We have previously held that the terms of employment of an Oklahoma City police officer are controlled by the city charter. Graham v. City of Oklahoma City, 859 F.2d 142, 146 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196 (Okla. 1980) and Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okl. 26, 182 P.2d 762 (1947)). As an appointee of the city manager, Driggins's terms of employment in the City's Human Resources Department similarly are controlled by the city charter.

The terms of employment of a police officer employed by the City of Oklahoma City are controlled by the city charter. Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196 (Okla. 1980); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okl. 26, 182 P.2d 762 (1947). The city charter grants all power to discipline and discharge city employees to the city manager and specifically states "removals and demotions shall be made solely for the good of the service."

And it is well settled in that state that a charter adopted in that manner becomes the organic law of the municipality and supersedes all general laws of the state in conflict with it relating to purely municipality matters. Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762; Dickinson v. Tidd, 10 Cir., 137 F.2d 610. In City of Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630, 46 P.2d 334, on which the insurance company places strong reliance, it was held that in a home-rule city the power of removal of members of the fire department is governed by the provisions of the charter rather than by state law.

The court, however, held the city's charter provisions allowing the city manager to fire employees "for the good of the service" took precedence over the statute, and therefore the "for cause " provision of § 50-123 created a property interest only in the pension and retirement benefits granted by state law, and not in continued employment with the city. In that determination, the Rains court relied on Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 1947 OK 200, 182 P.2d 762, 764, which held that city charter provisions relating to the removal or discharge of officers or employees were "solely matters of municipal concern and control over general laws," and were therefore within the general rule that a city charter becomes the organic law of the city, superseding the general laws relating to municipalities in matters of purely municipal concern. ¶ 16 We are not persuaded by Durant's arguments.

See also Oliver v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 654 P.2d 607, 609 (1982); City of Ponca City v. Edwards, Okla., 460 P.2d 418, 421 (1969); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762, 764 (1947). The next question before us today is whether the City was authorized to pay the contested health insurance benefits under the terms of the Moore City Charter § 2-3 and §§ 10-111 and 23-108 of the Code.

Even where, by legislation, removal could only be for "good and sufficient cause" the discretion of the appointing authority was not substantially diminished. See City of Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630, 46 P.2d 334 (1935) (interest of a new fire chief in selecting his own men held good and sufficient cause for the removal of a fireman appointed by a former chief); Hunter v. Quick, 183 Okla. 19, 79 P.2d 590 (1938) (same); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762 (1947) (good and sufficient cause not limited to misconduct or inadequacy of employee-membership in F.O.P., considered detrimental to service by city manager, held to be sufficient cause). And further exemplifying this strict view concerning public employers' power over personnel matters, the court in Jones, supra, held that the provisions of the Tulsa city charter precluding policemen from being removed except for cause and after written notice and an opportunity to be heard did not apply to demotions, promotions, or transfers, stating that "such power should be guarded carefully for many sound reasons . . . and for an employee to be held within the protection of any specific legislative restriction of such power, he must definitely show that his position comes within the specific terms of such restriction."

(2) The City's charter supersedes the general laws (the Firefighters' and Policemen's Arbitration Law) in matters of purely municipal concern. (Goodwin v. Oklahoma City (1947), 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762); (3) The administration of municipal police and fire departments are matters of local municipal concern.

See also City of Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630, 46 P.2d 334, and Town of Luther v. State ex rel. Harrod, Okl, 425 P.2d 986, for further discussion and statements of this rule of law. In Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762, we sustained the City's discharge of a police officer, whose employment was not for a specified period, although the statutes enumerated the grounds for discharge of a police officer and further provided that no police officer could be discharged by the governing body without cause. We based our holding on the rule of law that the city charter became the organic law of the city, superseding the general laws relating to municipalities in matters of purely municipal concern, and that the provisions of the city charter relating to the removal of appointed officers were solely matters of municipal concern and control over the general laws.

Further, the provisions of a city charter, adopted and approved in accordance with the Constitution, Art. 18, § 3(a), not in conflict with any constitutional provision, supersede all laws of the state in conflict therewith insofar as such laws relate to merely municipal matters. Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762; Walton v. Donnelly, 83 Okla. 233, 201 P. 367. The charter provision of Oklahoma City, to the extent that the provision making an emergency ordinance take effect upon passage and before publication is in conflict with the general law relating to the publication of city ordinances, must prevail if the publication of city ordinances is merely a municipal matter.

t v. Denny, 118 Ind 449, 21 N.E. 274 (1889) (fire, police and public works held local matters). Similarly with respect to the administration of the police department: Richards v. Wheeler, 10 Cal.App.2d 108, 51 P.2d 436 (1935) (police and firemen's pensions); Lemaire v. Crockett, 116 Me. 263, 101 A. 302 (1917) (appointment of city police commissioner); State ex rel Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958) (selection of officers of police force contrary to procedures prescribed by state civil service statute, overruling earlier Ohio cases); State ex rel Lynch v. City of Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956) (selection of police chief outside of civil service list); Harsney v. Allen, 160 Ohio St. 36, 113 N.E.2d 86 (1953) (classification of police personnel); Hile v. City of Cleveland, 118 Ohio St. 99, 160 N.E. 621 (1928) (appointment of chief of police); State ex rel Vogt v. Donahey, 108 Ohio St. 440, 140 N.E. 609 (1923) (appointment of police officials); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okl 26, 182 P.2d 762 (1947) (discharge of police officer); In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956) (discharge of police officer). See also, Scheafer v. Herman, 172 Cal. 338, 155 P. 1084 (1916) (recall procedures affecting city attorney held municipal affair); State ex rel Frankenstein v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St. 339, 126 N.E. 309 (1919) (qualifications of city mayor); Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1915) (election of municipal officers held matter of local self-government); State ex rel Lentz v. Edwards, 90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914) (appointment of civil service commissioners).