Opinion
22A-SC-1471
02-02-2023
Shayna Goodman, Appellant-Defendant, v. Patricia Harris, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Appellant pro se Shayna Goodman Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Small Claims Court, Washington Township Division Trial Court Cause No. 49K07-2108-SC-1853 The Honorable Steven G. Poore, Judge
Appellant pro se Shayna Goodman Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bailey, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Shayna Goodman appeals the small claims court's judgment in favor of Patricia Harris on Harris' complaint alleging that Goodman had caused damage to Harris' car. Goodman raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the small claims court erred when it entered judgment against her. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] As discussed further below, the facts presented on appeal are limited. On August 5, 2021, Harris filed a notice of claim against Goodman in small claims court and asserted that Goodman's vehicle had caused damage to Harris' vehicle. The small claims court initially scheduled a telephonic hearing on October 5, 2021. Goodman appeared, but Harris did not. Accordingly, the court rescheduled the hearing and ultimately held a trial on Harris' notice of claim on February 10, 2022. Following the trial, the court found that the "physical evidence establishes that . . . it is more likely than not that [Goodman's] vehicle caused the damage to [Harris'] vehicle." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 16. And the court found that, because Goodman "simply denied" that she had caused the damage, she had made a "tacit admission that she had exclusive control over her vehicle during the time period at issue." Id. Accordingly, the small claims court entered a judgment in favor of Harris and against Goodman and ordered Goodman to pay Harris $1,601.73 plus costs and interest. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶3] Goodman appeals the small claims court's judgment against her. We observe that Goodman proceeds pro se. "It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so." Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
[¶4] Further, Harris has not filed an appellee's brief. When an appellee does not file a brief, our Court will not undertake the burden of developing arguments on that party's behalf. Thurman v. Thurman, 777 N.E.2d 41, 42 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). Rather, we apply "a less stringent standard of review" and may reverse the trial court if Goodman establishes prima facie error. Id. Prima facie "means at first sight, or on first appearance, or on the face of it." Id.
[¶5] We first note that Goodman's brief on appeal wholly fails to comply with the Indiana Appellate Rules. Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) requires an appellant to include in her brief an argument section that "contain[s] the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citation to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]" Here, Goodman has not included an Argument section in her brief, she has not included a statement of the applicable standard of review, and she has not provided us with any citation to the record to support her contentions.
[¶6] Nevertheless, we have read and considered Goodman's arguments on this issue. First, Goodman contends that the small claims court should have dismissed Harris' notice of claim after Harris failed to appear at the October 5, 2021, hearing. To support her contention, Goodman directs us to Small Claims Rule 10(A), which provides that, "[i]f the plaintiff fails to appear at the time and place specified in the notice of claim, or for any continuance thereof, the court may dismiss the action without prejudice."
[¶7] Here, there is no dispute that Harris did not appear at the October 5, 2021, telephonic hearing. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 4. However, while Goodman contends that she filed a "request to dismiss the claim" with the small claims court, she does not direct us to any portion of the record to demonstrate that she indeed filed such a request. Appellant's Br. at 4. Rather, we find no such request in Goodman's appendix. Further, the language of Small Claims Rule 10(A) is simply permissive-a court "may" dismiss the action without prejudice. Goodman has not directed us to any authority to demonstrate that a court is required to sua sponte dismiss an action in the event the plaintiff fails to appear. Goodman has not demonstrated that the court erred when it did not dismiss Harris' claim.
[¶8] Still, Goodman contends that the small claims court's judgment is not supported by the evidence. However, Goodman failed to include in her Appendix Harris' notice of claim. In addition, the small claims court's judgment indicates that it entered judgment against Goodman following a trial at which the parties presented evidence. But there is no Transcript of that hearing, nor is there a volume of Exhibits in the Record on Appeal. And Goodman did not supplement that omission by including essential record material in her Appendix in accordance with Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(h). Further, while Goodman provided a 2017 sales receipt from an auto body shop and various photographs of a vehicle in her Appendix, there is no indication on any of those documents to demonstrate that they were admitted as evidence at the trial. See id. at 17-22. As a result, Goodman has not met her burden to demonstrate that the small claims court's judgment is not supported by the evidence.
Conclusion
[¶9] Goodman has not met her burden to demonstrate that the court was required to dismiss Harris' claim or that the small claims court's judgment was not supported by the evidence. We therefore affirm the small claims court's judgment.
[¶10] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.