Opinion
2:21-cv-01090-RBH-MGB
04-11-2023
Darrell L. Goss, Sr., #305517, Plaintiff, v. Edward Moultrie, Ann Sheppard, Jake Gadsden, Jr., and Mike Brown, in their individual capacities, and Brian Kendall and Bryan Stirling in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 87.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this civil action on April 13, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.) In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that since May 9, 2019 and continuing to the present date, Defendants Warden Brian Kendall (“Kendall”), Associate Warden Ann Sheppard (“Sheppard”), and Chaplain Edward Moultrie (“Moultrie”) have been violating his constitutional rights by refusing to allow him to attend “in person” Sunday morning worship service “with fellow believers” at Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber”). (Dkt. No. 56 at 7.) According to Plaintiff, such conduct violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), and Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 7-8.)
Plaintiff also claims that since May 9, 2019 and continuing to the present date, Defendants Director Bryan Stirling, Deputy Director Jake Gadsden, Jr., and Chief of Pastoral Care Services Mike Brown have been violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights “by failing to hire and/or maintain adequate staffing (chaplains and officers)” for Sunday morning worship service at Lieber. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff claims that this conduct violates RLUIPA and his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 9-10.)
On October 7, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 87.) On October 11, 2022, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 88.) Plaintiff responded to the motion on November 22, 2022, and filed a supplemental response on December 5, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 103; 107.) On December 6, 2022, Defendants filed a reply brief, to which Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on December 15, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 108; 109.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Pub'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “‘against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'” Phillips v. Nlyte Software Am. Ltd., 615 Fed.Appx. 151, 152 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
When a court considers the motion, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” News & Observer Pub'g Co., 597 F.3d at 576 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Lane & Roderick, Inc., 736 Fed. App'x 400, 400 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, this standard must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of RLUIPA or a violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983; (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to any alleged violations; and (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 87-1.) In response, Plaintiff concedes that his claim for injunctive relief is “now moot” because “he was transferred from Lieber to Lee prison on October 13, 2022.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 13.) Plaintiff asserts that questions of fact preclude summary judgment as to his remaining claims. (Id. at 7-14.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred from Lee to Evans Correctional Institution on February 17, 2023. See SCDC Inmate Search, http://www.doc.sc.gov/InmateSearchDisclaimer.html (last visited April 5, 2023); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
As an initial matter, RLUIPA “only provides equitable relief to prisoners.” Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 113 (4th Cir. 2023). Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims center on: (1) Defendants' alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to attend “in person” Sunday morning worship service “with fellow believers” at Lieber; and (2) Defendants' alleged failure “to hire and/or maintain adequate staffing (chaplains and officers)” for Sunday morning worship service at Lieber. (Dkt. No. 56 at 8-9.) The record shows that Plaintiff is no longer housed at Lieber and, by Plaintiff's own account, his claim for injunctive relief is now moot based on his transfer out of Lieber. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends any claim for injunctive relief and therefore any claim under RLUIPA is moot. See, e.g., Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 113-14 (“Because Firewalker-Fields was transferred out of Middle River [Regional Jail] to long-term imprisonment in the Virginia Department of Corrections, any injunctive relief and therefore any claim under RLUIPA is moot.”); Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there.”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and violations of RLUIPA.
Given the foregoing recommendation, Plaintiff's only remaining claims are for alleged constitutional violations. The undersigned considers these claims below.
A. Relevant Legal Standards
1. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects officers from liability for “bad guesses in gray areas” and bases liability on the violation of bright-line rules. Id. (quoting Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 2011)). “Qualified immunity provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the court applies “a familiar two-step inquiry.” Harris v. Pittman, No. 17-7308, 2019 WL 2509240, at *10 (4th Cir. June 18, 2019) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). At step one, courts ask “whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the police officer's actions violated a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Meyers v. Balt. Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013). “At step two, the question is whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the time of the officer's conduct.” Id. (quoting Meyers, 713 F.3d at 731). District court and court of appeals judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (2009).
2. First Amendment
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment applies to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990). It provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. Amend. I. A detainee or prisoner has a First Amendment right to free exercise of religion while in prison. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To state a claim for violation of rights under the Free Exercise Clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a sincere belief in a religion; and (2) a prison practice or policy that places a substantial burden on the plaintiff's ability to practice that religion. See Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 168 (4th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing that the government's actions substantially burdened his exercise of religion. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015). Moreover, a prisoner must show a “conscious or intentional interference” with his rights; mere negligence is insufficient. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 194-95, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Amended Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment “right to freely exercise his religion” and his Fourteenth Amendment “right to due process of law to freely exercise his religion.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 7-8.)
