Opinion
Civil Action 20-1259
05-03-2021
JERMAINE I. GOODMAN, Plaintiff, v. MATHEW MICELI et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the motion to dismiss of Defendant Mathew Miceli (ECF No. 39) be granted, Defendant P. Saavedra's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 42) be denied, and the remaining Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 23) be granted in part and denied in part.
II. Report
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Jermaine I. Goodman (“Goodman”), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), commenced this pro se civil rights action arising out of incidents that occurred at the State Correction Institution (“SCI”) at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”).(ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) Named as Defendants in the Complaint are Mathew Miceli (“Dr. Miceli”), P. Saavedra (“Dr. Saavedra”) and DOC employees Stephanie Wood; Mark Capozza; Eric T. Armel; Debra A. Hawkinberry; Chuck Byers; Lisa Duncan; Keri Moore; Zachary J. Moslak; Beth Rudziemski; W. Tift; Dorina Varner; John E. Wetzel; and M. Wiles (sometimes collectively referred to as the “DOC Defendants”).
Goodman is now incarcerated at SCI-Albion.
Goodman alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
Goodman's motion for preliminary injunction which was filed concurrently with his Complaint was previously denied. (ECF No. 48.) All defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 23, 39, 42.) Defendants' motions have been fully briefed. (ECF No. 24, 40, 43, 51, 54, 59, 60.)
All paragraph numbers refer to the Statement of Claims in the Complaint and the exhibits appended to the Complaint. See Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) (“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court . . . consider[s] only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.”); Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he primary problem raised by looking to documents outside the complaint-lack of notice to the plaintiff-is dissipated where the plaintiff has actual notice . . . and has relied upon these documents in framing the complaint.”).
Goodman was diagnosed with Stage 3 Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in December 2017 and placed under the care of Dr. Miceli, who is an oncologist. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) At that time, Dr. Miceli recommended that Goodman be housed in a single cell in a status known as z-code. (Id. ¶ 4.) Based upon that recommendation, Goodman obtained a medical z-code from the prison as he underwent chemotherapy in January 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.)
Three months into his treatment, Goodman experienced severe pain and requested a stronger pain medication which Dr. Miceli denied. (Id. ¶ 6.) Goodman's chemotherapy ended in June 2018, but he continued to experience pain and other side effects after his last treatment. (Id. ¶ 7.) Nonetheless, Goodman asserts, Dr. Miceli discontinued the pain medication without consulting with Goodman and denied his subsequent requests to resume receiving it. (Id.)
Goodman was also on SCI-Fayette's mental health roster (see Id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 17, 25, 31, 37), and a few months after receiving his last chemotherapy treatment he was evaluated for PTSD. (ECF No. 2.) Although the evaluator recommended that Goodman participate in a class for PTSD entitled “Seeking Safety, ” he was never enrolled in it. (Id.)
Almost a year after his chemotherapy ended, in May 2019, Goodman sought medical treatment for neuropathy pain which Dr. Miceli denied as not related to lymphoma or chemotherapy. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Several months later, in July 2019, Dr. Miceli withdrew his recommendation for Goodman's medical z-code without prior warning or consultation. (Id. ¶ 9.) Goodman alleges that Dr. Miceli's decision placed his health and safety in jeopardy because as a result of his lymphoma and chemotherapy treatment, he suffered from reduced immunity, neuropathy, severe vision impairment, muscle weakness, chronic fatigue, chest and stomach pain, chemo brain, and PTSD symptoms. (Id. ¶ 10.) Goodman felt that given his physical and mental vulnerabilities, having a cell mate would place him “at risk of complications from infection and a cancer recurrence.” (Id.) Based on his concerns, Goodman asked Dr. Miceli to reconsider his z-code recommendation but Dr. Miceli refused to do so. (Id.) Goodman alleges that he was singled out for discrimination in this regard because Dr. Miceli did not revoke the z-code recommendation for other similarly situated cancer patients. (Id.)
Goodman then requested SCI-Fayette's classification program manager, Defendant Debra A. Hawkinberry (“Hawkinberry”), health care administrator Defendant Stephanie Wood (“Wood”), and his Unit Manager, Defendant Chuck Byers (“Byers”), to reinstate his z-code status and investigate whether his physical and mental ailments necessitated further treatment. (Id. ¶ 11.) Goodman alleges that Hawkinberry and Wood never responded to his requests while Byers not only denied his request but also threatened him with a misconduct report and disciplinary punishment. (Id.)
After his attempts to informally resolve this issue failed, Goodman filed a grievance on August 13, 2019, and requested that his medical z-code be reinstated “without the threat of a misconduct report/disciplinary punishment, ” because he was “still suffering from the physical and mental late effects” of his disease and chemotherapy. (Id. ¶ 12; ECF No. 1-13.) SCI-Fayette's Superintendent, Defendant Mark Capozza (“Superintendent Capozza”), denied his grievance. (Compl. ¶ 12; see Id. at 28; ECF No. 1-21.)
Three days later, Byers attempted to move another prisoner into Goodman's cell but Goodman, out of fear for his health and safety, refused to accept a cellmate. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Byers charged Goodman with a Class 1 misconduct (the “August Misconduct”) for refusing to obey an order. (Id.) As a result of this charge, Goodman was immediately handcuffed, taken to the restricted housing unit (“RHU”), and placed in solitary confinement pending a hearing (Id.)
At the subsequent hearing regarding this charge, Goodman explained to hearing examiner Defendant Beth Rudziemski (“Rudziemski”) that because he was on the prison's mental health roster, charging him with a misconduct as opposed informal resolution was a direct violation of DOC policy. (See id.; ECF No. 1-26.) Goodman also contended that removing his z-code status was improper as it would jeopardize his physical, mental, and emotional health. (ECF No. 1-26.) Rudziemski disagreed and sentenced Goodman to thirty days in disciplinary custody in the RHU. (ECF No. 1-27.) While Goodman appealed Rudziemski's decision, both SCI-Fayette's Program Review Committee (“PRC”) and Superintendent Capozza denied his appeals. (ECF Nos. 1-30; 1-32.) However, Goodman's final appeal was granted by the Office of the Chief Hearing Examiner and his August Misconduct was vacated on October 28, 2019. (Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 1-34.)
