days[] must be added due to the coordination proceedings because plaintiffs would not have been able to proceed to trial on this matter. This argument was specifically rejected by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One case Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 40–41 [ ( Gordon's Cabinet ) ][] which involved the predecessor to California Rules of Court, rule 3.515."
[Citations.]" ( Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 38 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].) The application of a statute to undisputed facts also presents a question of law subject to de novo review.
Profits earned by State Fund may not be retained by State Fund or the state but must be returned to "its insureds as a dividend or credit." ( Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 35 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 541] ["Under the statutory scheme, [State Fund] . . . is not intended to accumulate and hold assets over and above the amounts needed for liabilities, necessary reserves, and a reasonable surplus."]; see § 11775.) Defendants note correctly that under section 11873, subdivision (b), State Fund is subject to the Ralph C. Dills Act (Gov. Code, § 3512 et seq.), which contains the collective bargaining provisions for state employees, and to other provisions of the Government Code including sections 19851 and 19849.
Profits earned by SCIF may not be retained by SCIF or the state but must be returned to "its insureds as a dividend or credit." ( Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 35 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 541] ["Under the statutory scheme, SCIF . . . is not intended to accumulate and hold assets over and above the amounts needed for liabilities, necessary reserves, and a reasonable surplus."]; see § 11775.) Defendants note correctly that under section 11873, subdivision (b), SCIF is subject to the Ralph C. Dills Act (Gov. Code, § 3512 et seq.), which contains the collective bargaining provisions for state employees, and to other provisions of the Government Code including sections 19851 and 19849.
The court in Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 39, reached a different conclusion. It observed that coordination proceeding stay orders expressly provide "the five-year statute [is tolled] when a stay is granted."
To the extent the parties argue "pure questions of law, such as procedural matters or interpretations of rules or statutes, we exercise our independent judgment." (Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 38.) Based on her characterization of Cheng's challenge to the second set-aside request as the equivalent of a demurrer, Peiqi argues we cannot affirm the trial court's order unless we find that his Request for Order showed on its face that her action was barred as a matter of law.
To the extent the parties argue "pure questions of law, such as procedural matters or interpretations of rules or statutes, we exercise our independent judgment." (Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 38.) B. Jenny Forfeited Her Argument Regarding the Admissibility of a Declaration Marked as Exhibit A.
To the extent the parties argue "pure questions of law, such as procedural matters or interpretations of rules or statutes, we exercise our independent judgment." (Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 38.) But "[a]wards of child support and spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.]" (In re Marriage of de Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1360 (deGuigne).) We exercise our independent judgment on "pure questions of law, such as procedural matters or interpretations of rules or statutes. . . . [Citations.]" (Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 38.) B. The Trial Court Was Not Estopped from Modifying the September 2012 Order Regarding Stacey's Partnership Assets.
To the extent he argues that the orders were entered without authority, the issue is a "pure question[] of law, such as procedural matters or interpretations of rules or statutes, [to which] we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]" (Gordon's Cabinet Shop v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 33, 38.) To the extent he argues that the orders should not have been entered as a matter of discretion while his request for relief from the February 2011 judgment was pending, we review them for an abuse of discretion.