A substantial burden is placed upon a prisoner's religious exercise when a practice “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Nevertheless, prison restrictions that impact on First Amendment rights may be constitutional if they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 91 (1987). This standard “affords less protection to inmates' free exercise rights than does RLUIPA.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199-200. In deciding whether there is a reasonable relation between the policy and asserted interest served by it, courts should examine:
(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation or action and the interest asserted by the government, or whether this interest is “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational”; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the right ... remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what impact the desired accommodation would have on security staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there exist any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation or action.Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 499 (4th Cir. 2014); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-92.
In weighing these factors, the court must “respect the determinations of prison officials.” United States v. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, the court also must avoid “the micromanagement of prisons,” id. at 99, and instead “accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). “The burden is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 115 (quoting Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015)). Because plaintiff bears that burden, moreover, he also must allege facts in his complaint sufficient to show that the policy at issue lacked a “rational relation to legitimate penological interests.” Desper v. Clarke, 1 F.4th 236, 244 (4th Cir. 2021).
B. Evidence
Defendants have submitted certain affidavit testimony in support of their motion, and Plaintiff has submitted a declaration..
While the parties submitted additional evidence in support of their briefing, the undersigned summarizes the most relevant evidence below.
1. Defendant Brian Kendall
Defendant Brian Kendall has been the Warden of Lieber since October of 2019. (Dkt. No. 87-2 at 1.) Kendall avers that “[o]n average, Lieber houses between 750 and 850 inmates.” (Id.) In his affidavit, Kendall summarizes Plaintiff's housing history during the relevant time period, stating that Plaintiff was housed in the Restorative Housing Unit (“LRU”) from May 2019 through April 2022. (Id.) He explains that LRU “houses inmates who have either requested protective custody or have been deemed in need of protective custody for their own safety.” (Id. at 5.) Kendall continues,
Inmates in protective custody cannot be allowed in General Population because of the serious risk to the LRU inmate's safety. This means that LRU inmates cannot be anywhere that is open to general population unless the rest of the 900-plus inmates at Lieber are placed in lockdown. Because of this, inmates in LRU are not able to eat in the cafeteria with the other inmates, are not allowed to be in the gym or the recreation fields, and are not able to be out in the general population yard. Again, these restrictions are for the LRU inmate's safety and security as well as for the safety and security of the institution.(Id. at 6.)
According to Kendall, Plaintiff assaulted an officer within LRU in May of 2022, and he was placed in disciplinary detention in the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”). After his disciplinary detention was completed, Plaintiff was not allowed to return to LRU. He was placed in general population at Lieber on May 25, 2022. Plaintiff then stabbed another inmate on May 26, 2022, and he was placed back in RHU. After his disciplinary detention was completed, Plaintiff was released back to general population.. (Id. at 2.) Kendall avers that while in RHU, Plaintiff was “single celled and was not allowed to be around other inmates.” (Id.) He explains,
In his response brief, Plaintiff disputes “the allegations regarding Plaintiff's alleged assaultive behavior during his time in LRU and in the general population at Lieber.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 2.) While Plaintiff disputes the alleged conduct that resulted in his movement from LRU, he does not dispute Kendall's account of where Plaintiff was moved within Lieber during this time.
The prohibition against congregation is true for all inmates in RHU, but is especially important when an inmate has violently assaulted another inmate or staff member. Inmates in RHU are not allowed on the yard, in the cafeteria, in the chapel or anywhere else that general population inmates may be. They are also not allowed to congregate with other inmates in RHU or in LRU.(Id.)
With respect to Plaintiff's claims in this action, Kendall explains the impact that staffing shortages and the COVID-19 pandemic have had on prison life:
Before my arrival at Lieber in October 2019, Sunday morning Christian worship services were held on occasion for general population inmates. However, since my arrival at Lieber, severe staffing shortages have required all inmates at Lieber to be in their cells on Sunday mornings. Therefore, no inmates at Lieber have been able to attend Sunday morning worship services since October 2019. However, for inmates in general population in pre-pandemic time and currently, Christian worship services are held on the first and second Wednesday of the month, and Christian bible study is held every Tuesday.