While the appeal for the August Misconduct was pending, Goodman filed a grievance on September 19, 2019, based on denial of appropriate medical treatment for his eyesight. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Goodman claims that he suffers from a severe visual impairment that is not resolvable by eyeglasses. (Id.) Specifically, Goodman alleges that after undergoing chemotherapy treatments, his vision became worse and he began experiencing eye pain, blurred vision, and dizziness when he wore eyeglasses. (Id. at 28.) Therefore, upon recommendation of an outside doctor, Goodman asked to be allowed to purchase contact lenses and/or undergo Lasik-type eye surgery to correct his vision because he could barely see. (See id.; ECF Nos. 1-35; 1-37; 1-41.) According to the Complaint, Wood denied Goodman these requests. (Compl. ¶ 14.) In denying his grievance about this issue, Wood noted that because Goodman does not have an eye disease, he does not require contacts. (Id. at 28.) Further, Wood advised Goodman that she spoke with the optometrist who examined Goodman, who told her that Goodman did not need contacts. (ECF No. 1-40.) Superintendent Capozza upheld the denial. (Compl. at 28; ECF No. 1-42.)
Goodman also claims that Defendant Lt. W. Tift. (“Lt. Tift”), the RHU unit manager, subjected him to retaliatory and arbitrary punishment. (Compl. ¶ 15.) According to the Complaint, on October 8, 2019, Goodman was moved from his cell to a “totally filthy” cell because he was suspected of assisting another prisoner in his hunger protest the previous day. (Id.) Goodman claims that he was not provided any cleaning supplies or materials which placed his mental and physical health at risk. (Id.) Goodman alleges that despite the fact that Lt. Tift knew or should have known that he was a cancer survivor with reduced immunity, he allowed his subordinate correction officers to place Goodman in a filthy cell as form of arbitrary and retaliatory punishment. (Id.)
A week later, on October 14, 2019, a corrections officer (“CO”) informed Goodman that his disciplinary custody time in the RHU was over and that he was going back to general population. (Id. ¶ 16.) Goodman agreed to go to general population on the condition that his medical z-code be reinstated because he feared for his health and safety. (Id.) The CO told Goodman that his z-code was not reinstated and that he had been ordered by his superior officers to charge Goodman with a misconduct if he refused to accept a cellmate. (Id.) Goodman replied that it was not his intention to refuse any orders but in the interest of self-preservation he would remain wherever a single cell is available i.e., the RHU. (Id.) The CO charged Goodman with another Class 1 misconduct for refusing to obey an order (the “October 14th Misconduct”). (Id.)
The next day, as Goodman awaited adjudication of the October 14th Misconduct, Defendant M. Wiles (“Sgt. Wiles”), a RHU corrections officer, again charged Goodman with a Class 1 misconduct (the “October 15th Misconduct”) for refusing to obey an order and return to general population. (Id. ¶ 17; ECF No. 1-73.) That charge was reviewed and approved by Lt. Tift. (Compl. ¶ 17.)
At a subsequent hearing, Rudziemski determined that Goodman was guilty of both the charged misconducts and sentenced him to an additional thirty days in the RHU. (ECF Nos. 1-65, 1-75.) Rudziemski's determination with respect to both misconducts was upheld by the PRC, Superintendent Capozza, and the Chief Hearing Examiner, Defendant Zachary J. Moslak (“Moslak”). (ECF Nos. 1-67, 1-70, 1-72, 1-77, 1-80, 1-82.) Goodman alleges that Moslak arbitrarily denied his appeals because the October 14th and October 15th Misconducts were issued in violation of the same policy which had earlier resulted in vacating the August Misconduct, that is, because he was on SCI-Fayette's mental health roster he should not have been charged with a misconduct. (Compl. ¶ 32; see Id. ¶ 13.)
At the end of October 2019, Goodman reached out to Defendant Dr. Saavedra, a SCI-Fayette psychiatrist, and requested a mental health evaluation with respect to his z-code status. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Goodman alleges that Dr. Saavedra is responsible for providing mental health care to inmates. (Id. ¶ 10). According to the Complaint, Dr. Saavedra denied Goodman's request and told him that the z-code issue had to be addressed with the medical department. (Id. ¶ 19.) Goodman clarified that he was not requesting a z-code from him. (Id. ¶ 21; ECF No. 2-2.) Rather, he was wanted a mental health evaluation because he “may be traumatized or something.” (ECF No. 2-2.) He explained that getting cancer was a “traumatic event” which had “stressed him out considerably” and that he was having trouble with his focus and memory. (Id.) Goodman alleges that Dr. Saavedra ignored his request for a mental health evaluation. (Compl. ¶ 21.)
At the time, Goodman also requested “psychological help” from Defendant Lisa Duncan (“Duncan”), SCI-Fayette's licensed psychology manager who is responsible for providing psychological mental health care to prisoners at SCI-Fayette. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 20.) According to the Complaint, Duncan declined to help Goodman but referred him to SCI-Fayette's psychological service specialists. (Id. ¶ 20.) However, they did not provide any assistance and, in fact, opposed the reinstatement of Goodman's z-code. (See Id. ¶ 23.) Duncan also referred Goodman to Wood who had already ignored Goodman requests. (Id. ¶ 20.)
