(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga.App. 73, 75(3), 564 S.E.2d 486 (2002). In light of the lawyers' uncertainty about how much of Count 8 was read aloud, the record does not permit a presumption that the jury was tainted.
There is no ineffective assistance where, as here, trial counsel simply failed to introduce evidence cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial. See Johnson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 30, 31 (1) ( 570 SE2d 344) (2002); Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga. App. 73, 77 (3) (b) (ii) ( 564 SE2d 486) (2002). Carmichael, therefore, cannot show that his trial counsel's performance, even if deficient, resulted in prejudice so as to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Turpin v. Curtis, 278 Ga. 698, 699 (1) ( 606 SE2d 244) (2004); Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 114, 121 (7) ( 630 SE2d 621) (2006). See, e.g., Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga. App. 73, 75 (3) ( 564 SE2d 486) (2002); Smalls v. State, 242 Ga. App. 39, 40 (1) ( 528 SE2d 560) (2000). 2.
See Kidd v. Ga. Assn. of Educators, 263 Ga. App. 171, 173-174 ( 587 SE2d 289) (2003) (plaintiff could not show proximate cause based on his attorney's alleged error in defending him at an administrative hearing, where the record demonstrated that the hearing board was aware of and had considered the same information that the attorney had allegedly failed to place before the board). Cf. Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga. App. 73, 77 (3) (b) (ii) ( 564 SE2d 486) (2002) (ineffective assistance claim failed because no prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings could be shown based on defense counsel's failure to introduce evidence "simply cumulative of other evidence properly admitted"). (d) Kramer further points out that his attorneys erroneously argued to the federal district court that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provided the applicable standard of liability for his claim of inadequate medical care. Kramer, 306 FSupp.2d at 1226 (IV).
As this evidence shows that Evans received unmistakable advance warning that the State intended to use identified prior convictions in aggravation of sentencing, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Evans received sufficient notice under former OCGA ยง 17-10-2 (a) and in considering the convictions at sentencing. Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga. App. 73, 77-78 (3) (c) ( 564 SE2d 486) (2002).Young v. State, 245 Ga. App. 684, 686-687 (3) ( 538 SE2d 760) (2000).
(Footnote omitted.) Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga. App. 73, 77 (3) (b) (i) ( 564 SE2d 486) (2002). See also Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 48 (3) ( 597 SE2d 373) (2004) (once convicted, a defendant who "seeks to exculpate his co-defendant lacks credibility, since he has nothing to lose by testifying untruthfully regarding the alleged innocence" of his co-defendant) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984). See Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga. App. 73, 78 (3)(e) ( 564 S.E.2d 486) (2002) ("The applicable standard is found in the two-prong Strickland v. Washington,[ supra] analysis under which a defendant has the burden to show both attorney error and prejudice so that the validity of the outcome of the trial is called into question."). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)