The restriction on inmate movement, inmate and inmate gatherings has been further complicated by the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to March 2020, Lieber had volunteer groups coming into the institution every day of the week, Monday through Friday, to provide in person religious programming to a variety of religious denominations. When the pandemic arrived, SCDC placed restrictions on visitors and volunteers entering institutions.
From March 2020 until June or July 2022, visitors and volunteers were not allowed inside Lieber. This prohibition was put in place for the health, safety, and security of the inmates, staff, and visitors at Lieber.
Since the restrictions on visitors has been lifted, Lieber has tried to restart and build back up its volunteer programs. However, due to hesitation from previous volunteers and at least two mandatory quarantines since July 2022, the process of bringing back volunteers has been slow.
Lieber works hard to ensure that sufficient staff are present on a daily basis but this is a difficult task. Staffing levels are lower on weekends than on weekdays. Further, staff call outs due to illness or other emergencies, such as covid-19 exposure, exacerbate this issue. On an average Sunday morning, Lieber has only enough officers on shift to cover the most essential posts. These officers are responsible for providing the safety and security of the eight hundred plus inmates at Lieber.
In order for there to be a gathering of inmates, religious or otherwise, one officer is required to be present to monitor the gathering, and there must be sufficient officers available to serve as an emergency response team in the event of a fight, an assault on an officer, a riot, etc.(Id. at 2-3.)
Kendall claims that Plaintiff's “demand for a Sunday morning worship service in LRU or in general population would create a substantial burden on the safety and security of Lieber” because “[i]t would require Lieber to pull the limited officers available from their posts and would seriously jeopardize the safety of the staff and inmates at Lieber.” (Id. at 3.) Kendall continues,
Despite state-wide efforts by SCDC to hire more officers, staffing levels at institutions across the state have remained low. SCDC has provided incentives, such as raising the minimum salary, but this has not resulted in the necessary qualified applicants to sufficiently staff institutions.
Lieber takes every effort to allow inmates to practice their respective religion. SCDC provides tablets with religious programming and provides a full time Chaplain to provide religious services to inmates. Additionally, as resources, staffing, and safety concerns permit, Lieber sets up worship services for various religions.
While Lieber cannot accommodate worship services on Sunday mornings, Lieber does allow inmates in general population and in LRU to gather together for worship during weekdays when they are allowed out of their cell. Inmates may use the religious materials and programming on their tablets during this time to worship together.(Id.) Finally, Kendall disputes that Lieber could accommodate LRU inmates being “allowed out of their cells to gather for worship, including possibly viewing a DVD.” (Id. at 4.) He claims “this too would not have been possible based on staffing shortages and limited resources and the burden it would place on the safety and security of the institution.” (Id.)
2. Defendant Jake Gadsden, Jr.
Defendant Jake Gadsden, Jr. has been employed with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) since October 2019, and he is currently the Deputy Director of Programs, Reentry and Rehabilitative Services. (Dkt. No. 87-3 at 1.) In his affidavit, Gadsden provides context to the availability of tablets in prison. According to Gadsden, “SCDC issues electronic tablets to eligible inmates.... All tablets have access to a wide variety of free programming ranging from job and finance to education to religion. The tablets also include music, entertainment programs and games, some of which require payment.” (Id. at 1-2.) Gadsden has attached to his affidavit “a list of programs, videos, reading materials and other information provided to inmates . . . on their tablets.” (Id. at 2-30.)
3. Renwick McNeil
Renwick McNeil is the Assistant HR Director for Recruiting and Employment at SCDC. (Dkt. No. 87-7 at 1.) In his affidavit, McNeil discusses SCDC's efforts to recruit more staff. He avers,
Since 2019 and before, SCDC has dealt with staffing shortages statewide. SCDC has taken efforts to advertise and recruit qualified candidates, but SCDC cannot control how many applications it receives. SCDC conducts targeted recruitment efforts in various parts of the state, including efforts to recruit candidates for employment at [Lieber], which is in Dorchester County. Since the beginning of 2019, SCDC has held fifty-six career fairs/career events in the Berkeley/Dorchester/Charleston tri-county area. During that same time frame, SCDC has run constant radio, television, and billboard ads for employment with SCDC. Since the beginning of 2019, Lieber has hired eighty new employees. However, also during that time, Lieber has had one-hundred and forty-two people leave their employment at Lieber.(Id. at 1-2.)