In November 2019, Goodman asked Dr. Miceli to provide follow up care with respect to his cancer and to renew his nutritional supplement but Dr. Miceli ignored his request other than thanking God that Goodman was cancer-free. (Id. ¶ 26). Goodman alleges that he reached out to Duncan again and requested treatment for PTSD and chemo brain symptoms. (Id. ¶ 27.) Duncan allegedly took six months to answer Goodman's request and, instead of providing the requested treatment, referred him to the medical or psychiatry departments. (Id.) Another “treatment supervisor” completely ignored Goodman's request for PTSD therapy which he had recommended for Goodman the previous year. (Id.; see ECF No. 2-35.) Goodman alleges that he filed a grievance for being denied follow up care by Dr. Miceli, and for being denied mental health care for his PTSD and chemo brain symptoms by Dr. Saavedra and Duncan. (Compl. ¶ 29.) According to the Complaint, Wood denied Goodman's grievance and, on appeal, the “facility manager, ” that is, Superintendent Capozza, upheld the denial. (See Id. at 29; ECF No. 2-61.)
Goodman also submitted an inmate disability accommodation (“IDA”) request form to Wood in November 2019 detailing his alleged physical and mental disabilities. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Goodman claimed that he could not be housed in a double cell due to the long term effects of his cancer and requested reinstatement of his requested medical z-code status. (ECF No. 2-94.) He also requested permission to purchase contact lenses and/or to have Lasik-type eye surgery. (Id.) According to the Complaint, Wood never reviewed Goodman's IDA request form, which was violation of the DOC's policy regarding reasonable accommodations for inmates with disabilities. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Goodman alleges that he filed a grievance because Wood “left him in the dark” regarding the status of his IDA request for over three months and in the meantime, SCI-Fayette's officials continued to subject him to “multiple misconduct reports in relation to his physical and mental disabilities.” (Id. ¶ 38.) As stated in the denial of the grievance, these issues were not justifications for a disability accommodation. (ECF No. 2-87.) According to the Complaint, Superintendent Capozza denied Goodman's grievance. (See Id. at 29; ECF No. 2-91.) In doing so, Superintendent Capozza advised Goodman that the issues he raised did not qualify him for ADA status. (ECF No. 2-91.)
Unable to get his z-code status reinstated and being subjected to disciplinary punishment for refusing to accept a cellmate, Goodman requested to be placed in administrative custody status in November 2019. (Compl. ¶ 22.) This would keep Goodman in the RHU but he would avoid being charged with misconducts for disobedience and spending time in disciplinary custody. (Id.) Goodman alleges that SCI-Fayette's deputy superintendent, Defendant Eric T. Armel (“Armel”) not only denied him administrative custody status, but also ordered his subordinates to continue charging Goodman with misconducts if he refused to accept a cellmate in general population. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 30, 34.)
On November 12, 2019, a CO informed Goodman that he was under orders to charge him with a misconduct if he refused to go to general population. (Id. ¶ 25.) Goodman specifically requested protection under administrative custody status because he feared for his health and safety in general population. (Id.) The CO proceeded to charge Goodman with a Class 1 misconduct for refusing to obey an order (“November Misconduct”). (Id.) At his hearing before Rudziemski, Goodman argued that because he feared for his safety, he should have been granted administrative custody status. (ECF No. 2-23.) He also maintained the matter should have been resolved informally because he was on SCI-Fayette's mental health roster. (Id.) Rudziemski rejected Goodman's arguments and sentenced him to another thirty days in the RHU. (ECF No. 2-25.) Rudziemski's determination with respect to the November Misconduct was upheld by the PRC, Superintendent Capozza, and Moslak. (ECF Nos. 2-27, 2-29, 2-32.) In denying Goodman's appeal, Moslak noted that “[Goodman's] history of misconducts preclude[d] any informal resolution for the same charge.” (Compl. ¶ 33.)
Goodman alleges that on November 20, 2019, he was “subjected to a cruel and unusually cold cell in the RHU.” (Id. ¶ 28.) According to the Complaint, when his “urgent and numerous requests for adequate heat were ignored and denied, ” Goodman filed a grievance and “requested relief in the form of sufficient heat and to cease using a cold cell as a retaliatory punishment . . . .” (Id.) Goodman alleges that he was finally moved to another cell a month later. (Id.)
On December 11, 2019, Goodman again requested Armel to reinstate his z-code or to grant him administrative custody status but he refused. (Id. ¶ 30.) The next day, Goodman was scheduled to be released from the RHU. (Id. ¶ 31.) Goodman alleges that he decided to “try to double-cell in general population because receiving multiple misconduct reports and languishing in solitary confinement was causing him severe distress.” (Id.) But as the time to leave the RHU approached, Goodman began to undergo an “anxiety attack” and requested to speak with someone from the medical department. (Id.) When a nurse came to see him, Goodman explained his fears of having a cellmate and also that “his heart was racing, he was sweating, trembling and feeling dizzy.” (Id.) The nurse told him that the only thing he could do for Goodman was leave a note for the psychiatrist to see him tomorrow. (Id.)
Goodman then spoke to a CO at the RHU and explained that “he feared for his health and safety in a double-cell to the point he is having an anxiety attack” and requested protection under administrative custody status. (Id.) The CO responded that his orders were to charge Goodman with a misconduct if he did not go to general population in a double cell. (Id.) The CO also informed Goodman that he had been instructed by his superior officer not to mention anything in the misconduct report about Goodman requesting administrative custody protection. (Id.) The CO then charged Goodman with Class 1 misconduct for refusing to obey an order (“December Misconduct”). (Id.) Goodman alleges that no one from the psychiatry department ever came to see him about this anxiety attack symptoms. (Id.)
At the hearing for the December Misconduct, Goodman maintained that he should have never been issued a misconduct because he was on the prison's mental health roster and also that he should have been granted protection under the administrative custody status. (See id.; ECF No. 2-49.) Rudziemski rejected Goodman's arguments and sentenced him to another thirty days in the RHU. (ECF No. 2-50.) This determination was upheld by the PRC, Superintendent Capozza, and Moslak. (ECF Nos. 2-52, 2-54, 2-56.) In denying Goodman's appeal, Moslak explained that “[r]epetitive misconducts result in formal hearings and a progressive discipline approach.” (Compl. ¶ 37.)
