Opinion
Civ. A. 20-1259
07-25-2022
JERMAINE I. GOODMAN, Plaintiff, v. STEPHANIE WOOD, MARK CAPOZZA, ERIC T. ARMEL, CHUCK BYERS, M. WILES, LT. W. TIFT, P. SAAVEDRA, and LISA DUNCAN, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
Pending before the Court are two motions for summary judgment and a motion to strike. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that both motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 83, 87) be granted and the motion to strike (ECF No. 105) be denied.
II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural Background
Jermaine I. Goodman (“Goodman”), at all relevant times, was a prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) housed at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”). On August 28, 2020, he commenced this civil rights action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Mathew Miceli; Dr. P. Saavedra; Corrections Health Care Administrator Stephanie Wood (“Wood”); Superintendent/ Facility Manager Mark Capozza (“Capozza”); Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services Eric T. Armel (“Armel”); Corrections Classification Program Manager Debra A. Hawkinberry (“Hawkinberry”); A-Unit Manager Chuck Byers (“Byers”); Licensed Psychology Manager Lisa Duncan (“Duncan”); Chief Grievance Officer Keri Moore (“Moore”); Chief Hearing Examiner Zachary J. Moslak (“Moslak”); Hearing Examiner Beth Rudziemski (“Rudziemski”); L-5 Captain/ J-Unit Manager W. Tift (“Tift”); Chief Grievance Officer Dorina Varner (“Varner”); former Secretary of Corrections John E. Wetzel (“Wetzel”); and Sergeant M. Wiles (“Wiles”). He alleges that the defendants violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution as well as his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. (ECF No. 1.) Goodman simultaneously filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which was denied. (ECF Nos. 3; 48.)
Thereafter, all defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 62.) The undersigned recommended that the motions be granted in part and denied in part. (Id.) Over the parties' objections, District Judge William S. Stickman IV adopted the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 66.) Goodman's Fourteenth Amendment and ADA claims were dismissed as well as individual defendants Dr. Miceli, Hawkinberry, Rudziemski, Moslak, Moore, Vaner, and Wetzel. The Court also dismissed the Eighth Amendment claims against Wood and Capozza relating to Goodman's disability claim and the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Armel. Thus, the remaining claims are Goodman's Eighth Amendment claims against Duncan, Wood, and Capozza regarding Goodman's mental health treatment requests and his First Amendment retaliation claims against Tift, Wiles, Byers, and Armel. (Id.)
There appears to be some confusion as to which complaint is the applicable complaint. (See ECF Nos. 83 ¶ 3; 88 at 2.) On September 11, 2020, this Court ordered the Clerk of Court to strike Goodman's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9), because it was identical to the original complaint and it appeared Goodman was trying simply to supplement the original complaint with an exhibit. The Court further ordered that the Clerk file the exhibit as a separate docket entry entitled “Supplement to the Complaint,” which he did. (ECF No. 12.) Consequently, the original complaint along with the supplement (ECF Nos. 1; 2; 15) constitute the applicable complaint.
Because Judge Stickman adopted the Report and Recommendation without modification, the Court construes his May 25, 2021 Order to dismiss all Eighth Amendment claims with the exception of those claims against Duncan, Wood, and Capozza relating to Goodman's mental health treatment. (ECF No. 66.)
This matter proceeded through discovery and a summary judgment briefing order was issued. Presently before the Court are two motions for summary judgment, one filed by Dr. Saavedra and another filed by Defendants Duncan, Wood, Capozza, Armel, Byers, Wiles, and Tift (collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”).
In the Case Management Order, Goodman was advised that
his Response to a motion for summary judgment may include opposing or counter affidavit which have either been sworn to under oath (notarized) or include at the end of the affidavit, immediately before the signature, the following in accordance with 28 U.S. § 1746: “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this ___ day of___, 20___.” Affidavits that are not either notarized or contain a declaration under penalty of perjury as set forth above will not be considered when determining the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff may attach copies of any depositions, answers to interrogatories or requests for admission, institutional records or other documents Plaintiff requests this Court to consider when addressing the summary judgment motion. The motion for summary judgment will be evaluated under the procedures set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.(ECF No. 68.)
The Corrections Defendants filed a motion, supporting brief, concise statement of material facts, and appendix. (ECF Nos. 83-86.) Goodman responded with a brief in opposition. (ECF No. 96.) He did not, however, file a response to the concise statement of material facts or an appendix in support of his counter position.
Dr. Saavedra likewise filed a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, a concise statement of material facts, and supporting appendix. (ECF Nos. 87-90.) Goodman filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 98) to which Dr. Saavedra replied. (ECF No. 103.) Goodman subsequently filed a response to Dr. Saavedra's concise statement of material facts. (ECF No. 104.) Dr. Saavedra then moved to strike Goodman's response to her concise statement. (ECF No. 105.) The motion to strike was denied in part by the Court as follows:
Defendant has not demonstrated that he has sustained any undue prejudice by the untimeliness of the submission and therefore the Response will not be stricken. Defendant's request for an order that deems Plaintiff's denials to be admissions is taken under advisement and will be addressed in the Court's Report and Recommendation regarding the pending motions for summary judgment. If Defendant Saavedra wishes to file a further reply in support of his motion in light of Plaintiff's submission, he may do so no later than June 15, 2022.(ECF No. 106.) Dr. Saavedra thereafter replied to Goodman's responsive concise statement of material facts. (ECF No. 107.)
B. Relevant Factual Background
1. Medical and Misconduct History
In 2017, Goodman began treating with Defendant Saavedra, D.O., a psychiatrist and qualified mental health provider licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 1, 2, 8; 104 ¶ 1, 2, 8.) Dr. Saavedra is one of the professionals at SCI-Fayette responsible for providing psychiatric treatment to inmates, i.e., assessing psychiatric needs, diagnosing mental health conditions, adjusting mental health diagnoses, and prescribing and monitoring medication. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶¶ 2-3; 104 ¶¶ 2-3.)
