § 20-1-360, which provides that “[n]othing . . . shall render illegal any marriage contracted without the issuance of a license.”⁴ Id.

4 The Supreme Court of South Carolina abolished common law marriage as of April 2019. Stone v. Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266, 270 (S.C. 2019). The court in Stone declined to apply its ruling retroactively. Because Plaintiff alleges a common law marriage occurring prior to April 2019, the decision in Stone has no impact on this case.

In order for a common law marriage to occur, the parties must have the capacity to be married and must have the present intent to enter into a marriage contract. Tarnowski v. Lieberman, 560 S.E.2d 438, 440 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). An express contract is not always necessary as the intent to be married can be inferred from the circumstances. Kirby v. Kirby, 241 S.E.2d 415, 416 (S.C. 1978). Cohabitation, however, is required. See Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., No. 2011-UP-242, 2011 WL 11734353, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. June 23, 2011) (“In South Carolina, common law marriage requires cohabitation accompanied by a present intent to be husband and wife.”) (citing Baker v. Baker, 499 S.E.2d 503, 507 (S.C. Ct.App.1998) (recognizing mutual understanding and intent are essential to the existence of a common law marriage); Callen v. Callen, 624 S.E.2d 59, 62 (S.C. 2005) (indicating that cohabitation combined with holding one's self out as married, creates a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a common law marriage)), aff'd, 757 S.E.2d 399 (S.C. 2014).

It is essential to a common law marriage that a mutual agreement exists between the parties to assume toward each other the relationship of husband and wife. Johnson v. Johnson, 112 S.E.2d 647, 651 (S.C. 1960). “The fact finder is to look for mutual assent: the intent of each party to be married to the other and a mutual understanding of each party's intent.” Callen, 620 S.E.2d at 62. Direct evidence of the requisite intent, such as a public declaration that the couple is entering into a contract of marriage, however, may not be readily available. See Johnson, 112 S.E.2d at 652 (explaining the facts “evidencing a mutual agreement to live together as husband and wife, and not in concubinage . . . are often difficult of ascertainment where the intent of the parties has not been formally and publicly declared”) (citation omitted). Thus, the existence of a common law marriage frequently is proved by circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidence typically relied on to establish a common-law marriage includes evidence establishing that the parties have lived together for an extended period of time and have publicly held themselves out as husband and wife. See, e.g., Kirby, 241 S.E.2d at 417 (finding common-law marriage where parties represented themselves as husband and wife in their community, filed joint income tax returns, and appeared as husband and wife on children's birth certificates); Owens v. Owens, 466 S.E.2d 373, 375 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (finding common-law marriage where, among other things, the parties held themselves out as husband and wife, entered into contracts together, and opened a checking account as husband and wife); cf. Cathcart v. Cathcart, 414 S.E.2d 811, 812 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no common-law marriage where parties testified they did not intend to be married to each other, and parties did not refer to each other as husband and wife, did not file joint tax returns, and did not receive mail at the same address).

With this background, the undersigned turns to the merits Plaintiff's claims.

2. Analysis

The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, does not establish any constitutional violation by Defendants. Plaintiff's claims against both Defendants hinge on their alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to prove his common law relationship “by mutual assent” rather than by documentation, in order to correspond with inmate Gaskins. According to Plaintiff, by “submitting requests [to SCDC officials] for correspondence privileges with each other indicating that they're common law married,” Plaintiff and Gaskins established their “mutual assent” to be common law spouses.⁵(Dkt. No. 34 at 5.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants' requirement of documentation contradicts South Carolina law regarding common law marriage.

5 While the Court need not reach this issue to resolve Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff appears to misunderstand the type of evidence required to establish a common law marriage in South Carolina. See section C.1.d, supra. Cohabitation is required to establish a common law marriage, and there is no evidence Plaintiff ever lived with Gaskins.

Defendant Leggins has averred that the documentation requirement she articulated to Plaintiff serves a critical screening mechanism. She avers, “it would create havoc, serious institutional security concerns, and render the Inmate-to-Inmate Correspondence policy meaningless if Inmates were essentially allowed to create their own ‘Relatives' list.” (Dkt. No. 314 at 3.) She explains, “If I/M Goss and/or I/M Gaskins were to provide the requested proof of their common law marriage before July 24, 2019, I could have the information verified through SCDC Office of General Counsel and, if acceptable to Legal, I would update both Inmates' Relative Screens to reflect their common law marriage.” (Id.) Caselaw supports that a documentation requirement such as this one does not raise constitutional concerns, as it is rationally related to a legitimate penological purpose to prevent an inundation of unsubstantiated inmate correspondence requests. See Maxwell/G-Doffee v. Golden, 2011 WL 6740557, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 17, 2011) (finding no constitutional violation by application of correspondence policy requiring that the plaintiff “must produce a valid marriage certificate or other similar documentation” to correspond with another inmate purported to be his wife; “The Court finds that this requirement is not arbitrary, and is reasonably related to legitimate security interests, because any male inmate could claim to be ‘married' to any female inmate (and vice versa) in order to enable the flow of correspondence between inmates at different units.”); Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905, 915-16 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (rejecting claims that prison officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of inmates' marriage and to grant them a spousal exemption to the rule that inmates could not correspond with each other violated their equal protection and due process rights”); Maldonado v. Bruce, 2008 WL 5435315, at *2 (D. Mont. July 16, 2008) (a restriction on a prisoner's First Amendment right to send and receive mail from his incarcerated common law wife, without proof of legal marriage, was reasonable where the restriction prevented unauthorized correspondence between male and female prisons); Mary of Oakknoll v. Coughlin, 101 A.D.2d 931, 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (1984) (finding no constitutional violation in administration of a “marriage license” requirement; rejecting argument that “respondent failed to employ the proper legal standard in assessing the validity of their spousal relationship”; finding the requirement “is intended to serve as a screening mechanism to prevent the reunion program from being inundated with inmate applications claiming persons to be their spouses without supporting documentation. Clearly, this requirement has a rational basis in that it promotes administrative convenience and efficiency by providing an operative standard for eligibility.”).