In January 2020, Goodman's mother allegedly wrote a letter to DOC Secretary Defendant John E. Wetzel (“Secretary Wetzel”) detailing the “abuse” that Goodman was suffering at the time from SCI-Fayette's officials. (Id. ¶ 34.) Goodman asserts that the response to this letter was “cursory non-response, ” and that a few days later Armel again denied Goodman's request to either reinstate his z-code or grant him administrative custody status. (Id.)
According to the Complaint, despite his fears and anxiety, on January 10, 2020, Goodman was released from the RHU into a double cell in general population. (Id. ¶ 35.) Goodman alleges that given his “numerous physical and mental ailments, ” he was “immediately incompatible” with his cellmate and “was forced to protect himself in a physical altercation.” (Id.) As a result, a CO pepper sprayed Goodman and charged him with a misconduct for assault, fighting, and refusing to obey an order (“January Misconduct”). (Id.) Goodman alleges that the pepper spray continued to “torture” him for “hours and days after it was first administered on him.” (Id. ¶ 36.) Goodman asserts that Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Capozza, Armel, and Wood's failure to provide him with a “sufficient decontaminate product and process” after he was pepper sprayed by their subordinate constituted cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.)
In April 2020, Deputy Armel allegedly placed Goodman under administrative custody but he was no longer requesting this as SCI-Fayette had already placed him on an administrative z-code as a result of the January Misconduct. (Id. ¶ 40.) Goodman claims that Deputy Armel also referred him to a long-term disciplinary program in the RHU. (Id. ¶ 40.) According to Goodman, that program is akin to being left in solitary confinement for an indeterminate amount of time. (Id.) Goodman alleges that he has also been denied parole because of his misconducts. (Id.)
Goodman alleges that on April 7, 2020, he submitted a sick call request because “he was suffering from chronic fatigue, low energy, muscle weakness and neuropathy symptoms.” (Id. ¶ 40.) However, SCI-Fayette did not provide Goodman with any medical treatment in response to this request. (Id.) Additionally, on May 3, 2020, Goodman allegedly submitted another sick call stating that he was suffering from the same problems mentions in the April 7, 2020 sick call as well “blurred vision, dizziness, flashbacks, mood swings and stomach pain.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Goodman claims that apart from a physician assistant checking his vital signs, he did not receive any treatment for his ailments. (Id.)
Goodman wrote to the DOC's mental health advocate on May 15, 2020. (Id. ¶ 42.) In that correspondence, Goodman explained that “his mental health needs were being severely neglected” by SCI-Fayette and requested help and treatment for his PTSD and chemo brain symptoms. (Id.) He did not receive a response to this request. (Id.)
Goodman claims that, as a result of Defendants' actions, he “suffered unnecessary chronic physical and mental pain from the effects of . . . cancer and chemotherapy which were left untreated.” (Id. at 25.) He alleges that “he suffered severe visual impairment, eye degeneration and glaucoma symptoms which were exacerbated by the [pepper spray] use . . .” (Id. at 26.) According to Goodman, he “suffered immense mental anguish by long-term confinement in the RHU. . . [which] was exacerbated due to [his] untreated PTSD and [c]hemobrain symptoms.” (Id.) Goodman also contends that he suffered an “incalculable loss of freedom by being denied parole as a direct result of [Defendants'] abusive actions . . .” (Id.)
C. Standard of Review
A valid complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). While “accept[ing] all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, ” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11.
To survive the motion, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; (3) look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
“[P]ro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008). “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.1996)).
D. Discussion
Goodman does not identify the specific defendants who are alleged to be liable for the various claims asserted in the Complaint. Broadly construed, Goodman asserts claims against all defendants under the Eighth Amendment and a claim of retaliation along with a Fourteenth Amendment claim against certain DOC Defendants. The Complaint also includes an ADA claim.
1. Section 1983 claims
Section 1983 provides a private citizen with the right to bring an action against any person who under color of state law deprives him of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This statute does not create substantive rights but instead “provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must establish that []he was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).
Importantly, a plaintiff must plead a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). That is because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, each defendant can be held liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g., id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201- 02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer automatically responsible for the wrongdoing of employees, does not apply under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Therefore, supervisor-defendants cannot be held liable for every illegal act that takes place in a correctional facility. Rather, they can be held liable only for their own conduct.
The Third Circuit has identified two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates. First, liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). Second, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
Because there is no question that defendants acted under color of state law, the Court's analysis focuses on whether Goodman has sufficiently alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.
a. Eighth Amendment Claims
It is well established that “[t]he Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the imposition of ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency.'” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). “The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to his future health.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994)).
Some, but not all, of Goodman's claims relate to his allegations regarding his medical needs. In order to establish an inadequate medical treatment claim under the Eighth Amendment, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that ‘the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs' and (2) an objective showing that ‘those needs were serious.'” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534 (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). As explained by the Third Circuit, “claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference.'” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. Rather, for a prison official “[t]o act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs [of a prisoner] is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles, 571 F.3d at 330 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-105; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). “Under [this] recklessness standard, ‘prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk.'” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).
The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference to exist in various scenarios including where a prison official: “(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment. . . . [or (4)] persists in a particular course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (citations and quotations marks omitted).
In sum, if alleged inadequate care “was a result of an error in medical judgment, ” then Goodman's claims fail. Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). If, however, the failure to provide adequate care was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical factors, then his claims are actionable.
Claims against Dr. Miceli
In seeking dismissal of Goodman's Eighth Amendment claim against him, Dr. Miceli argues that Goodman has failed to allege that Dr. Miceli was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Goodman's Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Miceli is premised on the following factual allegations:
• Three months into the chemotherapy treatment Dr. Miceli denied Goodman's request for a stronger pain medication.
