¶ 10 "In interpreting a statute, we give effect to the intent of the legislature." Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000). To do so, "[w]e begin with the plain language of the statute, reading the words and phrases in context and construing them according to their common usage."
"The power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability is vested in the General Assembly." Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000). Thus, in construing the meaning of a statute, we must determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.
Thus, the mental state of "knowingly" applies not only to the second prong of the statute, but also to the first, conduct, prong. This case is distinguishable from People v. Gorman, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2000) and Copeland v. People, 2 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 2000) in which we considered the applicability of section 18-1-503(4). In Gorman, we ruled that section 18-1-503(4) was inapplicable to the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute as the General Assembly did not specify a culpable mental state in the statute.
“The power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability is vested in the General Assembly.” Id. (quoting Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo.2000)). Accordingly, when determining the meaning of a statute, we must discern and give effect to the legislature's intent.
"Rather, the requisite mental state may be implied from the statute." Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000); People v. Gross, 830 P.2d 933, 942 (Colo. 1992).
In interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, which is vested with the power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability. Generally, to subject a person to criminal liability, there must be concurrence of the actus reus, an unlawful act, and the mens rea, a culpable mental state.Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000). Legislative silence on the element of intent in a criminal statute is not to be construed as an indication that no culpable mental state is required.
A person is guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor under section 18-6-701(1), C.R.S. 2008, when he or she knowingly "induces, aids, or encourages a child to violate any federal or state law, municipal or county ordinance, or court order." Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000). A person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.
And Marcy keeps good company. See, e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000) (referring to "the actus reus" as "an unlawful act"); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982) (same); People v. Hoskay, 87 P.3d 194, 198 (Colo. App. 2003) (same). ¶29 We have made similar declarations in other cases.
Build It & They Will Drink, Inc. v. Strauch, 253 P.3d 302, 304 (Colo.2011); Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo.2000). We begin with the plain language of the statute, reading the words and phrases in context and construing them according to their common usage. Strauch, 253 P.3d at 304. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written without resort to further statutory analysis.
Build It & They Will Drink, Inc. v. Strauch, 253 P.3d 302, 304 (Colo. 2011); Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000). We begin with the plain language of the statute, reading the words and phrases in context and construing them according to their common usage. Strauch, 253 P.3d at 304. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written without resort to further statutory analysis.