Opinion
No. 98C-08-012 HDR.
Submitted: April 17, 2000.
Decided: April 18, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Motion in Limine — DENIED
William D. Fletcher, Jr., Esq. Schmittinger Rodriguez 414 S. State Street, Dover, DE. 19901.
Richard W. Pell, Esq. Susan A. List, Esq. Tybout, Redfearn, Pell P.O. Box 2092 Wilmington, DE. 19899.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Claim for Punitive Damages — GRANTED
Counsel:
This is a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision involving Plaintiffs' vehicle and another motor vehicle driven by William B. Farrell, now deceased. The vehicles collided when Farrell turned at an intersection in Kent County across the path of Plaintiffs' oncoming vehicle. Plaintiffs' have sued for compensatory damages and punitive damages. Trial is set for April 24, 2000.
Two issues have been raised by motions before trial. First, Defendant seeks by a motion in limine to preclude all evidence of property damage to Plaintiffs' vehicle because of the payment to Plaintiffs of compensation for the value of the vehicle by their own insurance company and because Defendant's insurance company reimbursed their carrier for part of that sum. I hold that evidence of the property damage is admissible pursuant to the collateral source rule. See Medical Center of Delaware v. Mullins, Del. Supr., 637 A.2d 6 (1994) and Yarrington v. Thornburg, Del. Supr., 205 A.2d 1 (1964). I further hold that while such coverage for property damage to Plaintiffs' vehicle was required (unless waived) by Delaware's no-fault statute, 21 Del. C. § 2118 (a)(4), evidence of such damage is nonetheless admissible under the statute. The bar of § 2118 (h) applies only to no-fault benefits under 21 Del. C. § 2118 (a)(2) and (3) which generally are medical expenses and lost wages for two years after the accident.
Second, Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against the decedent's estate. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 provides in comment a:
The purposes of awarding punitive damages, or "exemplary damages" as they are frequently called, are to punish the person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him and others from similar conduct in the future. . . . Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of the deceased tortfeasor nor, ordinarily, under an action under the death statute.
Although Plaintiffs' argue that such a claim is allowed under Delaware's survival statute, 10 Del. C. § 3701, this Court has held on at least three occasions that punitive damages are not recoverable against an estate. Pearson v. Semans, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90C-MY-207, 1991 WL 89821, Balick, J. (May 16, 1992); Ortiz v. White, Del. Super., 1993 WL 331067, Babiarz, J. (May 6, 1993); and Stanley v. Scaran, Del. Super., 1989 WL 147329, Balick, J. (December 1, 1989). Based upon these precedents, I hold that punitive damages are not recoverable against Farrell's estate as a matter of law.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion In Limine is DENIED and Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment As To Plaintiffs' Claim For Punitive Damages is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
cmh oc: Prothonotary xc: Order distribution