Dr. Saavedra diagnosed Goodman in 2017 with an obsessive-compulsive disorder as well as an anxiety disorder in 2017 and prescribed him Prozac. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶¶ 8, 15; 104 ¶¶ 8, 15.) Later that year, Goodman was diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma and was placed in the care of an oncologist, Dr. Miceli. (ECF Nos. 86-1 at 48-53; 89 ¶ 10; 104 ¶ 10.) Relevant to this case is the fact that Dr. Miceli recommended that the DOC assign Goodman a medical Z Code meaning that he was entitled to single cell housing. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶¶ 5-7, 16-17; 104 ¶¶ 5-7, 1617.) While doctors can recommend that a prisoner be assigned a medical Z Code, ultimately, the decision lies with the DOC. (See ECF Nos. 89 ¶¶ 6-7; 104 ¶¶ 6-7.)
Dr. Miceli determined Goodman's cancer was in remission in fall 2018. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 19; 104 ¶ 19.) Nevertheless, it was not until summer 2019 that Dr. Miceli recommended Goodman's medical Z Code be removed and Goodman was informed he would need to choose a cellmate. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 22; 104 ¶ 22.)
According to medical records, on July 31, 2019, Goodman met with Byers, who advised him that his Z Code was no longer medically necessary and that he must choose a suitable cellmate. (ECF No. 86-1 at 7.) Goodman was warned that if he refused a cellmate, he would receive a DC-141 and be sent to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). (Id.)
That same day, Goodman prepared an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” to Wood wherein he wrote:
I had a temporary [Z C]code for medical reasons since December of 2017. Recently[,] the Medical Department said I no longer need the single-cell status. I disagree vehemently, but it seems medical (i.e. Dr. Miceli) is sticking to his misguided opinion. This is also a security issue due to the stress-disease connection that I am suffering from. I also have been a H-code since entering Fayette in Sept. 2010. In brief, I am requesting you to reinstate my temporary [Z C]ode under security reasons as soon as possible. I can give you more details of my issues when we speak in person. But suffice [it] to say, I cannot deal with having a cellie at this time. My unit manager says I have until Monday (8/5) to pick a cellie. I'll be honest, I won't pick or accept any kind of cellie. . .(ECF No. 1-14.) Wood responded, “You received a temp [Z C]ode on 2-18 for treatment. You['re] in remission according to medical. Your Z [C]ode cann[o]t be issued. Address with U.M. Byers. I can't help you in this matter.” (Id.)
On August 5, 2019, Goodman sent an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” to the A-Unit Management Team of which Byers was the head (ECF No. 1-8):
I'm writing to firstly demonstrate that my position in this matter is in no disrespect to you nor any attempt to disregard DOC/SCI-Fayette rules. But I cannot accept or agree to the termination of my Z[ C]ode status for the following reasons; (1) the medical department (i.e. Dr. Miceli's) claim that I no longer need a single cell is extremely short-sighted and misguided. I was diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin's
(Diffuse Large B-Cell) Lymphoma in December of 2017, while I was subjected to double celling. Dr. Miceli nor any other medical personnel here was able to explain how or why I contracted this potentially terminal illness. So after diligently studying the history and etiology of this particular cancer type, I've found that emotional stress, anxiety, sadness and anger, etc. are significant factors in the lives of people who have been diagnosed with Lymphoma. . . While being subjected to double-celling[,] I was experiencing all of the above factors to a high degree.... So now that my cancer is supposedly in “remission,” why would I go back into an environment/ condition which is probably the main reason I developed cancer in the first place. Furthermore, I am still suffering from physical and mental sideeffects from chemotherapy and the Lymphoma itself, which Dr. Miceli has denied is related to the cancer or the treatment. But his “opinion” in this matter is not based on any proof or any physical examination, etc. As I have not seen him personally in approximately 4 or 5 months. . . Therefore, I have no confidence whatsoever in Dr. Miceli's opinion or recommendation that I no longer need a single cell. . . It would be highly irresponsible for SCI-Fayette to force me into a situation (i.e., double-celling) where I am subjected to even more physical, emotional, and mental suffering. For these reasons[,] I request for you to extend my temporary [Z C]ode status, as there is no way I can deal with the physical and mental stress of having a cellie.(ECF No. 1-8) (emphasis in original). Byers responded, “Your ‘temporary' Z [C]ode status was assigned to you due to your oncological treatment. Your treatment is now over. Medical states it is no longer required - Dr Miceli is an Oncological Specialist - we are not. Your ‘temp' [Z C]ode has been removed.” (Id.)
Goodman was issued Misconduct No. D095567 for “using abusive language to an employee” and “refusing to obey an order” on August 16, 2019. (ECF No. 86-2 at 2.) He was also issued Misconduct No. D314103 for refusing a cell assignment and was sent to the RHU for thirty days as punishment. (ECF Nos. 1-25; 86-2 at 5, 15.) Both misconducts were eventually vacated. (ECF Nos. 1-34; 86-2 at 10.)
Upon entry into the RHU, Goodman was examined by psychological services, and his Psychiatric Review Team (Dr. Saavedra, Duncan, PSS Schaup, and CC2 Kneeper) prepared an Individual Recovery Plan. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 25; 89-8; 104 ¶ 25.) Goodman was described as “appear[ing] stable” and as having denied suicidal and homicidal ideations. (ECF No. 89-8.) A plan was devised to address his housing concerns and for further treatment of his mental health issues. (Id.) No change in diagnoses was noted. (Id.)
Three days later, medical records reflect that Goodman met with someone from psychological services during which time he complained that his medical Z Code had been removed without him being consulted. (ECF No. 89-7.) He also denied calling a C.O. a “bitch,” and did not claim to be suffering from any suicidal ideations. (Id.)
On August 27, 2019, Dr. Saavedra met with Goodman. (ECF No. 89-4.) In his notes, Dr. Saavedra recorded that Goodman's mood was stable and there was no metal health indication for him to have a medical Z Code. (Id.) Additionally, there was no change to Goodman's psychiatric diagnosis or medications. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 41; 104 ¶ 41.) He also advised Goodman to meet with the Program Review Committee to address his Z Code issues. (ECF No. 89-4.) The Program Review Committee is a DOC team made up of security and psychology staff that sees inmates in the RHU to address security issues and make housing or placement recommendations. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 43; 104 ¶ 43.)
Goodman was evaluated again on September 9, 2019, and an Individual Recovery Plan was prepared by his Psychiatric Review Team. (ECF No. 89-9.) No change in medical diagnoses or medications was noted but plans were made for Goodman to enroll in a trauma program known as “Seeking Safety.” (Id.) The team also recommended monthly meetings with a psychology staff member. (Id.)
