Newcomb v. Roarty, Fla. 1957, 93 So.2d 373. Incidental questions occurring throughout the litigation, the resolution of which might be helpful, if not dispositive of the entire case, are not properly the subject of a certified question. Newcomb v. Roarty, supra; Gordon v. Norris, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 914. In the latter case the Supreme Court pointed out that in order to avoid intruding on established areas of judicial procedure the exercise of jurisdiction under the certified question rule necessarily has its limitations, some of which are:

See Fla.App. Rule 4.6(a). Cf., Dees v. State, 295 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1974); Gordon v. Norris, 90 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1956). Admittedly, the question is without controlling precedent in this state.

Newcomb v. Roarty, Fla. 1957, 93 So.2d 373. Incidental questions occurring throughout the litigation, the resolution of which might be helpful, if not dispositive of the entire case, are not properly the subject of a certified question. Newcomb v. Roarty, supra; Gordon v. Norris, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 914. In the latter case the Supreme Court pointed out that in order to avoid intruding on established areas of judicial procedure the exercise of jurisdiction under the certified question rule necessarily has its limitations, some of which are:

" F.A.R. 4.6 may not be utilized for the purpose of apprising private litigants on the nature or extent of what their claims should or should not be, especially when it might involve the rights of a person or persons who are not parties to the cause, which might well be the case here. Gordon v. Norris, Fla. 1957, 90 So.2d 914; Dade County v. Philbrick, supra. In accordance with the foregoing, we must decline to answer the questions so certified, and remand the cause back to the trial Court for further proceedings.

Answer to questions (b) and (c) of the Certificate is declined as the statement of facts presented with reference to these questions does not produce a single determinative question of law, the answer to which would be dispositive of the cause. Gordon v. Norris, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 914. Question answered as to (a) in the negative; answer declined as to questions (b) and (c).

One of the purposes of the rule is to enable a circuit court to apply to the appropriate appellate court for instructions regarding questions of law which arise in the course of pending litigation and a decision upon which would be dispositive of the cause. Limitations on the type of questions are illustrated by our decisions in Schwob Company v. Florida Industrial Commission, 152 Fla. 203, 11 So.2d 782, and, Gordon et al. v. Norris et al., Fla., 90 So.2d 914. Since the creation of the District Courts of Appeal, numerous questions have been certified to those courts for answer. Cf., Davies v. Davies, 113 So.2d 250; Clar v. Dade County, 116 So.2d 34; In re Aron's Estate, 118 So.2d 546; McGuckin et al. v. Dade County, 121 So.2d 63. In McGuckin the District Court of Appeal declined to answer the certified question because it presented a proposition which required the construction of a controlling provision of the State Constitution. If decided by the circuit court, the proposition would have been subject to review by the Supreme Court on direct appeal.

" We decline to answer the question certified, for the reasons stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Thornal prepared for the Court in Gordon v. Norris, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 914, 915. It was suggested to the Court upon the presentation of this matter that unless the Court accepted the certified question and answered it, there would be no way in which the question certified could be reviewed by an appellate court. The answer to this contention was suggested in Howard Johnson, Inc., of Florida v. State Road Department of Florida, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 306.

In the case last cited we also attempted to announce several basic rules governing the certification of questions. In the more recent case of Gordon v. Norris, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 914, we further attempted to delineate in detail a number of the controlling conditions precedent to the acceptance of a certificate of a question by us under our present Supreme Court Rule 27. In Taylor v. Taylor, Fla. 1952, 59 So.2d 868, we held that a certified question which involves the application of ordinary rules of evidence is not within the contemplation of the applicable rules of this Court.