Sauer's preexisting condition made him more susceptible to injury. He had few symptoms and no significant disability from his preexisting back condition prior to the accidents in January 1992. It is true that a defendant cannot escape liability because a preexisting condition made plaintiff more susceptible to injury. See, e.g. Lancaster v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 822 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 480 U.S. 945 (1987); Maurer v. United States, 668 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1981); Gorman v. Prudential Lines, 637 F. Supp. 879, 881 (S.D. N.Y. 1986); Kegel, 289 F. Supp. at 795; Restatement (Second) of Torts Section(s) 461 (1965). However, one of the preexisting condition instructions told the jury to reduce the damages by the likelihood that Sauer would eventually have suffered the injury even if the accident had not occurred. Sauer does not challenge that instruction on appeal, and in any case, it was a correct statement of the law.

That said, “it is hornbook law that the wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds h[er].” Gilbert v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., No. 85-CV-4157, 1989 WL 59623, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1989) (declining to reduce the jury's award for emotional distress damages based on prior life experience that “undoubtedly added to the emotional distress she felt”); see also Stampf, 761 F.3d at 207 n.5 (“a defendant must take a plaintiff as [he] finds [her] and, therefore, is responsible for the harm [he] inflicts on a person even if that harm is exacerbated by the person's unknown infirmities” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gorman v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 637 F.Supp. 879, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“a tort-feasor must take the victim as it finds him, and is responsible for any aggravation or acceleration of an existing disease or infirmity if the defendant's breach of duty played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Villalta's earlier childhood experiences pale in comparison to the abuse inflicted on her by Barkats, and Defendants have submitted nothing to the contrary.

In the Jones Act context, a defendant "is responsible for any aggravation or acceleration of an existing disease or infirmity if the defendant's breach of duty `played any part, even the slightest' in producing the injury." Gorman v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 637 F.Supp. 879, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citation omitted).

Carmody was entitled to prevail on a theory that ProNav's negligence was an exacerbating cause of his critical illness, even if not the root cause. SeeGajewski v. United States, 540 F.Supp. 381, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (where plaintiff was forced to work excessive overtime hours aboard ship, after which he became sick and needed to be hospitalized, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that plaintiff's illness resulted from defendant's negligence despite the fact that the " circumstances, nature and cause of [the plaintiff's illness] remain an enigma" ); Milos v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 478 F.Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y.1979), (denying motion for a new trial where the jury found defendant liable where its negligence had aggravated plaintiff's pre-existing arthritic condition rendering plaintiff unable to continue work as a chief marine engineer), aff'd 622 F.2d 574 (2d Cir.1980); see alsoGorman v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 637 F.Supp. 879, 881 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (noting, on a motion for a new trial notwithstanding the verdict in a Jones Act claim, that an engineer was entitled to damages because stress from unsafe working conditions led to an angina attack, even where there was evidence presented that the attack would have been inevitable result of blocked arteries) ( cited inShea v. Icelandair, 925 F.Supp. 1014, 1025 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (in the context for a motion for a new trial, upholding verdict that defendant's conduct exacerbated plaintiff's physical symptoms even where there was testimony that, as a result of Parkinson's disease, plaintiff would have suffered certain of the same effects)).See alsoSentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109, 80 S.Ct. 173, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959) (noting, in a Jones Act case, that " [t]he jury's power to draw the inference [that defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's injury] was not impaired

Thus, for example, in a case analogous to this one, a jury found that an engineer was entitled to damages because stress from unsafe employment conditions led to an angina attack. Gorman v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 879, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). At trial the plaintiffs expert testified that although the plaintiff had a long-term buildup of fatty deposits in his coronary arteries, the immediate cause of his angina was the extreme stress to which he was subjected by unsafe working conditions.

Kruhlinski v. New York, New Haven Hartford Railroad Co., 217 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1357 (5th Cir. 1988); Howell v. Gould, Inc., 800 F.2d 482, 488 (5th Cir. 1986); Duty v. United States Department of Interior, 735 F.2d 1012, 1014 (6th Cir. 1984); Scarberry v. Ohio River Co., 217 F. Supp. 189, 193 (S.D.W.Va. 1963); Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838, 845 (D.N.J. 1954) (symptoms of brain damage considered only to the extent that unseaworthy condition aggravated them); Benedict on Admiralty § 32 at 3-284, 3-285 (1989). Contra Gorman v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 879, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Milos v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Where plaintiff would have experienced the symptoms of his preexisting condition at some time in the future even if he had not fallen, he can only recover that portion of his damages caused by the aggravating event, and not all damages associated with the preexisting condition.