Opinion
36034.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 20, 1956. REHEARING DENIED MARCH 13, 1956.
Damages. Before Judge Henson. Fulton Civil Court. November 18, 1955.
J. Walter LeCraw, for plaintiff in error.
E. M. Sasseville, contra.
The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's demurrer, nor thereafter in denying the defendant's motion for new trial as amended.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 20, 1956 — REHEARING DENIED MARCH 13, 1956.
Alfred Henton brought an action against T. G. Goodrum to recover for damages to his automobile, which, according to the petition, occurred because the defendant, while driving east on Memorial Drive in the City of Atlanta, moved his automobile from the right-hand lane to the center lane striking the plaintiff's automobile, which was traveling east on Memorial Drive in the said center lane.
The petition set forth the following ordinances of the City of Atlanta as being in effect at the time of the collision. "Sec. 30.38. Overtaking a vehicle on the left. The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations, exceptions and special rules hereinafter stated: (a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle. (b) Except when overtaking and passing on the right if permitted, the driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle."
"Sec. 30.40. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety."
The defendant was charged with negligence per se in violating these ordinances as well as with being negligent per se in having faulty brakes in violation of Section 115 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways of Georgia (Code, Ann. Supp., § 68-1715).
The defendant's demurrer to the portion of the petition setting forth the ordinance of the City of Atlanta known as § 30.40, quoted above, was overruled.
On the trial of the case the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which verdict was made the judgment of the trial court. The defendant filed a motion for new trial on the usual general grounds which he later amended so as to include two special grounds. The trial court denied the motion for new trial as amended, and to this judgment the defendant excepts as well as to the judgment overruling his demurrer.
1. The defendant's demurrer to the ordinance of the City of Atlanta known as § 30.40 was based on the objection that the said ordinance is void because it is too vague and indefinite to constitute any criterion of conduct in the operation of motor vehicles.
The Act of 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 556, 616; Code, Ann. Supp., § 68-1728), gives municipalities the right, by proper ordinances, to regulate traffic within the limits of the respective municipalities. The ordinance in question, § 30.40, supra, requires no more of a driver than does the general law of the State which covers this subject (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 556, 584; Code, Ann. Supp., § 68-1640), and although a municipal ordinance can be declared void because of its being unreasonable and is not be to measured by the more extensive powers of the State legislature ( Mayor c. of Savannah v. Cooper, 131 Ga. 670, 676, 63 S.E. 138), an ordinance that requires no more of a driver than does the general law of the State cannot be deemed unreasonable. Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling this ground of demurrer.
2. The first special ground of the defendant's amended motion for new trial complained of the introduction in evidence of the ordinance dealt with in the previous division of this opinion, and the defendant's objection was based on the same grounds as was his demurrer. Accordingly, the ruling of this court in the previous division of this opinion necessarily controls here, and the trial court did not err in admitting the ordinance in evidence.
3. In the second special ground the defendant complains that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction in evidence of the ordinance pleaded as § 30.38, supra, on the ground that it was "irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial."
"An objection to evidence as irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial, without more, is too general, and was properly overruled." McBride v. Johns, 73 Ga. App. 444 (2) ( 36 S.E.2d 822). Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's objection.
4. On the trial of the case there was evidence adduced that the defendant, while driving in the right-hand lane turned into the center lane, where the plaintiff's automobile was being driven in the same direction as was the defendant's automobile, causing the right rear fender of his automobile to strike the front of the plaintiff's automobile, and in so doing caused the driver of the plaintiff's automobile to lose control of the plaintiff's automobile and to drive across the street and strike a telephone pole causing the damage to the plaintiff's automobile sued for.
Therefore, there was evidence to support the verdict of the jury, and where there is any evidence supporting the verdict of a jury, which has been approved by the trial judge, this court will not disturb it on review.
Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Quillian, J., concur.