A month later, Goodman was seen by psychology, and again, it is reported that he denied mental health concerns and appeared to be stable. (ECF No. 89-10.) Also noted was his complaint that he had been falsely accused of helping another inmate with a hunger strike and had wrongfully been moved to a new cell as punishment. (Id.) No changes to his diagnoses were noted. (Id.)
While in the RHU on October 14, 2019, Goodman refused an order to pack his property in preparation to move back to the general population and received Misconduct No. D089742. (ECF No. 86-2 at 17.) He was punished with fifteen days disciplinary custody (“DC”). (Id. at 19.) After being reviewed by the Program Review Committee, the misconduct was upheld by Capozza who found there was sufficient evidence to support the misconduct. (Id. at 23.)
Goodman was issued another misconduct, Misconduct No. D336943, on October 15, 2019, this time from Wiles, for refusing to return to the general population. (ECF No. 86-2 at 25.) Again, Goodman was sanctioned with fifteen days DC. (Id. at 26.) Tift reviewed and approved Misconduct No. D336943. (Id.) Capozza found the misconduct appropriate and that all procedures employed were consistent with the law. (ECF No. 86-2 at 30.)
The next day, Goodman was seen by mental health. (ECF No. 89-10.) He purportedly denied any mental health concerns and appeared stable. (Id.)
On October 23, 2019, Goodman was evaluated by psychology after undergoing a hunger strike. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 51; 89-11; 104 ¶ 51.) According to his medical records, Goodman refused to eat unless someone took his request for a medical Z Code seriously. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 52; 104 ¶ 52.) Goodman was classified as having a “C” status with a diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder and an anxiety disorder. (ECF No. 89-11.)
Five days after his visit with psychology, on October 28, 2019, Goodman sent an “Inmate's
Request to Staff Member” to Dr. Saavedra. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 54; 104 ¶ 54.) His request reads:
I think I need some type of evaluation. I don't feel right. I'm supposed to be in remission from Non-Hodgkin['s] Lymphoma . . . but I don't feel like I am. I feel like my [i]mmune system is very weak and if I come into contact with any germs or dirt[,] I will get even sicker. I can't tolerate being around other prisoners and their germs. I was evaluated for PTSD in Aug. or Sept. of 2018 by Mr. Benko (AOD) and recommended for the Seeking Safety class . . . but Mr. Benko never put me in the class although I was in population for a whole year after I was recommended for it. Then[,] in July of 2019[,] my medical Z[]Code was removed,
but I was not mentally ready for such a drastic change. I was staffed for parole that same month and received the Institution's recommendation for parole for Oct. of 2019. I wanted to go home badly, but in Aug., the C.O.s tried to give me a cellie, but I couldn't bear the thought of being exposed to someone's germs and getting sick again. So[,] I refused, got a misconduct, and I've been in the RHU ever since. I messed up my parole[,] and I'm devastated. Then[,] I recently went on a [h]unger [p]rotest where I missed 49 straight meals because I feel like I'm being punished for being sick. I need help.(ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 55; 89-12; 104 ¶ 55.)
Dr. Saavedra responded to Goodman in writing on October 30, 2019. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 59; 89-12; 104 ¶ 59.) Believing a medical Z Code was not necessary for his psychiatric conditions, Dr. Saavedra wrote, “If Z[]Code was given in the past by the Medical Dept. due to your medical issues then you need to address this with medical - not psych.” (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 60; 89-12; 104 ¶ 60.)
The next day, Goodman wrote an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” but this time, he directed it to Duncan. (ECF No. 2-1.) He wrote:
I'm having issues that maybe only a licensed psychologist can help me with. I recently completed treatment last year for Non-Hodgkin['s] Lymphoma . . . which is a cancer of the immune system. I'm supposed to be in remission[,] but I don't really feel that I am. I'm constantly thinking about what I went through. How I almost died and why didn't I die. I also became very withdrawn from people. I feel that my immune system is still weak, so if I am in close proximity[,] my immune system will be compromised and I will get sick. Even worse[,] I'll probably get a recurrence of cancer. For this reason[,] I was not prepared to doublecell. I had a medical Z Code for 18 months since my cancer diagnosis. Then, without warning, in July of 2019, my Z Code was removed. I could not imagine being that close to another person which would definitely compromise my immune system. I was totally stressed out. I was due to see the parole board in Oct. 2019 and I had institutional support, but in Aug. 2019[,] I was ordered to double-cell. I was unable to do this mentally even though I was close to going home. I have been in the RHU ever since. Then recently[,] I went on a hunger protest where I missed 49 straight meals because I feel like I'm being punished for being sick. I need help.(ECF No. 2-1.) Duncan responded, “I wish you the best of health. As far as your . . . Z Code, if that was placed by medical, medical is who you would need to write to. Write to: CHCA Wood. Also accept support offered by PSS Schump/ PSS Jeffries.” (Id.)
On November 3, 2019, Goodman wrote another “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” to Dr. Saavedra. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 61; 89-13; 104 ¶ 61.) In this request, Goodman stated:
I think you misunderstood my [r]equest. I wasn't requesting you for a Z Code. I'm requesting help because I think I may be traumatized or something. I was just giving you the background on why I'm in the RHU and where my issues stem from. Getting cancer is a traumatic event[,] and it has stressed me our considerably. I feel detached from people[,] and I am constantly on guard and scared that I will get sick. The medical/oncology Dept. seems to think I'm fine, but I feel the opposite of fine. I'm constantly afraid the cancer . . . will reappear because my immune system is weak . . . and that I will die soon. I can't seem to focus or concentrate on anything[,] and I have trouble remembering things. No one knows what I'm going through[,] so they try to downplay it. Like your response to my request where you brushed me off by referring me to the medical Dept. Do you understand what I'm requesting now?(ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 62; 89-13; 104 ¶ 62.)
Goodman met with psychology on November 6, 2019. (ECF No. 89-14.) According to his medical records, Goodman appeared stable, denied having any mental health concerns, continued to request a medical Z Code, and became angry when he was told that one was no longer necessary. (Id.) It was further noted that Goodman should continue regular visits with psychology. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 71; 104 ¶ 71.)
Goodman sent an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” to Wood on November 11, 2019, along with his request for an IDA. (ECF No. 2-8.)
On November 12, 2019, Goodman again refused an order to pack his property and return to the general population, and he received Misconduct No. D336992. (ECF No. 86-2 at 32.) He was found guilty and given thirty days DC. (ECF No. 86-2 at 34.) Misconduct No. D336992 was upheld by Capozza. (ECF No. 86-2 at 39.) According to medical records, Goodman refused to speak to psychological services the next day. (ECF No. 89-15.)
