Opinion
11-P-1237
04-03-2012
HARVEY GORDON & another v. JEFFREY M. LIBER & another.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs, Harvey and Karen Gordon (Gordons), appeal from a decision of a Land Court judge in favor of the defendants, Jeffrey M. and Jane E. Liber (Libers), holding that the Gordons do not in fact possess a right of access between the shared driveway, Welcome Lane, and a plot of land to which they hold title, transversing a strip of land owned by the Libers. The Gordons contend (1) the judge misinterpreted recorded documents by which the parties clearly and unambiguously intended to allow access to the easement along Welcome Lane from their lot (lot 7A) over the Libers' lot (lot 8), and (2) that a consistent reading of the documents provides them a right of access to Welcome Lane over lot 8, extending across the entire frontage of their lot. For substantially the reasons expressed by the judge in his comprehensive memorandum of decision, we affirm.
Discussion. Generally, '[i]n reviewing a matter wherein the trial judge was the finder of fact, we accept the judge's findings of fact as true unless they are clearly erroneous.' Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 36 (2008). This court may reverse the trial court's conclusion if the outcome is tainted by an error of law. Willet v. Willet, 333 Mass. 323, 324 (1955).
It is undisputed that resolution of this issue requires interpretation of certain recorded deeds, a 'Stipulation and Settlement Agreement' filed by the parties' predecessors in title in 2002 (2002 agreement) and a plan referenced in the 2002 Agreement. The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law. Brillante v. R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 548 (2002), citing Roberts Indus., Inc. v. Spence, 362 Mass. 751, 755 (1973). 'In interpreting a contract, the court must give effect to the parties' intentions and construe the language to give it reasonable meaning wherever possible.' R.W. Granger & Sons, supra (citation omitted). 'The basic principle governing the interpretation of deeds is that their meaning, derived from the presumed intent of the grantor, is to be ascertained from the words used in the written instrument, construed when necessary in the light of the attendant circumstances.' Sheftel v. Lebel, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 (1998).
The 2002 agreement and the plan were duly recorded.
A party seeking to assert an easement over a particular piece of land bears the burden of proving the nature and extent of any such easement. Foley v. McGonigle, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 746 (1975). A 'servient owner retains the use of his land for all purposes except such as are inconsistent with the right granted to the dominant owner' and doubts about the nature, scope or extent of such rights should be resolved in favor of freedom of land from servitudes. Butler v. Haley Greystone Corp., 352 Mass. 252, 258 (1967). The Gordons' argument is twofold, and necessarily relies on the language of paragraph 7 of the 2002 agreement: first, that it effectively ensures access to all lots in the area, and that, as a 'new lot,' lot 7A should be considered as one of the very lots to which access to Welcome Lane was intended; secondly, that the judge erred in failing to construe lot 7A as 'abutting' Welcome Lane, regardless of its status as a potential new lot, as the depiction of Welcome Lane on the plan is only a rough estimate of its location, and the actual abutting rights are more accurately displayed in the detail of a separate 'Access and Utility' easement. Neither argument has merit.
1. 'New lot.' While paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 2002 Agreement contemplate extending access to new lots created after 2002, the Gordons fail to identify any evidence in the record that supports their view that lot 7A, owned by them independently of lot 7, must be classified as a 'new lot' and therefore entitled a right of access to Welcome Lane. The explicit language of the 2002 agreement denotes that 'Lot 7A shall be deemed to be appurtenant to Lot 7,' evidencing an intent of the grantors to consider lot 7A as accessory to lot 7 and different from the surrounding, residential lots. The Gordons' attempt to minimize the legal significance of the 'appurtenant' relationship between lots 7 and 7A fails of logic. The Libers' interpretation is more reasonable: that the explicit description of the appurtenant relationship between lots 7 and 7A, expresses the right of lot 7 owners to access lot 7A by passage over lot 8 as long as those two lots remained under common ownership. That interpretation necessarily forecloses an independent grant of access from Welcome Lane to lot 7A in circumstances such as the instant case, where lot 7A is now owned separately from lot 7. We agree that the plain language of the 2002 agreement does not create a separate right of access to lot 7A. To hold otherwise is to ignore the evidence contained in the record.
2. Rights as an 'abutter.' The Gordons' remaining contention is that the judge erred in failing to find that they currently possess a right to access Welcome Lane across the strip of the Libers' parcel (lot 8) that lies between Welcome Lane and the Gordons' lot (lot 7A), at any point along the full frontage of lot 7A. The Libers contend, on the contrary, that the judge correctly decided that the Gordons do not have any access across lot 8 because their lot does not abut Welcome Lane. We agree.
a. The Agreement and the Plan. Interpretation of the recorded documents reveals that the location of Welcome Lane is set forth in the undisputed, main illustration within the plan referenced in the 2002 agreement. The Gordons' view that there is a more expansive 'new Welcome Lane,' following the boundaries of the 'Access and Utility' easement, is not supported by the plain language of the 2002 agreement or the main drawing appearing on the plan.
The Gordons' reliance upon a later plan, one which displays the area without the detailed illustration of Welcome Lane from the earlier plan, is misplaced; this later plan was prepared to adjust a southerly property line of the defendants' property according to a boundary line agreement between Kevin Poole and Michael Vacchione, and Bruce Urko and Laurie-Jean Urko, and does not involve the narrow area at issue in this case.
b. The Deeds. To support their position, the Gordons rely also on the plain language of the several deeds by which lots 7 and 7A were conveyed by their predecessors in title, lot 7A was conveyed to themselves, and lot 8 was conveyed to the Libers; they highlight the language in their own deed to lot 7A, which states 'Said Lot is conveyed with it the benefit of an easement across Lot 8, Lot 7, and Lot 6 shown on said Plan to pass and repass with vehicles on the way known as Welcome Lane in the areas where such lane, as now bounded and defined on said Plan, crosses over said Lot 8, Lot 7 and Lot 6.'
However, such a reading fails to include the second portion of the paragraph, necessary for full understanding of the meaning: 'on the way known as Welcome Lane in the areas where such Lane, as now bounded and defined on said Plan, crosses over . . .' (emphasis added). In view of that language, lot 7A cannot be deemed to have frontage on, and thus does not abut, Welcome Lane. To give reasonable meaning to all the relevant documents, we conclude that the parties intended to restrict any right of vehicle access to the confines of Welcome Lane, as depicted. This interpretation precludes any conclusion that the plaintiffs have a right of access of a 'new Welcome Lane,' as it refers to only one delineation of Welcome Lane.
The Gordons' alternative argument, that the judge's ruling imposes an 'impermissible restraint on alienation not created by the parties' is likewise without merit. See Bowen v. Campbell, 344 Mass. 24, 26 (1962). It is only 'unreasonable' restraints that are unenforceable or unlawful, however. See, e.g., Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 384 Mass. 63, 66-67 (1981). The sale of lot 7A separate and apart from lot 7 is not prohibited. To suggest that 'restraint' can also include a claim of a reduced market value as compared with a similarly situated lot that has appropriate easement rights is to misapprehend the doctrine.
Conclusion . Upon this trial record, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the decision of the judge was factually or legally incorrect.
As to continuation of the plaintiffs' current unblocked access to their garage over the defendants' land, the judge made no indication that the plaintiffs may legally continue this use. They did not raise below, nor did they contend on appeal, that their access depends upon a finding of an implied or prescriptive easement. Indeed, the judge briefly addressed these issues in the conclusion of his memorandum of decision, dismissing both claims to the extent they were raised.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Cohen, Brown & Fecteau, JJ.)