• Once the chemotherapy ended, Dr. Miceli completely discontinued Goodman's pain medication even though Goodman was still experiencing pain.
• A year after the chemotherapy ended, Dr. Miceli refused to treat Goodman's neuropathy pain as not related to cancer or chemotherapy.
• Over a year after the chemotherapy ended, Dr. Miceli revoked his z-code recommendation for Goodman.
• Dr. Miceli refused to provide follow up cancer care or renew Goodman's nutritional supplement and declared him cancer free.
A review of the exhibits Goodman attached to the Complaint reflects that he disagreed with Dr. Miceli's medical judgment. This does not support a claim under the Eight Amendment, however. Denying a patient's request for a stronger pain medication, discontinuing medication after a certain treatment is over, concluding that certain symptoms are unrelated to a disease, revoking a recommendation for single cell status, or not providing treatment based on the determination that a patient is free from a disease fall squarely within the professional judgment of a physician. “It is well established that as long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.” Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322- 23 (1982)).
None of the allegations in the Complaint support an inference that Dr. Miceli was deliberately indifferent to Goodman's serious medical needs with respect to his cancer treatment, chemotherapy, and follow up care. As an oncologist, Dr. Miceli treated Goodman's cancer. He made medical judgments regarding pain management and whether a medical z-code remained necessary over a year after chemotherapy was concluded. Dr. Miceli determined that further medical treatment for Goodman's cancer was unnecessary after he declared him cancer-free. All of these decisions rested within his medical judgment, and even if they were as a result of error, are not actionable under the Eighth Amendment.
Thus, because Goodman has failed to set forth any facts that support a claim that Dr. Miceli was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, his Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Miceli should be dismissed.
Claims against Dr. Saavedra
Dr. Saavedra seeks dismissal of Goodman's Eight Amendment claim on the same basis, asserting that Goodman's failure to allege deliberate indifference is fatal to his claim. According to Dr. Saavedra, Goodman “has alleged only that he requested a mental health evaluation from Dr. Saavedra about his medical z-code.” (ECF No. 43 at 4.) Because he is not Goodman's medical doctor, Dr. Saavedra contends, Goodman has failed to set forth any facts that would support a claim that he was aware of any risk to Goodman's health or safety. (Id.) In support of his contention, Dr. Saavedra asserts that Goodman “has not claimed that he was experiencing a serious mental health need requiring attention from Dr. Saavedra.” (Id.)
However, Goodman alleges throughout the Complaint that he was experiencing certain mental health issues, including PTSD, that necessitated Dr. Saavedra's intervention. Certain exhibits attached to the Complaint reflect that when Dr. Saavedra initially denied Goodman's request for a mental health evaluation and referred him to the medical department to resolve the z-code issue, Goodman told Dr. Saavedra that he was not requesting a z-code from him. (ECF No. 2-2.) Rather, in a follow up request, Goodman noted he wanted a mental health evaluation because coping with cancer which was a “traumatic event” that had “stressed him out considerably” and that he was having trouble with his focus and memory. (Id.) Goodman was also on SCI-Fayette's mental health roster. According to the Complaint, Dr. Saavedra took no action to help him. Indeed, Goodman filed a grievance related to Dr. Saavedra's alleged denial of mental health care. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 29.)
While some of the exhibits attached to the Complaint reflect that Dr. Saavedra was “following” Goodman (ECF No. 2-41, 2-61), none of these exhibits reveal that Dr. Saavedra responded to Goodman's request for a mental health evaluation. Goodman has alleged that Dr. Saavedra knew that Goodman's mental health condition necessitated “treatment but intentionally refuse[d] to provide it. . .” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. Given these allegations, which must be taken as true, whether Dr. Saavedra was deliberately indifferent to Goodman's mental health needs, or these needs were serious, are issues that cannot be resolved at this stage. Therefore, Dr. Saavadra's motion to dismiss should be denied.
The DOC Defendants
Goodman does not identify the specific DOC against whom he is asserting Eighth Amendment claims, which can include issues related to medical care, cruel and unusual punishment, or the conditions of confinement.
To the extent that Goodman seeks to impose liability on any of the DOC Defendants for deferring to Dr. Miceli's medical judgment, including the revocation of his medical z-code status, he has failed to state an Eight Amendment claim against them. Goodman's allegations against Dr. Miceli are based on his disagreement with the medical treatment he received and Dr. Miceli's recommendation that a medical z-code was no longer necessary. Based on allegations of the Complaint and the accompanying exhibits, it is clear that Dr. Miceli treated Goodman for cancer and after determining that Goodman was cancer-free, discontinued treatment and revoked his medical z-code recommendation. Because Goodman's allegations center upon his disagreement with the treatment rendered by Dr. Miceli, none of the DOC Defendants, who are non-medical personnel, can be found to be deliberately indifferent. See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (“[Non-physician prison officials] can[not] be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.”).
Thus, all claims regarding Goodman's efforts to have his z-code reinstated, and the denial of these requests by various DOC Defendants, should be dismissed, as well as all claims regarding the medical treatment rendered by Dr. Miceli.
