Because Ultra failed to compel GLC to file an answer or seek additional time for it to do so, no certified record from the lower tribunal was ever filed in the superior court. See Maddox v. City of Newnan , 118 Ga. App. 347, 347, 163 S.E.2d 756 (1968) ("Assignments of error and recitals of fact contained in a petition for certiorari to the superior court from the judgment of a recorder’s court which have not been verified by the answer of the magistrate, no answer having been filed, cannot be considered [.]" (emphasis supplied)); Herault , 137 Ga. App. at 448 (1), 224 S.E.2d 480 ("The return or answer must constitute a verification or denial, from the record or otherwise, of material assertions in the petition."); Gornto v. City of Brunswick , 119 Ga. App. 673, 673 (3), 168 S.E.2d 323 (1969) ("[T]he [dismissal of the petition for certiorari] was correct for the additional reason that there was no certification of the record of the trial from the recorder’s court to the superior court." (citation omitted)).

The statute does not explain who "the respondent" is or why "the respondent" must be served, but there is authority that the judicatory body whose decision is appealed is the "respondent" on whom service is required. See Bass v. City of Milledgeville, 121 Ga. 151 ( 48 S.E. 919); Gornto v. City of Brunswick, 119 Ga. App. 673 ( 168 S.E.2d 323); Johnson v. Hicks, 31 Ga. App. 43 ( 119 S.E. 437). The trial court therefore erred in dismissing the petition on grounds that the Civil Service Board was not named a party, but the petition was properly dismissed because the Board was not timely served as respondent. It cannot readily be determined why § 5-4-6 (b) requires "the respondent" (the inferior judicatory) to be served, since OCGA § 5-4-3 fully and expressly provides for "service" by the clerk of court of the writ of certiorari on the inferior judicatory: "On the filing of the petition in the office of the clerk of the superior court, with the sanction of the appropriate judge endorsed thereon ... it shall be the duty of the clerk to issue a writ of certiorari, directed to the tribunal or person whose decision or judgment is the subject matter of complaint, requiring the tribunal or person to certify and send up all the proceedings in the case to the superior court."

[Cit.]" Gornto v. City of Brunswick, 119 Ga. App. 673 (2) ( 168 S.E.2d 323). "If the legislature desires to make some other method of service sufficient, substituted service may be provided for by [law]..." Atwood v. Hirsch, 123 Ga. 734, 735 ( 51 S.E. 742). The legislature has not so provided in the statute which authorized the appeal in this case. "As service by mail does not constitute personal service, it is wholly inadequate in this case.

At the time of dismissal, no judicial determination had been entered on the petition. See Gornto v. City of Brunswick , 119 Ga.App. 673, 168 S.E.2d 323 (1969) (construing statute requiring service on respondent-in-certiorari to mean personal service).In October 2014, Discovery re-filed the petition for writ of certiorari, citing OCGA §§ 5–4–3 and 9–2–61 (a). Subsequently, the City filed a motion to dismiss the re-filed petition on the basis that it was void ab initio because the original petition and writ were never properly served on ZBA pursuant to OCGA § 5–4–6 (b) before the action was dismissed and that, therefore, the dismissed action was void and not subject to renewal under OCGA § 9–2–61 (a). Discovery filed a response to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the City failed to meet its burden of showing improper service of the original petition and writ because, inter alia, personal service was not required for renewal, and that even assuming personal service was required, Discovery had shown good cause to excuse such service.