Accordingly, it is not clear to us that the reasoning in Union Trust applies outside the context of mortgage interest or even outside the special circumstances created by the post-Depression foreclosure moratorium enacted by the New York legislature. See Gorgas v. Perito , 299 N.Y. 265, 270, 86 N.E.2d 742 (1949) (explaining that moratorium statute created "special circumstances" in which recovery of certain interest installments was permitted "even though recovery of both principal and interest were held barred by the Statute of Limitations"); see also Tortora v. Malve Realty & Constr. Corp. , 96 N.Y.S.2d at 391–92 (recognizing exception for mortgage interest from general rule that when right to recover principal is barred by statute of limitations, right to recover interest is likewise barred); Braman v. Westaway , 60 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (holding, in case involving interest on corporations' loans rather than mortgage interest, that "where the principal liability is barred [by statute of limitations], the liability for interest on such loans is correspondingly barred"). Thus, even though the quoted pronouncement in New York Jurisprudence is stated generally, we cannot confidently conclude that the New York Court of Appeals would so hold in the circumstances of this case.

im on the principal is time-barred only after the Legislature passed the mortgage moratorium statutes "enacted for the protection of owners and obligors on bonds and mortgages" and intended "to prevent foreclosures and the exaction of higher rates of interest during the emergency period" (Metropolitan Sav. Bank v. Tuttle , 290 N.Y. 497, 503–504, 49 N.E.2d 983 [1943] ; see e.g.Chapin v. Posner , 299 N.Y. 31, 42, 85 N.E.2d 172 [1949] ; Ernst v. Schaack , 271 App.Div. 1012, 68 N.Y.S.2d 95 [2d Dept.], affd , 297 N.Y. 566, 74 N.E.2d 482 [1947] ; In re Bond & Mortg. Guarantee Co. , 272 App.Div. 944, 945–946, 72 N.Y.S.2d 31 [2d Dept. 1947], affd , 297 N.Y. 765, 77 N.E.2d 786 [1948] ; see also Civ Prac Act §§ 1077–a, 1077–b). The jurisprudence emanating from this legislation was premised "upon the theory, evolved in response to the special circumstances created by the mortgage moratorium, that successive defaults in payment of interest installments gave rise to separate new causes of action" (Gorgas v. Perito , 299 N.Y. 265, 270, 86 N.E.2d 742 [1949] ). Plaintiff makes no argument that these cases apply outside the narrow context of the mortgage moratorium legislation in which they were decided, and instead argues that they are distinguishable.

Other than the payment of interest on August 17, 1961, there has been no payment of any of the installments. Whether such payment which is claimed to have been made without authority of the present majority stockholder who acquired ownership prior to the payment revived the obligation ( Gorgas v. Perito, 299 N.Y. 265) or whether the alleged acknowledgment of the debt by the corporation records did likewise, are matters of proof which only the trial court can pass upon. Nor can the fourth defense be considered sham.

A default lifts the ban of the moratorium so that suit may be brought and the statute consequently begins to run (Kirschner v. Cohn, 270 App. Div. 126). Nevertheless the obligations of the covenants continue until demand is made or until the mortgagee elects to declare the principal due, and these constitute separate obligations and the statute on each of such obligations does not start to run until the respective item is payable (see Gorgas v. Perito, 299 N.Y. 265, 269). Plaintiff argues that the pattern so presented involves grave logical inconsistencies and consequently despite the decisions cannot be the law.

A default lifts the ban of the moratorium so that suit may be brought and the statute consequently begins to run ( Kirschner v. Cohn, 270 A.D. 126). Nevertheless the obligations of the covenants continue until demand is made or until the mortgagee elects to declare the principal due, and these constitute separate obligations and the statute on each of such obligations does not start to run until the respective item is payable (see Gorgas v. Perito, 299 N.Y. 265, 269). Plaintiff argues that the pattern so presented involves grave logical inconsistencies and consequently despite the decisions cannot be the law.