Tenn. Comp. R. Regs. r. 1120-12-.02 (1988) sets out the procedure for requesting an appointing authority to review a written reprimand.See State ex rel. Byram v. City of Brentwood , 833 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991); Goodwin v. Metropolitan Bd.of Health , 656 S.W.2d 383, 386-87 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983). The trial court took up Mr. Davis's petition for review under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (1998) in August 1996. During the hearing, the Department and Commissioner Culpepper moved to dismiss Mr. Davis's petition because it was not timely filed.

In dissent, Judge Cantrell relied upon two cases in which the Court of Appeals had previously disallowed joinder of an administrative appeal and an original action. Those cases, Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. App. 1983) and State ex rel. Byram v. City of Brentwood, 833 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. App. 1991) were distinguished by the majority. We granted application for permission to appeal to decide this issue of first impression in Tennessee.

Conversely, in Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health, the Court of Appeals stated: "a non-judicial board has no power or authority to make constitutional rulings." Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1983). A series of cases have spawned confusion on the applicable Tennessee rule.

See Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) ("[N]either the technicalities of the Civil Rules of Procedure nor the common law rules of evidence necessarily apply before nonjudicial bodies unless the rules of that body so require.")

It is a practice that has been condemned by this court on more than one occasion. See Winkler v. Tipton County Bd. of Educ., 63 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001); Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 386-87 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983). In Winkler, the petitioner, a tenured teacher, was charged with unprofessional conduct.

Therefore, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence do not apply unless the Board enacted a rule to adopt them. See Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 388 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983) ("[N]either the technicalities of the Civil Rules of Procedure nor the common law rules of evidence necessarily apply before nonjudicial bodies unless the rules of that body so require") (emphasis added) (citing Big Fork Mining Co. v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981); L N Railroad Co. v. Fowler, 197 Tenn. 266, 271 S.W.2d 188 (1954)). In this instance, the Civil Service Merit Act does not provide that Board hearings are subject to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. 1971 Tenn. Priv. Acts, ch. 110, § 23.

Thirty-eight years ago, this Court "heartily condemn[ed] that which appear[ed] ... to be a growing practice, i.e., the joinder of an appeal with an original action and the simultaneous consideration of both at the trial level." Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health , 656 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) ; see alsoGroves v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety and Homeland Sec. , No. M2016-01448-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 6288170, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018). We explained as follows:

The court also dismissed Mr. Groves's declaratory judgment action for, among other reasons, improper joinder of an original action with an administrative appeal. Thirty-five years ago, this Court "heartily condemn[ed] that which appear[ed] . . . to be a growing practice, i.e., the joinder of an appeal with an original action and the simultaneous consideration of both at the trial level." Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). As we explained,

While we agree that Mr. Howell's regulatory taking claim should have been dismissed, we do so because the regulatory taking claim—and all of Mr. Howell's claims invoking the original jurisdiction of the chancery court—should have been dismissed at the outset. We emphasize that a litigant may not bring claims invoking the original jurisdiction of the Chancery Court when he or she has initiated the proceedings by seeking a writ of certiorari. SeeState ex rel. Byram v. City of Brentwood , 833 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ; Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health , 656 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) ("The chancellor eventually dismissed the Declaratory Judgment aspect of the case, but we hold it should have been dismissed at the very outset."). In Goodwin , this Court stated as follows:

Therefore, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence do not apply unless the Board enacted a rule to adopt them. See Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) ("[N]either the technicalities of the Civil Rules of Procedure nor the common law rules of evidence necessarily apply before nonjudicial bodies unless the rules of that body so require.") (emphasis added) (citing Big Fork Mining Co. v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); L N Railroad Co. v. Fowler, 197 Tenn. 266, 271 S.W.2d 188 (1954)). . . . Accordingly, in reviewing decisions from these "less than legally formal hearings," appellate courts are guided, not by the Rules of Evidence, but instead "by a sense of fair play and the avoidance of undue prejudice to either side of the controversy and [must determine] whether . . . the action of the hearing Board in admitting or excluding evidence was unreasonable or arbitrary." Goodwin, 656 S.W.2d at 388.