Similarly, Goodman's claim regarding his vision should be dismissed. Goodman alleges that he suffers from a severe visual impairment “most likely due to chemotherapy” that is not resolvable by eyeglasses. He claims that at the recommendation of an outside doctor, he asked to be allowed to purchase contact lenses and/or have Lasik-type eye surgery but was denied the opportunity to do so. However, as the exhibits attached to the Complaint confirm, Wood addressed his inquiry. She noted that his eye prescription did not indicate a medical need for contact lenses but that she would request additional information in order to determine that there was a medical indication for Goodman's request. (ECF No. 1-38.) After a further request from Goodman, Wood advised him that pursuant to the prison's policies, contact lenses are provided only based upon a disease of the eye or a prescription, and neither of those were present. (ECF No. 1-39.) Further, she advised Goodman that she asked two physicians look into this. (Id.) Goodman's grievance regarding this issue was later denied by Wood and that denial was upheld by Superintendant Capozza and DOC's Chief Grievance Officer Defendant Dorina Varner based upon the fact that an optometrist who examined Goodman indicated that he did not need contacts. (ECF Nos. 1-40, 1-42, 1-52.) Goodman later submitted a disability request form to Wood in which he requested that his visual impairment be accommodated by allowing him to purchase contact lenses and/or have Lasik-type eye surgery. Goodman alleges that Wood never responded to his disability request. When he filed a grievance in this regard, Superintendent Capozza denied that grievance.
Clearly, Goodman's complaints relate to his disagreement with the findings of an optometrist regarding his eye condition and whether he had an eye disease or needed contact lenses. Wood, Superintendent Capozza, and Varner are non-medical personnel and as they advised Goodman, they relied upon the determination of an optometrist who examined him. Thus, they were not deliberately indifferent because they are entitled to rely upon the expertise of the medical professional who evaluated Goodman. See, e.g., Roberts v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, No. 1:15-cv-2456, 2016 WL 4379031, * 3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff's claim against health care administrator when his sole alleged involvement was that he did not investigate the plaintiff's claims that the medical professionals were not providing him with adequate treatment); Roberts v. Tretnick, No. 2:13-cv-45, 2014 WL 4218249 * 4-5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2014) (dismissing plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim against health care administrator when plaintiff was receiving medical treatment from medical professionals at the prison).
Goodman's claim related to his disability request also fails to state a claim against any of the DOC Defendants. As the exhibits attached to the Complaint confirm, none of the DOC Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need in denying his disability request. While Goodman alleges a delay by Wood in responding to his request, the delay does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference based on the facts alleged by Goodman and the exhibits attached thereto. It is clear from the face of the IDA form that he wrote and submitted that he claimed to be disabled both physically and mentally due to long term effects of his cancer treatment and sought reinstatement of a medical z-code so that he could occupy a single cell. However, Dr. Miceli concluded in July of 2019, more than a year after Goodman's chemotherapy ended, that a medical z-code was no longer necessary. Moreover, Goodman's additional requests for contact lenses and/or Lasik surgery were also addressed by medical personnel and found to be unnecessary. In addition, as stated in Superintendent Capozza in upholding the denial of his grievance, Goodman did not qualify for ADA status. (ECF No. 2-91; see also ECF No. 2-95.) Simply put, this does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.
Goodman's allegations regarding his mental health needs require further analysis. Goodman has alleged when Dr. Saavedra denied him the proper mental health treatment with respect to his PTSD, he reached out to certain of the DOC Defendants. Specifically, he alleges that he requested psychiatric help from Duncan, a licensed psychology manager, who did not help him but referred him to SCI-Fayette's psychiatric service specialists and to Wood, the health care administrator. When Goodman reached out to Duncan a second time, he alleges, she did not respond to his request for over six months. He also filed a grievance in this regard which was denied by Wood and upheld by Superintendent Capozza.
With respect to Duncan and Wood, whether they acted with deliberate indifference to objectively serious mental health needs cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage as all of Goodman's allegations must be taken as true. Therefore, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, Goodman's allegations regarding lack of mental health treatment sufficiently state an Eighth Amendment claim regarding Goodman's mental health needs against Duncan and Wood.
With respect to Superintendent Capozza, Goodman alleges that his grievance for lack of mental health treatment was denied. “Where a grievance alleges an ongoing constitutional violation, a supervisory defendant who reviews it is personally involved in that violation because he is confronted with a situation he can remedy directly.” Harnett v. Barr, 538 F.Supp.2d 511, 524-25 (N.D.N.Y 2008). Goodman's allegation that Superintendent Capozza denied, without adequate investigation, grievances alleging ongoing constitutional violations is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Carter v. Smith, No. 08-279, 2009 WL 3088428, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2009); Zappulla v. Fischer, No. 11-6733, 2013 WL 1387033, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013) (“[T]he Complaint further alleges that Defendant Lee, after being informed of that ongoing violation through the grievance process, failed to remedy that wrong. Those allegations . . . are adequate to state a claim against Lee.”); Whitehead v. Rozum, No. 11-102, 2012 WL 4378193, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2012) (“In the prison setting, where a grievance alleges an ongoing constitutional violation, a supervisory defendant who reviews it is personally involved in that violation because he is confronted with a situation he can remedy directly.”), report and recommendation adopted by, 2012 WL 4370929 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2012).
As such, to the extent that Goodman alleges that there were ongoing constitutional violations that Superintendent Capozza was made aware of, he has plausibly stated a claim for which Superintendent Capozza may be liable. Therefore, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, Goodman has stated a claim against Superintendent Capozza regarding Goodman's lack of mental health treatment.
With respect to the pepper spray incident, Goodman admits that he was involved in a physical altercation with his cellmate that prompted a CO to use the spray. Goodman does not claim that the use of pepper spray violated his constitutional rights. Instead, he alleges that the spray continued to “torture” him due to insufficient decontamination procedures and seeks to hold Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Capozza, Armel, and Wood responsible for failing to provide him with a “sufficient decontaminate product and process” after the pepper spray incident. Based upon these allegations, Goodman is claiming that after he was sprayed, he was inadequately decontaminated. He does not allege, however, that he sustained any serious medical conditions as a result.
“[T]he mere fact that the plaintiff suffered injuries from an officer's use of typical detention tools which may cause pain, e.g., pepper spray and handcuffs, does not automatically convert any injuries to ‘serious medical conditions.” Klein v. Madison, 374 F.Supp.3d 389, 424 (E.D. Pa. 2019). At the same time, “[c]ourts have held that the failure to decontaminate prisoners or otherwise provide medical treatment for prisoners exposed to pepper spray can support a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment where the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Bomar v. Wetzel, Civ. A. No. 17-1035, 2020 WL 907641, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2020).
