Opinion
No. 04-02-00908-CR.
Delivered and Filed: February 4, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2001-CR-6220, Honorable Pat Priest, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: CATHERINE STONE, Justice, SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles Goodwin ("Goodwin") was convicted of robbery, and a jury assessed the punishment of life in prison. On appeal, Goodwin asserts two points of error: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of extraneous conduct by Goodwin during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial; and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to invite the jury to consider the effect of the parole laws in determining Goodwin's sentence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Luci Thomas and Tom McLaughlin were working at a fast food restaurant when McLaughlin noticed a vehicle parked at the menu board. Shortly after McLaughlin noticed the vehicle, the vehicle pulled up to the order window. The driver told Thomas that he had a gun and to give him all the money in the register. When the driver demanded the money from Thomas, he had a white cloth wrapped around his right hand Thomas immediately closed the window and told McLaughlin that a man attempted to rob her. McLaughlin called the police. After arriving at the restaurant, Officer Mark Duke dispatched the description of the vehicle and its driver over the radio. Officer Robert Ingram was leaving a nearby station when he heard the call regarding the restaurant robbery. Shortly after hearing that call, Officer Ingram heard another dispatch about a burglary of a home nearby with a description of the actor and possible license plate of the car involved. Upon arriving at the home, Officer Ingram noticed a car parked on the side of the road. The driver of the car was attempting to conceal himself below the dash. When Officer Ingram turned his vehicle around, the car sped off. A car chase ensued until, eventually, the car crashed into a privacy fence. The driver exited the car and attempted to flee on foot, but Officer Ingram eventually took the driver into custody. At that time, Officer Ingram received a description of the vehicle involved in the robbery at the restaurant. Officer Ingram then transported the driver approximately two miles to the restaurant where the employees identified the driver, Goodwin, as the person who tried to rob the restaurant.Extraneous Offense
In his first point of error, Goodwin claims that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of unrelated extraneous conduct when it admitted evidence of Goodwin's actions between the time of the robbery and his identification by the restaurant employees. The admission of evidence is a decision within the discretion of the trial court. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). Thus, the trial court's admission of evidence will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 379-80. This standard means that as long as the trial court's ruling was within a "zone of reasonable disagreement," there is no abuse of discretion and the trial court's ruling will be upheld. Rachel v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Generally, evidence of other criminal acts or wrongful acts is not admissible to prove a person's guilt. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); Avila v. State, 18 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.). In this case, the trial judge admitted evidence of the extraneous acts based on the "same transaction contextual evidence exception" to Rule 404(b). "Same transaction contextual evidence" is a recognized exception to Rule 404(b) and consists of other offenses related to the main offense. Garza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (citing Lockhart v. State, 847 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)). This evidence is admissible when it "is necessary for the state to logically present evidence of the charged offense." Id. The evidence is admissible to enable a jury to hear all relevant facts surrounding the circumstances of the charged offense. Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). "Where several crimes are intermixed or blended with one another, or connected so that they form an indivisible criminal transaction, and full proof by testimony . . . of any one of them cannot be given without showing the others," the evidence is considered "same transaction contextual" and is admissible as an exception to Rule 404(b). Pondexter, 942 S.W.2d at 584; see also Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Goodwin contends that the evidence surrounding the burglary does not constitute "same transaction contextual evidence" and is inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Goodwin relies on the principle laid out in Pondexter v. State that "same transaction contextual evidence" is admissible only when it is required for the jury's proper understanding of the offense and when the offense would not make logical sense without also presenting the same transaction evidence. 942 S.W.2d at 584. Goodwin contends that the sole purpose of the evidence was to link him with many other offenses in an effort to show his bad character, which is an impermissible purpose under Rule 404(b). We disagree. Goodwin's actions following the burglary of the restaurant are relevant to his identification as the individual who robbed the restaurant. The manner by which Goodwin came to be identified as the robber was a necessary fact the jury needed to hear to enable the State to logically present its case. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 167-68 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (finding that where actions of a defendant are significantly blended with the indicted offense, these actions are admissible as "same transaction contextual evidence"). Therefore, this evidence constitutes "same transaction contextual evidence" that is admissible under Rule 404(b). Having determined that the evidence was relevant for purposes of establishing the manner by which the restaurant employees were able to identify Goodwin, we must next consider whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Many courts have recognized the considerable freedom granted to trial judges' evaluations of the probative value of proffered evidence in relation to its prejudicial effect. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 378; see also Winkfield v. State, 792 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd) (finding that a trial court's decision on the relationship of probative value of evidence over the prejudicial effect will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion). When Goodwin objected to the admission of the extraneous evidence, the judge stated that he considered the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice and found that the probative value was sufficiently strong. Clearly, the probative value of this evidence was strong because it was a crucial link to establishing Goodwin's identity. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.Parole Law
In his second point of error, Goodwin argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to the Prosecutor's closing argument inviting the jury to consider parole law when deciding punishment. In his closing statement to the jury during the punishment phase of the trial, the prosecutor stated:And you have heard a lot about the parole system that we have. And I imagine that some of you probably are not very happy with the way it — it works. But, nonetheless, it is the law. And I will go ahead and explain it to you a little bit. In here, it says that `he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good conduct time equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less. Okay, so if a defendant, in Texas is convicted, for example, of this type of offense and you assess, say, a 99-year sentence — right? . . . Even though we know a life sentence means 15 years before he is eligible — a person would be eligible for parole, the state would ask you, in this case, to assess life in prison. Send a message to the parole board as to what your intent is. Okay? Do you see how that works?Goodwin argues that these statements are impermissible and in direct violation of the statutory directive not to present evidence regarding the operation of parole law. The standard of review for improper jury argument is to review the record in its entirety to determine whether any erroneous statements were made, and if so, whether they were so prejudicial as to deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d 378, 385 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). In applying this standard, we find that no erroneous statements were made. Article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that during the punishment phase of a criminal trial, the court shall inform the jury of the effect of parole in general. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 4 (Vernon 1981 Supp. 2003). This statute allows the jury to consider the general effects of parole law such as eligibility requirements but not how the parole laws will apply specifically to the defendant. Id. A prosecutor "must avoid applying the parole law specifically to the defendant on trial." Clark v. State, 643 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Hawkins v. State, 99 S.W.3d 890, 901 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref'd). A prosecutor may, however, summarize the court's charge to the jury regarding when a person with a certain punishment is eligible for parole as long as such summary is an accurate reflection of the law. Helleson v. State, 5 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). Permissible prosecutorial argument is limited to four distinct areas: summation of the evidence; reasonable conclusions from the evidence; answer to the defendant's argument; and a plea for law enforcement. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 154 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Summation of parole law, as long as accurate and not specifically applied to the defendant, is a proper plea for law enforcement. Compare Hawkins, 99 S.W.3d at 901(finding a prosecutor's statement about when the defendant would be eligible for parole harmful error even with a limiting instruction); with Helleson, 5 S.W.3d at 397 (holding a prosecutor's argument that "a person is eligible for parole" is proper when it accurately reflected the law). In this case, the prosecutor's statements regarding parole law are permissible. These statements did not apply the parole law to Goodwin specifically but remained general in nature. The prosecutor's statements did not indicate when Goodwin would be eligible for parole but summarized when a person convicted of a life sentence would be eligible for parole. Finally, the statement by the prosecutor urging the jury to consider the general application of parole was simply a plea for a longer sentence and a legitimate argument for law enforcement. Thus, the trial court did not err in overruling Goodwin's objection to the prosecutor's closing statements during the punishment phase of the trial.