On November 15, 2019, Goodman sent Duncan an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member.” This time he wrote:
I received your reply to Request from 10/31/19. I wasn't writing you about my Z[]Code. I was just explaining my psychological situation. I think I'm suffering from some sort of PTSD/ chemo-brain. I was recommended for a PTSD therapy group (Seeking Safety) in Sept. 2018, but I was never enrolled in it even though I was in general population for about a year after the recommendation (up until Aug. 16, 2019). Now that I'm back here I still ‘can not'[sic] get any treatment.... PSS Schultz and Jeffries do not offer me any support. They come to my door for a couple minutes and talk about what they can't do or offer some generic advice. They are here for show[,] not substance nor are they licensed psychologists. In fact, they operate more like C.O.s than Psych. Staff. I refuse to talk to them because they are condescending and the opposite of helpful. The bottom line is that I'm being denied help and treatment for a serious condition. And I find it disingenuous for you to wish me the best of health while not looking into my situation for ways to improve my mental health. I need help.(ECF No. 2-34.) Duncan responded, “I see that you are on AC status in the RHU. Psychology staff competently cover your housing unit. Dr. Saavedra also provides psychiatric services . . . to you as well over in the RHU. Chemo-brain sounds medical/ psychiatric, so discuss this with medical or psychiatry.” (Id.)
Goodman was seen by psychology again on November 13, 2019. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 79; 104 ¶ 79.) During this meeting, Goodman refused to speak. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 81; 104 ¶ 81.) Nevertheless, psychology recommended that Goodman continue to meet regularly with the department. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 82; 104 ¶ 82.)
Next, Goodman sent an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” directed to Armel on December 9, 2019 (ECF No. 2-68), stating:
Requesting self-confinement under AC status because I fear for my health and safety in General Population. I had a medical Z[]Code (because of my Non-Hodkin['s] Lymphoma . . .) for 18 months until July of 2019. The removal of this
Z[ C]ode by the medical-oncology Dept. was baseless and exposes my health and safety to harm in a double -cell. I am currently in the grievance/ litigation process with medical about this. In the meantime[,] I have been in the RHU under DC status for almost 4 months for “Refusing to Obey an Order” to double-cell in population. It is not my intention to refuse any orders or violate DOC policy. [Lymphoma] is a cancer of the immune system. This means my immune system is weak and easily subjected to infection, etc. The last time I had a cellie[,] I almost died. So my fears are genuine and reasonable. I understand that you do not want to reinstate my Z[ C]ode that medical removed. Therefore, I am requesting protection under AC status at least until my medical situation is clarified. I want the record to reflect that I fear for my life in a double-cell and if I'm forced to double-cell[,] I will have to protect myself.(ECF No. 2-68.) Armel responded, “Your Z [C]ode was removed in July. We can discuss this at PRC.” Disappointed, Goodman sent a similar request to Wood later that day. (ECF No. 2-85.) He wrote, “You said you would talk to Armel about at least getting me AC status. I reiterate that it is not a smart move medically (physically and psychologically) to subject me to a double-cell. You did not keep your word to me. So now I will have to protect myself.” (Id.)
Dr. Saavedra met with Goodman the next day. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 83; 89-16; 104 ¶ 83.) During this time, Goodman complained that “his medical Z [C]ode was taken away,” that he had “PTSD,” and that he had not been taken to participate in the PTSD group. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶¶ 8384, 86; 104 ¶¶ 83-84, 86.) Following an evaluation, Dr. Saavedra recommended that Goodman continue his medication and advised him to talk to “GP psychology” about participating in the PTSD group. (ECF Nos. 89 ¶ 91; 89-16; 104 ¶ 91.) He further noted a Z Code was no longer necessary. (ECF No. 89-14 at 2.)
Two days later, Goodman was given Misconduct No. D337171 for refusing to obey an order to leave the RHU. (ECF No. 86-2 at 57.) He was given thirty days DC for failing to obey orders. (Id. at 59.) Capozza upheld the hearing examiner's decision. (Id. at 63.)
On January 20, 2020, Goodman received Misconduct No. D403648 for assault, fighting, and refusing to obey an order to stop the fighting. (ECF No. 86-2 at 41.) He was given ninety days DC. (Id. at 45.)
According to records, Goodman was given a temporary Z Code by Armel on January 22, 2020, because he had been in a fight. (ECF No. 86-1 at 8.)
During his meetings with psychology on February 11, 2020 and March 13, 2020, Goodman denied any mental health concerns according to his medical records. (Id.; ECF No. 86-2 at 4950.) A mental health contact note dated March 17, 2020, states that Goodman met with psychology, complained that he was experiencing symptoms of PTSD, and expressed his fear of having a cellmate. (ECF No. 86-2 at 49.) When he was reminded of his Z Code status, though, Goodman's demeanor changed. (Id.)
On March 23, 2020, Goodman sent an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” Tift. Goodman wrote:
On 3/8/30, I was given a direct order to move from JC-14 cell to JA-8 cell. Upon arrival in JA-8, the cell was totally filthy and unsanitary. Even worse, the sink drain was clogged up causing the running water and backed up sewage water to fill the entire sink to the point of overflow. . .(ECF No. 1-62.)
Goodman was placed in Administrative Custody on April 8, 2020. (ECF Nos. 2-99; 89-289-26.) He continued to meet with psychology weekly until he was transferred to SCI-Albion in August 2020. (ECF Nos. 86-1 at 1-15.)
Goodman was never diagnosed with PTSD while confined at SCI-Fayette. (ECF Nos. 2 99; 89-2-89-26.)
In a handwritten entry at the top of ECF No. 2-21 at 1, Goodman represents that he “was recommended for the PTSD therapy group ‘Seeking Safety' in Aug/ Sept. 2018 by AOD treatment Supervisor Steve Benko.” (Id.)
2. Grievance History
Between January 20, 2019 and September 10, 2020, Goodman filed eighteen grievances, five of which relate to his remaining claims. (ECF No. 86-1 at 55.)
Specifically, on August 13, 2019, Goodman filed Grievance No. 818210 after his temporary medical Z Code was withdrawn. He wrote:
My medical Z[ C]ode status was removed recently by Dr. Miceli. He claims that it is no longer required or necessary, etc. But the opposite is true. I was diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin's (Diffuse Large B-cell) Lymphoma in Dec. 2017, while I was subjected to double-celling. Emotional stress, anxiety, sadness, anger[,] and hopelessness are significant factors in the lives of people who have been diagnosed with Lymphoma. While being subjected to double-celling[,] I was experiencing all of the above factors as a direct result of having a cellie. Furthermore, I am still suffering from [the] physical and mental side-effects [of] chemotherapy and the Lymphoma[,] itself. For me to go back to a double-cell would subject me to the same environment in which I developed cancer in the first place. It also would place a physical burden on me due to my on-going ailments. Relief: Reinstatement of Medical Z [C]ode status or its equivalent without threat of misconduct for refusing to double-cell due to valid physical and mental health issues.(ECF No. 86-1 at 21.) The Facility Grievance Coordinator denied the grievance after speaking with oncology. (Id. at 23.) Superintendent Capozza similarly denied the grievance at the Facility Manager level. (Id. at 19.) The denial was upheld by SOIGA. (Id. at 17.)
On October 9, 2019, Goodman filed Grievance No. 828296, which provides:
On Tuesday Oct. 8, 2019 C.O. Berry weirdly came to work with me on his mind. At approx. 0620 in the morning while doing [a] count[,] he yelled out my name and said that he was moving me to another cell. At that time[,] I was on D-pod (JD-15) in the RHU. I asked C.O. Berry numerous times throughout the morning why I was being moved for no apparent reason. Eventually[,] he told me it was because I was suspected of assisting another prisoner on D-pod in his Hunger Strike the previous
day. C.O. Berry moved me into a filthy, totally unclean cell as a punishment and gave me no supplies whatsoever to clean this cell. Basically[,] I was put inside a dirty cage like a[n] animal. I am a recent cancer (i.e. Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma) survivor. This being a cancer of the immune system . . . means my immune system is weak and subject to be compromised by unsanitary conditions. It takes me approximately one month to thoroughly and repeatedly clean a cell to where I feel somewhat saf[e] from my immune system being compromised. Relief: Not to be subjected to arbitrary, collective[,] or retributive punishment by C.O. Berry or his coworkers. (2) Consistent and extra access to true cleaning supplies (within reason while in RHA[; and] [t]o be moved back to JD-15 cell if possible or another open cell on D-pod (within reason) while in RHA.(ECF No. 86-1 at 63.) The initial review of the grievance found the claim to be without merit after the officer spoke with Officer Burrie and RHU staff. (Id. at 64.) Superintendent Capozza upheld the denial at the Facility Manger level. (Id. at 59.)
Goodman appealed to SOIGA, but his grievance was denied because his “final review needed to be postmarked by 01/02/20; however, it was not postmarked until 01/10/20” and Goodman provided no evidentiary support relative to his claim that the delay was attributable to the library. (Id. at 58.)
On November 27, 2019, Goodman filed Grievance No. 837270. He complained:
I'm currently in the RHU[,] and there is almost no heat in my cell. I have written to the maintenance mechanic twice about this problem. I have a chronic running nose because it is always cold in my cell. This is not a new problem [at] SCI-Fayette. This is a form of punishment and retaliation for coming to the RHU. Relief: For there to be adequate heat in my cell and for SCI-Fayette to stop using cell temperatures as punishment and retaliation. If not, I want $1,000 for every day that I am subjected to confinement with little or no heat. This issue has been ongoing since at least 11/20/19.(ECF No. 86-1 at 72.) His grievance was denied on initial review because his cell temperature was checked on November 3, 2019 and was 72° F in the cell and 69° F on the back wall. (Id. at 71.) It was also noted that the vent in his cell was partially blocked. (Id.) Goodman appealed, but Capozza upheld the initial response. (Id. at 69.) Grievance No. 82727 was ultimately upheld on final review. (Id. at 68.)
Goodman filed a second grievance on November 27, 2019, Grievance No. 837274, in which he wrote:
I am being denied sufficient medical care. I completed chemotherapy for Non-Hodgkin['s] Lymphoma . . . in June of 2018. But since then[,] I still have been suffering from the late effects of the cancer and treatment. These include: chronic fatigue, low energy, muscle weakness, neuropathy/ nerve pain, stomach problems, blurred vision, worsening eye-sight[,] and chemo-brain/ PTSD. I have consistently informed Oncologist Dr. Matthew Miceli of these problems[,] but he has consistently dismissed my ailments as not “cancer-related.” In fact, recently, on or around Nov. 20th, 2019, he informed other medical staff that I am no longer under his care. He claims I am cancer-free. Even if I am[,] I have a right to consistent follow-up care for any long-term effects of cancer and its treatment. I am also being denied mental health care for chemo-brain and PTSD. I feel I am being punished and retaliated against for voicing my concerns and grievances.(ECF No. 86-1 at 83.) He further noted that he had complained to “[p]sychology, [p]sychiatry, and [t]reatment services” about these issues. (Id.) As to relief, Goodman wrote “sufficient followup cancer care by an independent . . . specialist. No less than $75,000 for deliberate indifference, in addition to $1,000 for every day I am denied medical care.” (Id.)
Wood prepared the Initial Review Response finding that the medical care Goodman was receiving was appropriate. (ECF No. 89-17 at 6.) Therein, she explained (in relevant part) that Goodman's medical care was appropriate and noted that he was treating with Dr. Saavedra. (ECF No. 86-1 at 82.) Wood further advised that to the extent Goodman desired any additional treatment, he could sign up for a sick call any time. (Id.)
Again, Goodman appealed. Capozza upheld the denial finding Wood's response was adequate given that Goodman was receiving proper medical care and his cancer was in remission. (ECF No. 86-1 at 76.) SOIGA upheld the denial noting that the Bureau of Health Care Services conducted an independent review of the record and determined that the “medical care provided was reasonable and appropriate.” (Id. at 74.)