4. Plaintiff's Declaration and Related Evidence.
Plaintiff submitted his declaration “subject to the penalty of perjury.” (Dkt. No. 103-1 at 4.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (providing that a declaration under penalty of perjury can satisfy a requirement for a sworn declaration).
In his declaration, Plaintiff states he has been an inmate at SCDC for 15 years, and he has been at Lieber for 10 of those years.. (Dkt. No. 103-1 at 1.) Plaintiff avers that during his “time at Lieber, Christian worship service (church service) has always been held on Sunday mornings between the hours of 10:00 AM-12:00 AM [sic]....[T]hat changed in 2019.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff avers he was in LRU from May 2019 through May 2022 “due to me having protective concerns with the prison gangs.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, LRU initially did not offer religious services of any kind to its inmates, but “after having filed an enormous amount of staff requests, inmate grievances, and ultimately this current lawsuit, [Defendant] Chaplain Moultrie began conducting worship services for the Christian inmates in LRU. But the services only lasted for about 2 months and ceased.” (Id.)
Prior to May of 2019, Plaintiff was last housed at Lieber in June of 2016. See SCDC Inmate Search, http://www.doc.sc.gov/InmateSearchDisclaimer.html (last visited April 5, 2023).
Plaintiff has submitted discovery, which provides context to the temporary worship services Moultrie provided. In Defendants' response to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, they state, verbatim,
Since the beginning of the COVID pandemic, no religious services have been held in general population due to COVID restrictions, including the restriction on volunteers entering the prison. In or around August of 2021, Chaplin Moultrie made the initiative to start having in person religious services in the Restorative Unit. At that time, Chaplin Moultrie had an assistant Chaplin, and his plan was to help start the program and then hand the program over to his assistant. For approximately 1012 weeks, services were held on Wednesdays in the Restorative Unit. However, near the end of 2021, the assistant Chaplin left his employment and there was also an inmate altercation at one of the services. Thereafter, the in person services stopped, but inmates still had access to religious programming on their tablets.(Dkt. No. 103-2 at 3.)
Plaintiff avers that he asked both Defendant Associate Warden Ann Sheppard and Defendant Chaplain Moultrie the reason LRU inmates cannot have church services on Sundays. Plaintiff states that while Sheppard told him the reason was “staff shortages,” Moultrie said it was because “he ha[s] to be at his church on Sundays.” (Dkt. No. 103-1 at 3-4.) Plaintiff asserts that if no one was available to conduct services, then an alternative would be “to allow LRU Christian inmates to have church services by watching DVDs of church services.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff further states that despite SCDC's alleged concerns about “staffing issues and the COVID-19 pandemic, . . . they still allowed inmate visitation to resume on Saturdays and Sundays between the hours of 9:00AM-4:00PM for the general population.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “Lieber permitted inmates to visit with their family before the pandemic and during the pandemic.” (Id.)
5. SCDC Policy PS-10.05, Inmate Religion
Both parties rely on SCDC Policy PS-10.05, and this court takes judicial notice of the Policy. https://www.doc.sc.gov/policy/PS-10-05.htm.pdf; see Malik v. Ward, No. 8:08-cv-01886, 2010 WL 936777, at *2 n.4 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2010) (holding that “[t]he Court may take judicial notice of the SCDC grievance process, specifically, SCDC Policy GA-01.12”); see also Sec'y of State For Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a court may “take judicial notice of matters of public record”).
Relevant here, the SCDC Policy concerning inmate religion states that
Within the limitations imposed on the Agency as a result of its safety and security needs, the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) will be committed to upholding and facilitating the constitutional rights afforded inmates to religious freedom. Inmates will be given the opportunity to practice their religious faith to the extent that such practice does not interfere with the security and safety of the institution, staff, or others. The South Carolina Department of Corrections will provide necessary programs to facilitate the practice of any recognized religion based on inmate request, need, and available resources.(SCDC Policy PS-10.05 at 1-2.) The Policy provides that “[a]ll SCDC inmates will have access to religious programs,” but that “[r]eligious activity may be limited by concerns for the safety of volunteers, staff, and inmates. Inmates in secure and restricted areas will not be allowed to leave their areas for religious programs.” (Id. at 6.) The Policy also includes the scheduling of worship services and study groups for inmates in general population. (Id. at 6-8.)