It is well-established that under § 1983, a defendant must be shown to have had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d at 1207. A § 1983 plaintiff may establish supervisory liability by alleging that individual defendants who are policy makers “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel., 372 F.3d at 586 (quoting Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725).
Goodman does not allege that Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Capozza, Armel or Wood were personally involved in the incident, were aware that it occurred, had any role in providing decontaminate to Goodman or that there was an on-going constitutional violation that they could remedy. Significantly, Goodman does not allege that these defendants had any role in establishing an unconstitutional policy or practice regarding the use of pepper spray or decontamination. Accordingly, Goodman has failed to allege a viable Eight Amendment claim against Secretary Wetzel, Superintendent Capozza, Armel or Wood with respect to the pepper spray incident.
b. Retaliation Claim
Goodman also appears to have alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against certain DOC Defendants.
It is well established that “[r]etaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of his constitutional rights is unconstitutional, ” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 376, and “as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). A prisoner alleging First Amendment retaliation “must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action taken by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Goodman alleges that certain DOC Defendants subjected him to retaliatory punishment for voicing concerns and filing grievances regarding the medical treatment he was receiving at SCI-Fayette. Goodman claims that when he requested help from Byers regarding physical and mental health ailments, Byers not only denied his request but also threatened him with a misconduct report and disciplinary punishment. However, verbal threats alone do not constitute adverse action. Chruby v. Kowaleski, 534 Fed.Appx. 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2013).
On August 13, 2019, however, Goodman filed a grievance in which he requested that his medical z-code be reinstated without a threat of a misconduct report/disciplinary punishment because he was still suffering from the physical and mental effects of his cancer and subsequent treatment. Three days later, Byers attempted to move another prisoner into Goodman's cell and then charged Goodman with the August Misconduct and placed him in the RHU. In this instance, all three elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim are satisfied, that is, protected conduct (expressing concerns, requesting help and/or filing a grievance), adverse action (misconduct charges and RHU placement), and causal link (adverse action took place within three days of filing the grievance).
Broadly construed, the Complaint also alleges that Goodman continued to engage in protected activity in the RHU by appealing his misconducts and requesting appropriate medical treatment and disability accommodations. Goodman alleges that Lt. Tift subjected him to retaliatory and arbitrary punishment while he was at the RHU. One such incident involved an RHU CO placing Goodman in a filthy cell without providing him with cleaning supplies because he was assisting another prisoner in his hunger protest the previous day. Goodman alleges that this was a retaliatory punishment and was done under the supervision of Lt. Tift who knew or should have known that he was a cancer survivor with reduced immunity. He also alleges that he was left in a cold RHU cell for a month in retaliation for his efforts to seek treatment. Additionally, while Goodman was awaiting adjudication of the October 14th Misconduct for refusing to leave the RHU, Sgt. Wiles issued him with the October 15th Misconduct for the same offense. Goodman alleges that Lt. Tift reviewed and approved the October 15th Misconduct.
Further, Goodman alleges when he asked Armel to place him on administrative custody status because he feared for his health and safety, Armel denied his request and ordered to his subordinates to continue charging Goodman with misconducts. According to the Complaint, one CO told Goodman that he had instructions to charge Goodman with misconducts and not to mention anything in those reports about the fact that Goodman has requested protection under administrative custody status.
In sum, Goodman has alleged that he was on the prison's mental health roster and was concerned about his health. When he expressed those concerns, he was placed in the RHU by Byers. Throughout his time in the RHU, Goodman continued to engage in protected activity and as a result he was subjected to retaliatory punishment by Lt. Tift, Sgt. Wiles, and Armel. Accordingly, Goodman has plausibly alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against Byers, Lt. Tift, Sgt. Wiles, and Armel.
c. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
DOC Defendants also seek dismissal of Goodman's Fourteenth Amendment claim to the extent it is duplicative of his Eighth Amendment claim. (ECF No. 24 at 11.) It is clear that “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). Thus, all claims that are duplicative of Goodman's Eighth Amendment claims should be dismissed.
Not all of Goodman's factual allegations fit squarely within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, however. Specifically, Goodman appears to be alleging that certain DOC Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights with respect to his misconduct hearings, subsequent appeals, and grievances.
To establish a due process violation in the prison context, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a liberty interest protected by the Constitution or a statute. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 479 n.4, 483-84 (1995). A prisoner's liberty interests are not violated, however, unless a condition “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Therefore, in determining whether a prisoner's due process rights have been violated, courts first consider whether there has been a denial of a liberty or property interest. See Ky. Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). If a prisoner makes such a showing, the next step for the courts is to evaluate “whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Id.
Goodman's due process claim with respect to his misconduct hearings and appeals fails at the first step of the inquiry. As a result of the misconducts from August 16, 2019, to December 12, 2019, Rudziemski sentenced him to a total of 180 days in disciplinary custody. However, 180 days in disciplinary custody, without more, is insufficient to establish the kind of atypical deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a protected liberty interest. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months in disciplinary custody insufficient to trigger a due process violation); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-708 (3d Cir. 1997) (fifteen-month placement in administrative custody did not implicate a protected liberty interest because said confinement was not atypical); Young v. Beard, 227 Fed.Appx. 138 (3d Cir. 2007) (aggregate 980 days in disciplinary segregation did not violate the due process clause.
Even if Goodman had established his RHU placement amounted to a denial of a protected liberty interest, he was afforded all of the process he was due through misconduct hearings and subsequent appeals. Indeed, one of his misconducts was vacated on appeal. Therefore, the process provided to him was sufficient to pass constitutional muster. See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[B]efore being placed in solitary confinement for administrative-rather than disciplinary-reasons. . . an ‘informal, nonadversary review' at which the prisoner has the opportunity to state his views, satisfies the requirements of due process . . . ”)
Accordingly, to the extent that Goodman has attempted to assert a due process claim against Rudziemski, Superintendent Capozza and Moslak, who were the DOC Defendants involved in the misconduct hearings and subsequent appeals, he has failed to state a claim.
