Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-01172-BHH-JDA
04-01-2020
Roselyn Goodrum, Petitioner, v. United States of America, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Roselyn Goodrum ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, brings this habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
The Court has carefully reviewed the Petition [Doc. 1] and supporting documents [Doc. 1-1] filed in this action and takes judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's underlying criminal case, United States v. Goodrum, No. 1:16-cr-0166-RBH-1 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2016) ("Goodrum"). See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'"). Petitioner's Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal
On September 1, 2016, Petitioner plead guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina to Count 1 of the Superseding Indictment at case number 4:16-cr-0166-RBH-1, charging Petitioner with conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Goodrum, Docs. 166; 167; 168. On November 16, 2016, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw her plea of guilty, and, on December 7, 2016, Petitioner filed an amended pro se motion to withdraw her plea of guilty. Id., Docs. 206; 224. Petitioner also filed a pro se motion for new counsel on December 7, 2016. Id., Doc. 226.
On December 20, 2016, the Honorable Kaymani D. West granted Petitioner's motion for new counsel and appointed new counsel to represent Petitioner. Id., Docs. 235; 236. Thereafter, on February 9, 2017, the Honorable R. Bryan Harwell denied Petitioner's pro se motions to withdraw her plea of guilty. Id., Doc. 249.
On February 9, 2017, Judge Harwell sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 27 months, followed by 3 years of supervised release. [Doc. 1 at 2]; Goodrum, Docs. 250; 252. Petitioner waived her right to appeal. Id., Doc. 255.
On March 10, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising nearly identical grounds to those she raises in the instant Petition. Id., Doc. 258. On July 11, 2018, Judge Harwell dismissed Petitioner's motion to vacate, with prejudice. Id., Docs. 320; 321. Petitioner filed an appeal, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal on December 21, 2018. Id., Doc. 346.
Petitioner's Present Action
Petitioner now seeks habeas relief from her conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner alleges she is serving a sentence, but she appears to be on supervised release. [Id. at 1.] Petitioner alleges she is challenging "[t]he authority of the court to impose sentencing after [her] guilty plea was withdrawn without having a trial." [Id. at 2.] Petitioner alleges the following ground for relief: "On December 20, 2016, Judge Kaymani D. West allowed me to withdraw my guilty plea and proceed to trial." [Id. at 6.] Petitioner alleges the transcript from that hearing "clearly states that Judge West appointed me new counsel[ and] allowed me to withdraw my plea and proceed to trial." [Id. at 6.] For her relief, Petitioner asks the Court to set aside or vacate her sentence, uphold Judge West's ruling, and remove her conviction from her record. [Id. at 7.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).
Furthermore, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012) (explaining that a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254). Petitioner is a pro se litigant, and thus her pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
DISCUSSION
Savings Clause Test
Ordinarily, "defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255." Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). However, § 2255 includes a savings clause, which permits a district court to consider a § 2241 petition challenging the validity of a prisoner's conviction or sentence when § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of . . . detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); In re: Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Petitioner can challenge her federal sentence under § 2241 only if she can satisfy the requirements of the § 2255 savings clause, which states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In other words, Petitioner's § 2241 action is barred unless she can demonstrate that the relief available to him under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Nevertheless, "the remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion." In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5 (citation omitted).
The savings clause test is a jurisdictional requirement that must be met before the Court can entertain a petition filed pursuant to § 2241. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the Court may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, and if a petitioner cannot meet the savings clause requirements, then the § 2241 petition "must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." Rice, 617 F.3d at 807. The Fourth Circuit has established a test for evaluating whether a petitioner meets the savings clause under § 2255 when she contests her conviction. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34. Specifically, a petitioner can show that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to challenge a conviction when:
(1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.Id. at 333-34. Notably, however, the savings clause is not satisfied merely because a petitioner's prior § 2255 motion was unsuccessful or because a petitioner is unable to meet the requirements to file a successive § 2255 motion. Chisholm v. Pettiford, No. 6:06-cv-2032-PMD-WMC, 2006 WL 2707320, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2006). As explained below, Petitioner's § 2241 action should be dismissed because she has not established the elements of the In re Jones test.
Analysis
As noted, Petitioner appears to challenge her conviction, arguing that Judge West granted her motion to withdraw her plea of guilty. Contrary to Petitioner's argument, Judge Harwell denied Petitioner's motions to withdraw her plea of guilty on February 9, 2017, Goodrum, Doc. 249, after which he sentenced her to a term of imprisonment followed by supervised release. Additionally, Petitioner previously filed a § 2255 petition collaterally attacking her conviction and sentence, asserting identical grounds to those she raises here. The District Court denied Petitioner's § 2255 motion, and the Fourth Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal. Accordingly, "[a]s there is no possibility of setting aside the guilty plea at this juncture, [Petitioner's] motion [should be] denied." United States v. Frilando, No. 4:97-cr-00084-CWH-1, 2013 WL 4020607, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2013).
Because Petitioner appears to challenge her conviction, the undersigned applies the test announced in In re Jones. To the extent Petitioner also challenges her sentence, the undersigned also finds that she has failed to meet the test set forth in Wheeler.
Further, Petitioner cannot satisfy the savings clause test as she has failed to show that, subsequent to her first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which she was convicted is deemed not to be criminal. Because Petitioner cannot satisfy the savings clause test, this Court lacks jurisdiction over her Petition. See Galloway v. United States, No. 2:16-cv-348, 2016 WL 8943463, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2016) ("When a § 2241 motion filed by a federal prisoner seeks to attack a conviction or sentence (rather than the execution of a sentence) and does not satisfy the savings clause by meeting the requirements of 'the Jones rule' outlined above, the district court 'lack[s] jurisdiction over the [§ 2241] Habeas Motion' and is required to dismiss it.") (quoting Rice, 617 F. 3d at 807).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons explained above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition filed in this case. Accordingly, it is recommended that the § 2241 Petition be dismissed without requiring the Respondent to file an answer or return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge April 1, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).