The Act contains no language limiting its application to cases involving design or manufacturing defects in new products. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals observed in an analogous case, ‘If the legislature had wanted to place these restrictions on the law, it could have done so.’ Gorath v. Rockwell International, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Minn.App.1989).” (Emphasis added.)

Id. at subd. 3(a-c); Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131-32 (Minn.App. 1989), review denied (Minn. July 27, 1989). The seller's-exception statute sets forth a specific procedure:

A seller has a duty to inspect a product if it has actual or constructive knowledge that the product is dangerous. Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Minn.App. 1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. July 27, 1989). Whether the seller knew or should have known of the product's defect is typically a question for the jury.

Minn. Stat. ¶ 544.41, subd. 2;Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989). A plaintiff may defeat dismissal of the seller only if she can establish:

Nor is there a duty to warn if the connection between the injury and the allegedly negligent act is too remote. Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (no duty to warn where the connection between the product's sale “and the accident some 9 years later was too remote to impose liability”). Block has offered no factual basis that Brooklyn Park Motors had any knowledge of, or reason to know of, the alleged defect so as to subject it to negligence liability.

This reasoning is contrary to Minnesota law. Although the employer is generally responsible for ensuring worker safety, "a manufacturer may not delegate its duty to design a reasonably safe product." See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 624; Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989). Further — to the extent they are relevant — the district court reads the ANSI standards too narrowly.

App. 1986) ("Strict liability does not apply to a dealer in used equipment."); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 791 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Idaho 1990) (no common law or statutory basis for imposing strict liability on commercial seller of used products); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975) (declining to impose strict liability on dealer of used automobiles where no allegation defects were created by dealer); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa 1987) (where defect is not caused by dealer nor discoverable by reasonable and customary inspection, strict liability does not apply); Sell v. Bertsch Co., Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (D.C. Kan. 1984) (applying Kansas law; seller of defective used product who has not repaired or remanufactured product not strictly liable); Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, Inc., 549 A.2d 385, 392 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (dealer in used products not strictly liable unless dealer created the defect); Gorath v. Rockwell International, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131-32 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989) (absent evidence that seller of used goods exercised control over design, manufacture, or warnings, had actual knowledge of defect, or created the defect, strict liability does not apply); Brigham v. Hudson Motors, Inc., 392 A.2d 130, 135 (N.H. 1978) (declining to extend application of strict liability to those in business of selling used vehicles); Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979) (dealer of used equipment not strictly liable for defective used equipment sold "as is"); and Crandell v. Larkin Jones Appliance Co., Inc., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D. 1983) (agreeing with rationale of courts refusing to extend strict liability to sellers of used goods except in instance where seller has rebuilt or reconditioned goods). These cases reveal not only that the states are split on whether and in what circumstances to hold a seller of used goods strictly liable, but they also reveal no trend that might convince a federal court sitting in diversity that the Connecticut

Mr. Oien has not brought forth any evidence suggesting that the inspection procedures used by Home Depot were unreasonable or inadequate, nor that a reasonable inspection would have given Home Depot notice of the alleged dangerous condition. See Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Minn.Ct.App. 19889) (affirming summary judgment in part because “[a]ppellants have failed to offer any evidence that an inspection of the paper cutter would have indicated its alleged . . . condition.”); Pape v. Macks, LLC, No. A10-1417, 2011 WL 1466433 (Minn.Ct.App. Apr. 19, 2011) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff offered no “evidence that an inspection of the door would have revealed the alleged defect” and instead “rel[ied] on conclusory statements about the inadequacy of respondents' inspections or the possible effect of reasonable inspection

OfficeMax asserts that Sieber's claims against it should be dismissed because Bond Street is the manufacturer of the Stebco cart and OfficeMax is a "passive middleman." In Minnesota, the "passive middleman" statute, allows for the dismissal of defendants other than the manufacturer from a products liability action if certain conditions are met. Minn. Stat. § 544.41; Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). First, the manufacturer must have answered or be required to have answered the complaint.

The type of promotion described by Masepohl does not constitute "significant control over the design or manufacture of the product" as required by section 544.41, subdivision 3. See Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l. Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989) (defining a non-passive middleman as one who had "some involvement with the condition of the product"). Masepohl does not dispute that none of the Distributors manufactured, produced, or designed any cigarettes or inspected the cigarettes prior to sale.