The internal review comments were provided to appellant — only the names of the internal reviewing physicians were redacted. We find support for our decision in Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257 ( Goodstein). In Goodstein, the physician in question was asked to take a drug test in response to confidential information received by the medical staff committee suggesting the physician had a drug problem.

We disregard those assertions that lack record citations. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1260 fn. 1 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 577].) MPC 823 LLC (MPC 823) is a limited liability company that was formed to pursue the development of residential property in Menlo Park.

We disregard those assertions that lack record citations. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Goodstein v. Cedars–Sinai Med. Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1260 & fn. 1, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 577.) MPC 823 LLC (MPC 823) is a limited liability company that was formed to pursue the development of residential property in Menlo Park.

To the extent Dr. Dennis means to suggest she has a right to due process of law under the state and federal Constitutions with respect to the peer review process, she is mistaken. As explained in Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 577], "'[s]ince the actions of a private institution are not necessarily those of the state, the controlling concept in such cases is fair procedure and not due process. Fair procedure rights apply when the organization involved is one affected with a public interest, such as a private hospital.

The rationale for a court not rendering a final decision on the merits of a physician's application for staff membership is that judges are untrained and courts are ill-equipped to make such decisions. (See Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1266, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 577.) If the correct standards were applied, the reviewing court's second inquiry is whether the administrative findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.

[Citations.] It is the duty of counsel to refer the reviewing court to the portion of the record which supports appellant's contentions on appeal. [Citation.] If no citation 'is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived.' [Citation.]" (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 (Guthrey); see also Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1260, fn. 1.) In this case, the recitations of facts and arguments in O'Connor's briefs are devoid of citations to the reporter's transcript of the hearings held in the lower court.

Other cases since the early 1980's have made the same point repeatedly. ( Powell, supra , 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 274, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 381 ; Dougherty v. Haag (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 315, 317, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ; Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1265, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 ; Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospital (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 638, 653-654 & fn. 4, 183 Cal.Rptr. 423 ; Applebaum v. Board of Directors (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 648, 657, 163 Cal.Rptr. 831 ( Applebaum ).) The former common law in California involving fair procedure was supplanted in 1989 with the enactment of section 809 et seq., part of a comprehensive statutory scheme for medical licensing intended to exercise the state's right to opt out of 1986 federal legislation in which the Legislature perceived deficiencies.

Those factual assertions are disregarded. (Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294; Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1260 fn. 1.) For this reason as well, his argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. Third, the record demonstrates that substantial evidence does support the court's factual findings, as well as the court's conclusion that the Board's findings were supported by the weight of the evidence.

We have discretion to ignore assertions lacking proper record support. (See Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1260, fn. 1.) On this basis, we may ignore the entirety of Jimenez's presentation of the facts.

We deny the motion. We will ignore statements of fact that are not supported by the record, whether in the brief of Salvio or in the briefs of Lee. (E.g., Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1260 & fn. 1.) I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY