Opinion
A150368
04-20-2017
JEREMY GOODMAN, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLANO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR 320025)
The superior court denied a criminal defendant's request for an in camera review of a correctional officer's personnel files on the ground that the factual scenario suggested by the defendant was not "plausible." We conclude the superior court employed too restrictive a definition of the word "plausible" and, in effect, required the defendant to speculate about the officer's motives. We therefore reverse its decision and direct it to conduct the requested in camera review.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jeremy Goodman, an inmate at California State Prison-Solano, is charged with battery on a non-prisoner, possession of heroin in jail, and resisting an executive officer. The charges stem from an incident in which Correctional Officer J. Johnson conducted a search and, according to Johnson, Goodman resisted him, jerked his body, and struck him. Goodman denies doing so.
On November 2, 2016, through counsel, Goodman brought a Pitchess motion seeking an in camera review of Johnson's personnel file. The motion was supported by a declaration from his attorney, which states in part:
A Pitchess motion is one brought by the defense in a criminal case to access a law enforcement officer's personnel information, pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. --------
The requested material is necessary to properly prepare the defense of this case for trial and is relevant material for the following reason:
a. Correctional Officer Johnson has alleged that he was struck by the defendant as a result of the defendant resisting and jerking around during a search of his person. The defendant has denied resisting or jerking his body. It is asserted that Officer Johnson lied about the defendant's action and wrote false information in his report. I am informed and on that basis believe the following: on November 7, 2015 the defendant was sleeping in his assigned bunk. He was awakened by several correctional officers to be served with a CDCR form 115 for failing to report to school. After the other staff left, Correctional Officer Johnson began to search the defendant. Upon discovery of a cell phone the officer immediately threw the defendant to the ground and had him place his hands behind his back. The defendant denies resisting the officer and denies jerking his body. Any physical contact between defendant and the officer was occurred [sic] only when defendant was patted down, and then thrown down by the officer.
b. Because Correctional Officer Johnson is the primary witness, the items requested will be used by the defense to show through the presentation of witnesses and through cross-
examination that (1) Correctional Officer Johnson has a history of dishonesty so that his testimony in this case is not trustworthy; (2) Officer Johnson engaged in acts of violence, or excessive force when searching, arresting and interacting with prisoners[;] (3) Officer Johnson has in the past falsified and manufactured evidence so that the and reports so that the evidence he is called upon by the prosecution to present will lack reliability and trustworthiness.
The superior court denied Goodman's motion on December 9, 2016, stating:
[Counsel], you know, explain to me the plausibility of this situation because I have read—there is nothing in your declaration to suggest that your client did anything but comply and what would be plausible about the officer's just suddenly during this interaction attack him? That's where I have problems. I mean anything is possible but that doesn't sound plausible to me.
I know we have situations where an inmate may say or do something that might make somebody angry or upset but what I have read here is there is nothing— it just occurs, with no—nothing to suggest that your client did anything that would upset anybody or cause—he was doing what he was told and then the officer just basically attacked him. I don't see that that is plausible. [¶] . . . [¶]
Yeah, I still don't think there is a plausible factual scenario that has been submitted to cause the Court to grant it so it is denied. And I mean as an aside the only one who would have had a motive would be the defendant himself since he apparently had contraband on him.
Thereafter, Goodman filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition in this court and requested that we restrain the superior court from further proceedings. On February 2, 2017, we stayed the preliminary hearing in the lower court, requested informal briefing, and gave notice pursuant to Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 (Palma) that if warranted, we might issue a peremptory writ in the first instance.
DISCUSSION
Peace officer and custodial officer personnel records are confidential. (Penal Code, § 832.7.) Their contents, however, may be discoverable if a criminal defendant files a motion, supported by a declaration establishing good cause for discovery, i.e., demonstrating that the information being sought is material to the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the agency has the records at issue. (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick).) To establish good cause the movant must present a plausible factual scenario. (Id. at pp. 1025-1026.) The factual scenario need only demonstrate that the alleged misconduct could or might have occurred. (Id. at p. 1016.) The showing of good cause must meet a "relatively low threshold." (Id. at p. 1019.) The scenario need not be corroborated, credible, or believable. (Id. at p. 1019; Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 72; Uybungco v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048-1049.) In the appropriate circumstance, it need be nothing more than a simple denial of what is asserted by the police. (Warrick, supra, at pp. 1024-1025.)
If the defendant presents a scenario that could have occurred, it is plausible in that it "presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges." (Uybungco v. Superior Court, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049, citing Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) If the court finds good cause for discovery, it conducts an in camera review of the documents and discloses only that information, which it determines is relevant. (Warrick, supra, at p. 1019.) In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a Pitchess motion, we employ an abuse of discretion standard, recognizing that the lower court has "wide discretion" when ruling on such motions. (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1019.)
Applying these principles, we conclude the superior court erred in not conducting an in camera review of the officer's personnel file. The court found Goodman's scenario to be implausible in that Goodman alleged no misconduct on his part and offered no reason why Johnson would attack him if he were cooperating. The court considered it far more likely that Johnson, who had contraband on his person, would resist the search. In essence, the superior court was asking, "Why would Johnson behave as Goodman alleges?" A movant seeking discovery pursuant to Pitchess, however, is not required to "provide a motive for the alleged officer misconduct." (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025.) Rather, as noted, all the movant needs to do is to present a plausible scenario, i.e., one that could or might have occurred. (Id. at p. 1016.) Without in any way suggesting that Johnson attacked Goodman, it is nonetheless plausible that he did.
Citing People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1318-1319 (Thompson), the Attorney General argues that "[t]rial courts are permitted to apply common sense in determining what is plausible, and to make determinations based on a reasonable and realistic assessment of the facts and allegations." In Thompson, the Second District Court of Appeal upheld the denial of a Pitchess motion where the defendant sought discovery of 11 officers' personnel records. The Second District, however, emphasized that it was not rejecting defendant's version of events because it was not credible, but because it was neither internally consistent nor complete. (Id. at p. 1317.) Thompson denied being in possession of cocaine or receiving money from the officer, but did not state a nonculpable explanation for why he was in the area where drugs were being sold. In addition, Thompson alleged a police conspiracy, which required all the officers "to completely misrepresent what they saw and heard as percipient witnesses." (Id. at p. 1318.) There were significant gaps in Thompson's factual scenario, including gaps about his own behavior, e.g., why he was in the area if not to buy drugs. One would expect him to be able to explain his presence there. In contrast, in the instant case, any gaps in Goodman's story concern Johnson's motivation for behaving the way Goodman alleges he did. Goodman cannot be reasonably expected to know Johnson's motivation. Thus, his failure to explain Johnson's motives is not fatal to establishing good cause to have the superior court review Johnson's personnel file.
DISPOSITION
When "petitioner's entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue," the accelerated Palma procedure is appropriate. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171.) For the reasons given above, the superior court is directed to vacate its December 9, 2016 order and to enter a new and different order, finding good cause to conduct an in camera review of Johnson's personnel file. Our decision does not in any way suggest what action the superior court should take after reviewing that file. The stay issued by this court on February 2, 2017 is dissolved.
/s/_________
McGuiness, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Pollak, J. /s/_________
Siggins, J.