Goodman also alleges that Moslak denied his due process rights because charging him with a misconduct as opposed informal resolution was a direct violation of DOC's policy because he was an inmate on SCI-Fayette's mental health roster. He further asserts that Armel's refusal to place him on administrative custody status violated the DOC's policy. This does not serve as a basis for a due process violation, however, because federal and state regulations in and of themselves do not create a liberty interest in that procedure. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 41 (1983) (stating the mere fact of careful procedural structure to regulate use of administrative segregation does not indicate existence of protected liberty interest).
Finally, although Keri Moore, the DOC's Assistance Chief Grievance Officer and Dorina Varner, the Chief Grievance Officer, are named as Defendants, Goodman does not allege that these Defendants had any interactions with him other than their involvement in the grievance process. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Complaint that could sustain a viable supervisory liability due process claim against Secretary Wetzel. This is so because participation in an after-the-fact review of a grievance or appeal is insufficient to establish personal involvement on the part of those individuals reviewing grievances. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208 (finding the filing of a grievance is not enough to show the actual knowledge necessary for personal involvement); Brooks v. Beard, 167 Fed.Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a state prisoner's allegation that prison officials and administrators responded inappropriately, or failed to respond to a prisoner's grievance, did not establish that the officials and administrators were involved in the underlying allegedly unconstitutional conduct).
Accordingly, Goodman has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against any of the DOC Defendants.
2. ADA Claim
Broadly construed, Goodman appears to premise his ADA claim on the fact that Wood never responded to his request for accommodations for his alleged physical and mental disabilities and that Superintendent Capozza denied his subsequent grievance pertaining to this matter. Goodman's ADA claim fails for several reasons.
Title II of the ADA provides that “[n]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. It is well established that “[s]tate prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity,' which includes ‘any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.'” Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B)); see also Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Title II of the ADA applies to services, programs and activities provided within correctional institutions.”).
While “a prison's refusal to accommodate inmates' disabilities ‘in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all prison programs' constitutes a denial of the benefits of a prison's services, programs, or activities under Title II, ” Furgess v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006)), Goodman has not stated a viable ADA claim because he has not alleged “that he is a qualified individual with a disability, who was precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.” Id. at 289. Goodman cannot maintain an ADA claim without alleging any facts demonstrating that the denial of his IDA request was because of his alleged disabilities. See Deparlos, 492 Fed.Appx. at 215 (Dismissal of an ADA claim appropriate where the “complaint merely asserts that defendants violated the ADA and fails to allege any facts that demonstrate that the alleged inadequate or improper medical care [plaintiff] received was because of a disability.”) Nor has Goodman alleged that he was excluded from participating in or denied of benefits of any its services, programs, or activities.
Even assuming that Goodman could be considered disabled under the ADA, the circumstances surrounding the denial of his disability request would relate to an Eighth Amendment violation as opposed to a viable ADA claim. See Rashad v. Doughty, 4 Fed.Appx. 558, 560 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he failure to provide medical treatment to a disabled prisoner while perhaps raising Eighth Amendment concerns in certain circumstances, does not constitute an ADA violation.”); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for the disability.”).
Moreover, although the Third Circuit “has yet to address individual liability under Title II of the ADA, ” Brown v. Deparlos, 492 Fed.Appx. 211, n.2 (3d Cir. 2012), it has approvingly cited “decisions of other courts of appeals holding that individuals are not liable under Titles I and II of the ADA.” Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002). See also Matthews v. PA Department of Corrections, 613 Fed.Appx. 163 (3d Cir. 2015). While the Third Circuit “has recognized an exception to this general rule to the extent a plaintiff may sue for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in their official capacities.” Mayon v. Capozza, No. 2:14-CV-1203, 2015 WL 4955397, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015) (citing Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002)), Goodman is not entitled to such relief because he has been transferred to a different correctional facility.
For these reasons, Goodman's ADA claim should be dismissed.
E. Leave to Amend
When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harleee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alston v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d. Cir. 2000).
Under the circumstances here, allowing Plaintiff to file another complaint would be futile. Particularly given the detailed nature of the Complaint and the extensive number of exhibits to the Complaint, there is no indication that Plaintiff could cure the deficiencies in the claims he brings against Dr. Miceli, the Fourteenth Amendment and ADA claims and the claims he has brought against certain DOC Defendants for whom dismissal is recommended.
F. Conclusion
Therefore, based upon the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Dr. Miceli's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 39) be granted and that Dr. Saavedra's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 42) be denied.
With respect to the motion to dismiss of the DOC Defendants (ECF No. 23), it is recommended that it be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, it is recommended that the Court:
1. grant the DOC Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment and ADA claims with prejudice;
2. grant the DOC Defendants' motion to the extent that they seek the dismissal of Debra A. Hawkinberry, Beth Rudziemski, Zachary J. Moslak, Keri Moore, Dorina Varner, and John E. Wetzel from this lawsuit with prejudice;
3. grant the DOC Defendants' motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Eric T. Armel with prejudice;
4. grant the DOC Defendants' motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Stephanie Wood and Mark Capozza relating to Plaintiff's disability claim with prejudice;
5. deny the DOC Defendants' motion with respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Lisa Duncan, Stephanie Wood, and Mark Capozza regarding his mental health treatment requests;
6. grant the DOC Defendants' motion with respect to all other Eighth Amendment claims; and
7. deny the DOC Defendants' motion with respect to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against Lt. W. Tift, Sgt. M. Wiles, Chuck Byers, and Eric T. Armel.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).