Opinion
March 25, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Underwood, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs to the defendants, and the complaint is dismissed.
The plaintiff and the defendants entered into an oral contract in New York, under which the plaintiff was to provide architectural services for the defendants' project in Florida. The plaintiff was not a licensed architect in Florida, yet represented that he was qualified for the project. When the plaintiff failed to get the plans sealed and approved by the building department, the defendants refused to pay the plaintiff for any of his services. After a nonjury trial, the court awarded the plaintiff $3,000 for that portion of his services which constituted consultation and did not involve the practice of architecture per se.
It is clear that the Supreme Court correctly found that the plaintiff was practicing architecture in Florida without a license; however, it incorrectly determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a recovery. It is well settled that not being licensed to practice in a given field which requires licensure precludes recovery for the services performed, "either pursuant to contract or in quantum meruit" (Charlebois v Weller Assocs., 72 N.Y.2d 587, 593; see, Chipouras Assocs. v 212 Realty Corp., 156 A.D.2d 549; Hammerman v Jamco Indus., 119 A.D.2d 544, 545; see also, Fla Stat § 481.223; Rolls v Bliss Nyitray, 408 So.2d 229 [Fla]; Gaisford v Neuschatz, 201 So.2d 635 [Fla]). Additionally, the plaintiff's unlicensed practice of architecture cannot be separated from his work as a consultant, because it is all part of one indivisible contract (see, Chipouras Assocs. v 212 Realty Corp., supra, at 550; American Store Equip. Constr. Corp. v Dempsey's Punch Bowl, 174 Misc. 436, 437, affd 258 App. Div. 794, affd 283 N.Y. 601). Therefore, the court improperly compensated the plaintiff for so much of the work that consisted of consultation. Bracken, J.P., Kunzeman, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.