On February 24, 2020, Goodman filed Grievance No. 852052 writing as follows:
On 2/12/20 I wrote a DC-135A Request to . . . Wood inquiring about the status of my Inmate Disability Accommodation (IDA) request I submitted on 11/11/19. Ms. Wood has so far ignored my inquiries into my IDA Request and has so far given me no indication that she has submitted it to the Central Office Inmate Disability Accommodation Committee (COIDAC). According to the DC-ADM 006, Section 2, B, if my Request was processed[,] I should have received a final determination by now. Therefore, I am being denied medical care by the CHCA with deliberate indifference for disregarding my IDA Request. Relief: (1) expedient/ expeditious processing and determination of my IDA Request[]; (2) 1,000 per day for every day in excess of the normal IDA processing timeframe[; (and)] (3) further unspecified punitive and compensatory monetary damages commensurate with my pain and suffering.(ECF No. 86-1 at 90.) The grievance officer denied this grievance stating that he had spoken to Wood and Wood had represented that she had spoken with Goodman about this issue. (Id. at 89.) The grievance officer also acknowledged that Goodman had since received a single cell. (Id.) Goodman appealed, and Capozza noted that Wood informed Goodman that he was not eligible for disability status and had appropriately followed-up. (Id. at 87.) This decision was upheld on final appeal. (Id. at 85.)
Goodman was denied parole on June 26, 2020, in part due to his misconducts. (ECF No. 2-110.)
C. Legal Standard
As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, summary judgment must be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which shows the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Id. (internal citation omitted). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court of Appeals has held that “where the movant bears the burden of proof at trial and the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine factual issue, the district court should deny summary judgment even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” Nat'l State Bank v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
In following this directive, a court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in that party's favor. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005); Doe v. Cty. of Ctr., Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001).
Although courts must hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), at the summary judgment stage a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of providing some affirmative evidence, not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g., Barnett v. N.J. Transit Corp., 573 Fed.Appx. 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the pro se plaintiff was still “required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements of her prima facie case”) (citation and quotation omitted); Siluk v. Beard, 395 Fed.Appx. 817, 820 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural law”).
D. Discussion
1. Motion to Strike
The Court must first address Dr. Saavedra's contention that Goodman's unverified denials, which lack pinpoint citations to the record, should be deemed admitted. (ECF No. 105.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), provides that where a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion” or “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials--including the facts considered undisputed--show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1), (3). In this vein, our Local Civil Rules of Court require a responding party to admit or deny each fact in the moving party's concise statement of material facts using support from the record, LCvR 56(C), and uncontroverted material facts may “be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party,” LCvR 56.E (emphasis added). Even a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of responding and providing some affirmative evidence, not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g., Barnett, 573 Fed.Appx. at, 243 (citation and quotation omitted); Siluk, 395 Fed.Appx. at 820.
While this Court agrees with Dr. Saavedra that some of Goodman's responses are deficient under our Local Rules, whether or not this Court deems those facts admitted does not change the outcome of this case. Accordingly, the Court will decline to deem these facts admitted and instead, will rely on the record as a whole to determine the applicable material facts.
The Court will also consider the entire record with respect to Corrections Defendants' motion.
In so ruling, the Court notes that it cannot consider the so-called affidavits of either Dr. Saavedra or Major Hawkinberry. This is because both are mislabeled as affidavits and neither comply with the Federal Rules relating to unsworn declarations. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Recently, the Third Circuit emphasized that “while an unsworn statement may be considered on summary judgment, an unsworn statement that has not been made under penalty of perjury cannot.” United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 923 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2019). Here, both “affidavits” were unsworn and neither contains the required language that the statements were made under penalty of perjury. (See ECF Nos. 86-2 at 65-66; 89-1.) For these reasons, the Court does not consider either unsworn statement as part of its analysis in which it recommends granting both motions for summary judgment and denying the motion to strike.
2. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The Corrections Defendants contend that Goodman has failed to exhaust his First Amendment retaliation claims as well as his Eighth Amendment claims against Capozza and Duncan. (ECF No. 84 at 14.) They offer two reasons why Goodman's claims are barred: (1) he did not timely appeal Grievance No. 828296 to SOIGA and (2) he failed to name Duncan, Capozza, Armel, Tift, Byers, and Wiles in his grievances. (Id. at 13.) Goodman summarily responds that he has “clearly documented in his Complaint [and] Exhibits exhaustion of all of the grievance and misconduct appeal stages” and to the extend he did not mention a particular defendant's name, it was out of fear of retaliation. (ECF No. 96 ¶¶ 3-4.)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) mandates that an inmate exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing a suit challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion is a “non-jurisdictional prerequisite to an inmate bringing suit” and when raised by a defendant, it constitutes a threshold issue to be addressed by the court. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2018).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement “is ‘mandatory': An inmate ‘shall' bring ‘no action' (or said more conversationally, may not bring any action) absent exhaustion of available administrative remedies.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638-39 (2016) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) and Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007)). Exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA regardless of the type of relief sought and the type of relief available through administrative procedures. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Courts are not given discretion to decide whether exhaustion should be excused, Ross, 578 U.S. 639, and there is no exception to the exhaustion requirement based on “futility,” Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
The PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement means not only that a complaint filed before administrative remedies are exhausted is premature and cannot be entertained but also that failure to exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with a prison's grievance procedures constitutes procedural default. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93-95; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-30 (3d Cir. 2004). That is because “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93; Spruill, 372 F.3d. at 227-30.
The prison's grievance policy is what “define[s] the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230-31 (“prison grievance procedures supply the yardstick for measuring procedural default”). Thus, the procedural requirements for exhaustion in a given case “are drawn from the polices of the prison in question rather than from any freestanding federal law.” Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231).
The DOC has an official Inmate Grievance System that governs the grievance and appeals process in Pennsylvania correctional institutions. See 37 Pa. Code § 93.9. The Inmate Grievance System is set forth in DC-ADM 804 and “is intended to deal with a wide range of issues, procedures, or events that may be of concern to an inmate.” DC-ADM 804, § 1(A)(2).
DC-ADM 804 sets forth a three-tier administrative remedy system. A prisoner is required to present his grievance to the Facility Grievance Coordinator for initial review. Id. § 1(A)(5). The prisoner must appeal an adverse determination by the Facility Grievance Coordinator to the Facility Manager. Id. § 2(A). From there, the prisoner must appeal to SOIGA for appeal to final review. Id. § 2(B).
The prison's grievance policy is what “define[s] the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230-31. There are several requirements to filing a proper grievance in accordance with DC-ADM 804. Relevant here, DC-ADM 804 requires:
The text of the grievance must be legible, understandable, and presented in a courteous manner. The inmate must include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim.
a. The statement of facts shall include the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the grievance.
b. The inmate shall identify individuals directly involved in the event(s).
c. The inmate shall specifically state any claims he/she wishes to make concerning violations of Department directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.
d. If the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the inmate must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance.Id. § 1(A)(11) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has “identified the benefits of exhaustion to include allowing a prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. Indeed, the “primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Because the “prison grievance procedures supply the yardstick for measuring procedural default[,]” the starting point of the Court's analysis is the grievance policy in effect at the Prison during the relevant time. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231. Here, a review of the initial grievances establishes that Goodman did not specifically identify Duncan, Capozza, Tift, Wiles, Byers, or Armel by name or occupation as being involved in any of the complained of events in his grievances. There is also no indication in the record that any conduct on the part of the prison excused the procedural default. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234. Said differently, the prison did not identify the unidentified persons and acknowledge they fell within the compass of the prisoner's grievance during the grievance process. See id.
Goodman attempts to evade this problem by arguing that he did not name the officers because he feared further retaliation. (ECF No. 96 ¶ 3.) The Supreme Court has identified “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books,” is not “available” because it is “not capable of use to obtain relief”: (1) when “it operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) when it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,” such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 1578 U.S. at 643-44. In addition, where prison officials deter an inmate from pursuing an administrative remedy by making “serious threats of substantial retaliation . . . and bodily harm,” the administrative remedy process is not “available.” Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 267. Accordingly, to defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense on the basis that he was being intimidated, an inmate must show “(1) that the threat was sufficiently serious that it would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance and (2) that the threat actually did deter this particular inmate.” Id. at 269.
Here, Goodman has provided no evidence that he was verbally threatened for using the grievance procedure or that the officials acted in a way to deter him for submitting grievance forms. See Williams v. Wetzel, Civ. A. No. 21-114, 2021 WL 5298872, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2021) (finding administrative remedies were available even though the prisoner would have to ask the same employee who knocked out his tooth and confiscated it for a grievance form). See also Davis v. Anderson, 619 Fed.Appx. 68, 71 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining a pro se plaintiff can bypass an institution and file a complaint directly with the Regional Director under 24 C.F.R § 542.13 where there is a concern). Instead, the record contradicts Goodman's claim that he failed to name certain defendants out of fear of retaliation. Indeed, Goodman filed no less than eighteen grievances while housed at SCI-Fayette naming officials he believed treated him unfairly and unconstitutionally. For these reasons, Goodman has procedurally defaulted on his claims against Duncan, Capozza, Armel, Tift, Byers, and Wiles.
Because none of the named defendants are named in Grievance No. 828296, the Court need not reach the question of whether Goodman's untimely appeal to SOIGA is excused by issues with library copying.
The Court could end its analysis here with respect to the claims against Duncan, Capozza, Armel, Tift, Byers, and Wiles. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Goodman did not procedurally default these claims, however, no reasonable factfinder could render a verdict in favor of Goodman on either his First Amendment or Eighth Amendment claims, as explained in the remaining sections.
3. First Amendment Retaliation Claims against Tift, Wiles, Byers, and Armel
The Corrections Defendants argue that Goodman cannot prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claims because he did not suffer an adverse action and no reasonable jury could find Goodman's constitutional actions were a substantial or motivating factor in any purported retaliation. (ECF No. 84.) Specifically, they contend that being housed in a cold cell is not an adverse action and Goodman has not offered any evidence supporting his claims that he was moved to a dirty cell, was denied cleaning supplies, or was forced to sleep in a cold cell. Additionally, all of the misconducts were issued for valid reasons. They also contend that there is no temporal proximity between any purportedly protected conduct and an adverse action. (Id.)
Goodman takes issue with the Corrections Defendants' portrayal of the facts. (ECF No. 96 ¶ 34.) He further argues being given misconducts was an adverse action, as was the Corrections Defendants' decision not to follow their own policy. (Id.) He did not address the Corrections Defendants' argument vis-a-vis substantial or motivating factors.
It is well established that retaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of his constitutional rights is unconstitutional, and “as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take that adverse action. See, e.g., Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001); Brown v. Plocinik, No. 3:19-CV-00839, 2022 WL 2759064, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 14, 2022). The Corrections Defendants do not dispute that filing a prison grievance is protected conduct. Instead, they challenge the second and third elements of Goodman's retaliation claim: adverse action and causation.
An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Goodman contends that he endured the following adverse actions: living in a cold and dirty cell, being forced to live with a cellmate, and being repeatedly issued misconducts. Courts have held misconducts as well as “a disadvantageous change in housing assignment” is an adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016).
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Corrections Defendants that Goodman has offered no evidence to support his claims that he was given a cold or unclean cell. Rather, the best evidence of record found in the grievance officer's responses suggests to the contrary. Concerning his misconducts, Misconduct Nos. D095567 and D314103 were vacated (albeit to permit recharging although it does not appear from the record that he was ever recharged). Thus, they do not constitute an adverse action. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2011) (a dismissed misconduct does not constitute an adverse action “because it would not be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness' from exercising his First Amendment rights”) (internal citation omitted).
Given the foregoing, the Court will limit its analysis of whether the constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take that adverse action as it relates to the remaining five misconducts.
As noted in Leach v. Biscoe, Civ. A. No. 4:20-cv-01429, 2022 WL 453537 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2022):
There are a variety of ways to prove causation for a First Amendment retaliation claim. One method is to show unusually suggestive timing between the protected conduct and the adverse action. When a plaintiff relies solely on circumstantial evidence of temporal proximity, the time between the protected conduct and the adverse action is often measured in days rather than weeks or months. However, there is no bright line rule limiting the length of time that may pass between a plaintiff's protected speech and an actionable retaliatory act by a defendant. Another approach is to demonstrate a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing. Finally, causation can be inferred from the evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.Id. at *7.
Goodman also not adduced any evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that his protected activity (filing a grievance) was in any way a substantial or motivating factor in the issuance of Misconduct Nos. D089742, D336943, D336992, D337171 or D403648. Said differently, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude the existence of unusual temporal proximity based on the dating of the grievances and misconducts, and Goodman cannot show a pattern of antagonism. Instead, the record demonstrates that on numerous occasions, Goodman was asked to move cells and he refused to do so. Further, it was only after they told him that he needed to choose a cellmate did Goodman begin filing grievances.
For these reasons, no reasonable jury could find for Goodman on his First Amendment retaliation claims and this Court respectfully recommends that the Corrections Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to these claims.
4. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Serious Mental Health Need Claim against Dr. Saavedra
Dr. Saavedra seeks summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable factfinder could render a verdict in favor of Goodman on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against him because there is no evidence Goodman suffered from a serious medical need or that Dr. Saavedra was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. (ECF No. 88 at 8-15.)
Dr. Saavedra maintains Goodman was not suffering from a serious mental illness because obsessive-compulsive disorder and anxiety do not constitute serious medical illnesses, Goodman was stable at all times, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that Goodman was suffering from PTSD or that his complaints of trauma were anything more than a veiled attempt to secure a medical Z Code. (Id. at 9-10.) Additionally, Dr. Saavedra argues, there is no evidence in the record that he was deliberately indifferent because Goodman was receiving ongoing medical treatment by meeting regularly with psychiatry and having his prescription for Prozac monitored. Dr. Saavedra adds there is no evidence that he intentionally refused to treat Goodman, ignored his concerns, delayed medical care for a non-medical reason, or prevented Goodman from receiving necessary treatment. (Id. at 16.)
Goodman counters that he suffers from a serious medical illness and a medical expert could establish this. (ECF No. 98 at ¶ 3.) He further asserts that Dr. Saavedra was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need because he took no action while Goodman spent five months in solitary confinement during which he conducted two hunger protests and repeatedly expressed his fear of having a cellmate. (Id. ¶ 4.) As a result, Goodman claims that he had to take matters into his own hands by entering into a physical altercation. (Id.) Goodman adds that the record on which Dr. Saavedra relies is fabricated and Dr. Saavedra's statement that he did not believe Goodman had PTSD is inconsistent with his recommendation that he participate in a PTSD group. (ECF No. 98.) Indeed, Goodman contends that he was only ever offered superficial treatment and his complaints were ignored. (Id.)
It is well established that “[t]he Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the imposition of ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency.'” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). “In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has incarcerated.'” Gray v. Garman, No. 4:21-CV-01221, 2022 WL 2392931, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 2022). “Prison officials ‘violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs by intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Flowers v. Francoise, No. 22-1077, 2022 WL 2447899, at *2 (3d Cir. July 6, 2022) (quoting Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534).
To establish a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must allege (1) a serious medical need and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, there is an objective and subjective component. Preziosi v. Nicholson, Civ. A. No. 19-1437, 2021 WL 4442840, at *14-*15 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2021).
The Supreme Court has described the state of mind that deliberate indifference requires as follows:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis added).
“Deliberate indifference is a subjective state of mind that can, like any other form of scienter, be proven through circumstantial evidence and witness testimony.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535. It has been found “in a variety of circumstances,” including where a prison official “knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it[,]” “delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason;” or “prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (citing Durmer v. O 'Can-roll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, since a defendant's state of mind, like other facts, can be proved by circumstantial evidence, the Farmer standard does not require a defendant to admit his consciousness of the risk of serious harm before liability can be imposed. 511 U.S. at 843 n.8. Even gross errors of judgment are not constitutional violations: liability requires subjective, not objective, culpability. Id.
Importantly, the subjective inquiry that must be made in determining whether deliberate indifference exists is meant to prevent converting medical malpractice or negligence claims into constitutional violations. “[T]hus, a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must show more than negligence or the misdiagnosis of an ailment.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, when it comes to claims of deliberate indifference, there is a “critical distinction” between allegations of a delay or denial of a recognized need for medical care and allegations of inadequate medical treatment. Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535 (citation omitted).
Because “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not “support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d. Cir. 1987), when medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care. See Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights”).Id. That said, the fact that prison medical personnel have provided some medical care to an inmate does not preclude a finding of deliberate indifference:
[T]here are circumstances in which some care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. For instance, prison officials may not, with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate, opt for “an easier and less efficacious treatment” of the inmate's condition. West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974)). Nor may “prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . [when] such denial exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.'” Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346 (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976)). And “knowledge of the need for medical care [may not be accompanied by the] . . . intentional refusal to provide that care.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 204 (11th Cir. 1985)).Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 228 (3d Cir. 2017). Thus, the court “must examine the totality of an inmate's medical care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, the record evidence demonstrates that Goodman met regularly with psychology, often weekly. Without offering any support, Goodman contends that these meetings were a sham to provide “an appearance of providing treatment” and believes this is the case because he was never treated for PTSD. Yet, Goodman was never diagnosed with PTSD by a treating physician (and the assessment of the alcohol and drug officer is not in the record). Furthermore, given his regular meetings with psychology, this Court must presume that his treatment was proper absent evidence that it violated professional standards of care. See Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535 (additional citation omitted). Here, Goodman has not even attempted to establish a violation of the standard of care. Instead, he relies on his own layperson's opinion that his treatment should have been handled differently but without more, that is insufficient to rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
Based upon the foregoing, Dr. Saavedra has met his burden to show he is entitled to judgment in his favor with respect to Goodman's claim that he was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the Court respectfully recommends Dr. Saavedra's motion for summary judgment be granted.
5. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claims against Duncan, Wood, and Capozza
As a general rule, non-medical prison officials like health care administrators and nurse supervisors “are not deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor or because they deferred to the judgment of the medical staff treating the inmate.” Dunyan v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:16-cv-02103, 2017 WL 3509243, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2017) (citing Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993)). The scienter requirement will only be imputed where they had a reason to believe prison doctors or their assistants were mistreating or not treating a prisoner. Id.
Here, the parties agree that Duncan, Wood, and Capozza are non-medical personnel. Given that no reasonable jury could find Dr. Saavedra violated Goodman's Eighth Amendment rights, this Court respectfully recommends that Goodman's Eighth Amendment claims against Duncan, Wood, and Capozza likewise be granted. This is because these defendants cannot be found liable for an Eighth Amendment violation when the treating doctor is not liable. See Price v. Williams, Civ. A. No. 1:18-cv-00583, 2020 WL 3172757 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2020) (providing “it would defy logic to hold the non-medical personnel liable when the actual providers were not liable”). Additionally, Goodman cannot meet the subjective part of his deliberate indifference claim given that he was receiving regular medical care for the reasons stated in the preceding section.
Accordingly, the Court recommends Duncan, Wood, and Capozza's motion for summary judgment on Goodman's Eighth Amendment claim be granted.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the motions for summary judgment filed by Dr. Saavedra (ECF No. 87) and the Corrections Defendants (ECF No. 83). It is further recommended that the motion to strike filed by Dr. Saavedra (ECF No. 105) be denied.
Under the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).