The “Handbook of Religious Practice” (the “Handbook”) is attached as an appendix to the Policy. The Handbook is “intended for use by Chaplains in the [SCDC] and other staff as needed,” and it is a supplement to the Policy. (Id. at 22.) In his briefing, Plaintiff quotes a portion of the Handbook pertaining to “Protestant Churches.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 6.) More specifically, the Handbook states,
Worship: A general, interdenominational Protestant worship service will be provided on Sundays in all institutions where inmates request a service. Other services can be scheduled as needed or requested, but usually no more than two (2) regular services of worship will be conducted weekly. A quiet room with adequate seating will be provided for the service. Essential equipment such as a piano, hymn books, pulpit, communion set, etc., will be provided. Services will be open to all inmates who want to participate unless they are in an RHU, Death Row or abuse the privilege by interfering with the order of the service. Work supervisors will seek to accommodate requests to participate. To avoid favoritism in scheduling volunteer groups, generally no group will be asked to participate more than once every two (2) months. There will be no denominational worship services. Services will normally last one (1) hour on Sunday mornings. Other services can last as long as two (2) hours.(Id. at 34-35.)
C. Analysis
As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that he is of the Christian faith and that his constitutional rights were violated because he was not permitted to attend “in person” Sunday morning worship service “with fellow believers” at Lieber from approximately May 9, 2019 until his transfer to a different prison in October of 2022. (Dkt. No. 56 at 7.) He asserts that Defendants Kendall, Sheppard and Moultrie are responsible for this interference with his right to practice his religion. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Stirling, Gadsden, and Brown violated his constitutional rights “by failing to hire and/or maintain adequate staffing (chaplains and officers)” for Sunday morning worship service at Lieber from approximately May 9, 2019 until October of 2022. (Id. at 8-9.)
Defendants respond that for the last several years, Lieber has not provided in person services on Sunday mornings due to limited resources, safety concerns, and COVID-19 restrictions. (Dkt. No. 87-1 at 1-2.) Defendants further assert that Christian inmates at Lieber have access to over 200 religious programs/resources on electronic tablets, and inmates in the general population are able to attend “in person worship services . . . on the 1st and 2nd Wednesday of each month” as well as “bible study every Tuesday.” (Id. at 2.) With respect to Plaintiff's claims about the alleged failure to “hire and/or maintain adequate staffing,” Defendants contend there is no evidence to support such claims. (Id. at 11-13.)
After the parties fully briefed the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Fourth Circuit issued a published decision in Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, finding that a jail did not violate the First Amendment when it did not provide any in-person prayer services on Fridays, where it depended on outside volunteers and donations to provide group religious services and had not received any relating to Muslim services, and it did not permit inmate-led groups of any kind. 58 F.4th at 113, 120. The Court also held that the jail could permissibly bar maximum security inmates from attending in-person religious services for security reasons. Id. at 113, 118. Citing Firewalker-Fields, another court in this circuit recently held that a restriction preventing an inmate from attending religious services “was plainly reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests of protecting the health and safety of inmates and correctional staff by preventing an outbreak of COVID-19 within the facility.” Hammock v. Watts, No. 22-cv-0482, 2023 WL 2457242, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2023).
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was housed in LRU at Lieber from May 2019 through April 2022. (Dkt. No. 87-2 at 1.) In May of 2022, Plaintiff was placed in disciplinary detention in RHU. (Id. at 2.) He was briefly in the general population at the end of May, and then placed back in the RHU. (Id.) Plaintiff was back in the general population at Lieber for an unspecified period of time from May until his transfer to a different prison on October 13, 2022. (Id.; Dkt. No. 103 at 13.) Additionally, from March 2020 until June or July 2022, visitors and volunteers were not allowed inside Lieber due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Dkt. No. 87-2 at 2-3.)