Given the legitimate penological interests supporting the documentation requirement at issue, there is no basis to find Defendants violated Plaintiff's First Amendment right to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”); LaSure v. Gore, 2009 WL 1748718, at *6-7 (D.S.C. 2009) (finding that an inmate's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated when prison officials confiscated mail he received from another inmate, since mail between inmates violated prison policy and the offender failed to provide evidence that he was granted permission to correspond with the inmate); Owens v. Padula, 2007 WL 2116440, at *2 (D.S.C. 2007) (“A prison regulation prohibiting correspondence between inmates is reasonably related to valid corrections goals and does not abridge the First Amendment rights of inmates.”).

Further, while Plaintiff argues he was treated differently than Gaskins because she was able to add Plaintiff to her inmate screen as her common law husband, such allegations do not establish an equal protection claim. (Dkt. No. 34 at 6-7.) Plaintiff has not alleged he was treated differently based on his membership in a protected class. Thus, the alleged differences in treatment are presumed valid and will be upheld if “reasonably related to any legitimate penological interests.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “[w]hen the state classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, [ ] special concerns are implicated”). As discussed above, Defendants have established that the documentation requirement bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. Plaintiff's equal protection claim therefore fails.

Also, as soon as it was discovered that Gaskins did not submit the required documentation with her request to add Plaintiff as her common law husband, Gaskins' screen was updated to show that Plaintiff was not a relative. (Dkt. No. 31-4 at 2.) Accordingly, the documentation requirement has now been applied to both Gaskins and Plaintiff. The fact that an SCDC official previously approved Gaskins' request without the requisite documentation is not binding on Defendants or any other SCDC official. See Howard v. Keohane, 898 F.Supp. 459, 462 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (“The fact that [a prison official] . . . previously approved Plaintiffs' request to correspond with each other on the basis that they were common-law spouses . . . is not binding on this Court. It is clear that Warden Hall's approval of such correspondence was in violation of BOP Program Statement 5265.08 Further, Warden Hall's decision to permit Plaintiffs to correspond was not binding on Warden Hambrick or any other BOP official.”).

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has not shown a constitutional violation based on Defendants' refusal to: (1) approve Plaintiff's request to correspond with Gaskins as his common law wife without the requisite documentation; and/or (2) to add Gaskins to Plaintiff's inmate screen as his common law wife without the requisite documentation. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages under § 1983.⁶

6 Because the undersigned finds no questions of fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the undersigned does not address Defendants' qualified immunity argument. See Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

D. Injunctive Relief

As noted, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in addition to compensatory and punitive damages. (Dkt. No. 28.) While the Amended Complaint asks for a permanent injunction, it appears at that stage in the litigation Plaintiff would be seeking a preliminary injunction. The standard for a permanent injunction is essentially the same as a preliminary injunction, except that a plaintiff must show actual success on the merits. Smith v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 901 F.Supp.2d 639, 649 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2012). “Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001).

To establish the need for a preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must show: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending a resolution on the merits of a case. See Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 180 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1960)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, nor has he made a showing of actual success on the merits. Further, Plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to suffer any irreparable harm. Nor has Plaintiff made a showing that the balance of equities tip in his favor or that any injunctive relief is in the public interest. Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying any request for injunctive relief.

E. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay and Motion to Consolidate (Dkt. Nos. 38; 39)

Finally, in separate motions, Plaintiff has moved “to consolidate this action with his prior case” and to stay this action “pending a decision to reopen his prior suit.” (Dkt. Nos. 38; 39.) Here, Plaintiff is referring to Morley, Case No. 2:19-cv-2469-BHH. In the Motion to Stay, Plaintiff asserts that he has filed a “motion to reopen his prior case” in Morley, and he argues that the Court should stay this action until that motion to reopen is resolved. (Dkt. No. 38.) In his Motion to Consolidate, Plaintiff asserts this action and Morley should be consolidated because they “involve a common question of law and fact.” (Dkt. No. 39.) The record shows that Morley is not an active case-Plaintiff's claims have been dismissed and the case is closed. Further, the District Judge has denied Plaintiff's motion to reopen that case. Accordingly, the undersigned finds Plaintiff's Motions to be without merit. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay and Motion to Consolidate are therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 31.)

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Additionally, based on the foregoing, the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 40), Motion to Stay (Dkt. No. 38), and Motion to Consolidate (Dkt. No. 39).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4^th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

Post Office Box 835

Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).