Opinion
Civil No. 04-85-BR.
May 28, 2004
HAROLD GOOKHEE Portland, OR, Plaintiff Pro Se
KAREN J. IMMERGUT United States Attorney Portland, OR
JEREMY N. HENDON Trial Attorney, Tax Division Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (#4), to which Plaintiff did not file a response. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On January 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed his Complaint, which he titled "Counterclaim — in admiralty — Re: God-given unalienable rights in the original estate — Article III; Constitution." Attached to Plaintiff's Complaint are numerous documents concerning income taxes. The attachments include Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") documents regarding the income taxes of Plaintiff (identified in these documents as Harold G. Lee), Sylvia W. Lee (Plaintiff's wife), and a business known as "Harold Lee M.D.P.C." Each page of each IRS document has the words "REFUSED FOR CAUSE" hand-written in large bold print diagonally across the document.
The substance of Plaintiff's claims is difficult to discern. Plaintiff does state that the nature of this case is injunctive, however, and that he seeks "injunctive relief from any future presentments and theft or kidnap actions from any foreign agents or principals." (Emphasis in original.)
Based on Plaintiff's statements and the documents attached his Complaint, the Court construes the Complaint as an attempt to enjoin the assessment or collection of federal income taxes. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on two bases: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly serve the true defendant; and (2) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
LEGAL STANDARDS
On a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), all allegations in the complaint are considered true and are construed in the plaintiff's favor. Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999). When the plaintiff appears pro se, the court "must construe liberally [the plaintiff's] inartful pleading." Ortez v. Wash. County, 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996). A court should not dismiss a complaint, thus depriving the plaintiff of an opportunity to establish his or claims at trial, "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider affidavits and other evidence that support or attack the complaint's jurisdictional allegations. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff has the burden the establish that the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction. Ass'n of American Med. Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2000).
Before dismissing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the " pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is `absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment.'" Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) ( per curiam)). If a pro se plaintiff is given leave to amend the complaint, the court must set out the complaint's deficiencies to assist the litigant in avoiding repetition of his or her errors. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988).
DISCUSSION
I. Caisse Is Not a Proper Defendant
Deborah Caisse is an IRS Revenue Agent in Kennewick, Washington. Defendant argues the United States is the only proper Defendant in this action, and the Court, therefore, should dismiss any claims against Defendant Caisse. According to the documents attached to Plaintiff's Complaint, Caisse, on behalf of the IRS, sent administrative summons and other document requests to Plaintiff to aid Caisse in her audit of Plaintiff's potential tax liabilities.
It is clear from the documents attached to Plaintiff's Complaint that any action Caisse may have taken against Plaintiff was in her official capacity as a government employee. Plaintiff does not allege any facts in his Complaint to support a claim that Caisse took any action against him in any capacity other than that of IRS agent. To the extent Plaintiff's Complaint is asserted against Caisse in her individual capacity, therefore, the Court concludes Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state such a claim.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against Caisse in her official capacity as an IRS employee, it is well established that such an action is essentially an action against the United States. See Smith v. Grimm, 534 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). An action against government officers is an action against the sovereign "if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury . . . or interfere with the public administration. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). An exception applies if the government officer acted beyond her statutory powers or exercised her powers in a manner that was constitutionally void. Id. at 621-22. Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts to support the application of either exception. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims against Caisse must be dismissed. B. The United States Enjoys Sovereign Immunity
At the center of Plaintiff's claim is a request to enjoin the federal government from actions related to the collection of taxes. "It is axiomatic that Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to any suit brought against the United States under admiralty law or otherwise." Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). Plaintiff has not alleged the United States consented to be sued. The lack of consent to be sued deprives this Court of jurisdiction.
In addition, the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars Plaintiff's claims. The "principal purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act is to preserve the Government's ability to assess and collect taxes expeditiously with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for a refund." Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 920 F.2d 1481, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation and citation omitted), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
A limited number of statutory exceptions to the Act's proscription against enjoining the government's tax assessment and collection efforts exists. In addition, a narrow exception exists when a plaintiff shows the government cannot prevail under any circumstances and the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief. Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff, however, has not presented any factual allegations to support the application of any of these exceptions. Accordingly, the Court concludes it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Anti-Injunction Act. Because it is clear Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies of his Complaint by amendment, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (#4) and DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.