Regardless of Plaintiff's housing placement at Lieber, the overarching justification for Plaintiff's inability to attend in person Sunday morning worship services was resource-efficiency. Kendall testified that even for inmates in general population, “severe staffing shortages have required all inmates at Lieber to be in their cells on Sunday mornings. Therefore, no inmates at Lieber have been able to attend Sunday morning worship services since October 2019.” (Dkt. No. 87-2 at 3.) During Plaintiff's placement in LRU and RHU, the restriction at issue was also based on security concerns. Inmates housed in LRU are in protective custody and are not allowed “to be mixed with inmates in general population out of concern for their own safety as well as the safety of staff members.” (Id. at 3, 6.) As for inmates housed in RHU, these inmates “are not allowed to have contact with any other inmates at Lieber for safety and security reasons.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff appears to attack the resource-efficiency rationale by stating that Lieber allowed visitation with inmates on the weekend, including during the pandemic. (Dkt. No. 103-1 at 4.) However, there is no evidence that Lieber's ability to provide weekend inmate visitation equates to an ability to provide the staffing needed for weekend worship services. Plaintiff also references a two month period in or around August 2021 wherein Defendant Chaplain Moultrie provided in person religious services in LRU. The record indicates these services were held on Wednesdays, and they ended after Chaplain “left his employment and there was also an inmate altercation at one of the services.” (Dkt. No. 103-1 at 3; 103-2 at 3.) Again, this evidence underscores SCDC's reliance on sufficient staffing and security in order to provide in person religious services. Defendants' concerns for security and resource-efficiency are valid penological interests supporting the restriction on Plaintiff's ability to attend in person Sunday morning worship services.
Additionally, the record shows that regardless of his housing, Plaintiff “could generally engage in worship” at Lieber. See Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 117 (noting the second Turner factor “is not about whether Firewalker-Fields had the opportunity to engage in Friday Prayer on his terms, but rather whether he could generally engage in worship”). During non-pandemic times, in person Christian worship services are available to inmates in general population twice a month on Wednesdays. (Dkt. No. 87-2 at 3.) Additionally, “eligible inmates” at Lieber are issued tablets that contain a variety of religious programming. (Dkt. No. 87-3 at 1.) These alternative means of religious expression support finding the restriction at issue reasonable..
Here, the undersigned recognizes that the Wednesday services are only available to inmates in general population. However, there is not a similar restriction on access to tablets with religious programming.
Further, Defendants maintain that Lieber does not have sufficient staff to accommodate a religious gathering of inmates on Sunday mornings. (Dkt. No. 87-1 at 9.) Defendants assert that if they “pull[ed] the limited officers available from their posts” to accommodate these Sunday morning services, it “would seriously jeopardize the safety of the staff and inmates at Lieber.” (Id.) The Fourth Circuit has found that concern for a “potential drain on scarce resources” is a “legitimate” reason for upholding a prison regulation. Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 118 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Finally, there are no obvious or easy alternatives to fully accommodate Plaintiff's request for in person Sunday morning services. While Plaintiff asserts “LRU Christian inmates” could “have church services by watching DVDs of church services,” extra staff would still be required if inmates were to gather for this service. (Dkt. Nos. 87-2 at 4; 103-1 at 4.) Plaintiff has not offered any solutions that are so easy and so obvious they suggest the restriction at issue is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 120 (“In the end, this fourth [Turner] factor is about easy alternatives, not finding the least restrictive means.”)
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends the restriction on in person Sunday morning worship services for inmates at Lieber is reasonably related to the legitimate penological purposes of resource-efficiency and security and is justifiable under Turner. Accordingly, Defendants Kendall, Sheppard, and Moultrie should be granted summary judgment based on any claims arising from their alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to attend in person Sunday morning worship services in violation of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 56 at 7-8.)
The undersigned further recommends summary judgment should be granted to Defendants Stirling, Gadsden, and Brown on Plaintiff's claims that these Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights “by failing to hire and/or maintain adequate staffing (officers and chaplains) at Lieber . . . to conduct Sunday mornings worship services.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 8-9.) As discussed above, Defendants have submitted evidence documenting SCDC's significant efforts to recruit qualified candidates since the beginning of 2019. (Dkt. No. 87-7 at 1-2.) There is no evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to any alleged constitutional violation here. To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants have failed to follow their own policies due to the staffing shortages, such a failure, without more, does not establish a constitutional violation.. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (violations of prison policies which fail to reach the level of a constitutional violation are not actionable under § 1983); see also Scott v. Hamidullah, No. 3:05-cv-3027-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904803 *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (“To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not follow their own policies, his claim fails as a failure of prison officials to follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, do not amount to constitutional violations.”) (citing Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990).
Because the undersigned finds no questions of fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the undersigned does not address Defendants' qualified immunity argument. See Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 87) be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).