And a parent is not liable for the negligence of his minor child in operating an automobile except under the doctrine of respondeat superior or under certain statutory provisions expressly imposing liability. Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P.2d 351, 93 A.L.R. 984; Colwell v. Bothwell, 60 Idaho 107, 89 P.2d 193; Idaho Code §§ 49-1003, 49-1004, 49-313. "When a plaintiff seeks to hold a parent liable for the negligent operation of an automobile by a minor child of the defendant, the plaintiff must plead and prove either facts bringing the case under statutory provisions imposing liability or facts establishing a relationship between parent and child that would invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior, or both."
In order to address the issue of negligent supervision, first we recognize the common law rule that parents are not responsible for the torts of their children. Gorden v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P.2d 351 (1934); see also Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272 (1973); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953); Herndobler v. Rippen, 75 Or. 22, 146 P. 140 (1915). In Gorden, this Court rejected an argument that would have imposed liability upon parents for a child's negligence based upon the theory of the "family purpose doctrine."
In theory it overlooks well-settled principles of law; in practice it would interdict the father's generosity, and his reasonable care for the pleasure or even the well-being of his children, by imposing an universal responsibility for their acts. 11 A.L.A. 1619. Gordon v. Rose, 1934 reported in 33 P.2d 351 (Idaho) says: — It may be true that as a matter of public policy the head of a family who purchases an automobile and permits the various members of the family, regardless of age or responsibility, to use the same unrestrained, should be required to assume the risk and held responsible for the acts of his household when driving the car, regardless of the purpose for which the car is being used. Courts generally now say that the automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality. That being true, if the principle of respondeat superior is not applicable to hold the head of the family responsible when a member of the family is using the automobile for his own purposes and we do not think the principle applicable, the only available ground left to justify the courts in applying the doctrine is one of policy. If this question of applying the family purpose doctrine is one of conflicting considerations of policy, and it would so appear, it is properly for the legislature to determine that poli
In favor of the finding and/or conclusion that the deceased had again come within the scope of his employment after his convivial and prandial peregrinations with Applington, are: first, he was in his master's truck, some indication he was on his master's business. Willi v. Schaefer Hitchcock Co., 53 Idaho 367 at page 371, 25 P.2d 167; Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502 at page 506, 33 P.2d 351, 93 A.L.R. 984; Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792 at page 800, 69 P.2d 136; Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 643 at page 656, 86 P.2d 181; Abbs v. Redmond, 64 Idaho 369 at page 373, 132 P.2d 1044; 159 A.L.R. 1314. Second, they were headed in the direction of where the hay was, namely, the James Russell ranch some ten or twelve miles westward of Weippe; and third, Applington, his boon companion of the day, testified he had agreed to help deceased get the hay and that at the time of the accident, "we were going to get the hay". The Board resolved the consequent conflicts in favor of respondent.
The placing of responsibility on the owner of the car in the Doty case was based on this testimony of Miss Doty, owner therein, that "I said that he (Russel Garst, driver of the automobile) might use mine (automobile) if he drove it," which the court held was sufficient to sustain the verdict on the theory that the owner of the car had made that specific individual, Russel Garst, restrictively her agent to drive the car. It is virtually conceded neither the family purpose doctrine ( Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P.2d 351, 93 A.L.R. 984) nor mere ownership in the automobile, since without dispute no purpose of James R. Bothwell was being served by the trip ( Willi v. Schaefer Hitchcock Co., 53 Idaho 367, 25 P.2d 167) applies or is adequate to show agency liability. Thus the only evidence to sustain agency herein or make James R. Bothwell responsible for the acts of Elizabeth Bothwell as his agent was this cross-examination of Miss Bothwell: "and your father understood you were to drive the car on this trip?