The insuperable difficulty with this contention and the supporting argument is that the instrument captioned "Final Report and Settlement Receipt" is not, in any real sense, an agreement, within the contemplation of section 19(h). It is true, as urged by plaintiff in error, that decisions prior to the enactment of the amendments to section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, in 1925, held that if an employee receives compensation for an injury, a petition for review under section 19(h) may be filed at any time within eighteen months after the date of the last payment. (Wabash Railway Co. v. Industrial Com. 286 Ill. 194; Carson-Payson Co. v. Industrial Com. 285 Ill. 635; Arnold Murdock Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 295; Simpson Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 366.) Likewise, the furnishing of medical care, prior to 1925, constituted a payment of compensation. (Goodman Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Com. 316 Ill. 394; Jackson v. Industrial Com. 302 Ill. 281; Central Locomotive and Car Works v. Industrial Com. 290 Ill. 436. ) These authorities cannot avail plaintiff in error for the adequate reason that section 8(a), as amended, now provides that the furnishing of medical, surgical and hospital services shall not be construed as an admission of liability or as the payment of compensation and section 8(i), added in 1925, ordains that any payments of compensation by the employer to an injured employee prior to the filing of the application for adjustment of claim shall not be construed against the employer as admitting liability to pay compensation. (Lewin Metals Corp. v. Industrial Com. 360 Ill. 371; Lewis v. Industrial Com. 357 Ill. 309.) The manifest object of the amendments to section 8 was to aid injured employees by encouraging their employers to furnish medical care promptly and to make compensation payments promptly by assuring the employers that neither the care rendered nor the compensatio

It is a universal rule in jurisdictions having Compensation Acts which are administered by a board that the findings of the board cannot be reversed where they are sustained by any substantial evidence. ( Morgan v. Butte Central Min. etc. Co., 58 Mont. 633, 194 P. 496; Ex parte Paramount Coal Co., 213 Ala. 281, 104 So. 753; Owl Drug Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 71 Cal.App. 303, 234 P. 921; Smith Son v. Industrial Acc. Com., 72 Cal.App. 240, 236 P. 962; Kettering Mercantile Co. v. Fox, 77 Colo. 90, 234 P. 464; Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Com., 316 Ill. 394, 147 N.E. 394; Bunker v. Motor Wheel Corp., 231 Mich. 334, 204 N.W. 110; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. State Industrial Com., 109 Okla. 65, 234 P. 765.) The court erred in entering judgment without any deduction for compensation theretofore paid respondent.

A strained construction not fairly within the provisions of the act cannot be supported. ( Berry Co. v. Industrial Com. 318 Ill. 312.) There was no denial by the employer of liability, and it has been repeatedly held by this court that the furnishing of medical, surgical and hospital services must be regarded as the payment of compensation under the act. Goodman Manf. Co. v. Industrial Com. 316 Ill. 394, and cases cited. What is now paragraph ( a) of section 8 of the act has undergone successive amendments at the hands of the legislature.

While a finding of the commission must be set aside if manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, ( Ayer Lord Tie Co. v. Industrial Com. 324 Ill. 504,) it will not be disturbed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. ( Goodman Manf. Co. v. Industrial Com. 316 Ill. 394.) Where the evidence is conflicting it is the province and duty of the Industrial Commission to consider and weigh it. Liability cannot be based upon a choice between two theories equally compatible with the evidence, one of which would show a liability and the other not. The facts showing the liability of an employer under the Workmen's Compensation act must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Cockrell v. Industrial Com. 327 Ill. 438.) The burden of proof was on the plaintiff in error to show that the injury of the leg caused death.

While an award under the Compensation act cannot rest upon conjecture or surmise or upon the choice of two views equally compatible with the evidence, yet it is the province of the Industrial Commission to draw reasonable inferences from evidentiary facts, and this court will not set aside a finding of the commission unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence. ( Rissman Son v. Industrial Com. 323 Ill. 459; Goodman Manf. Co. v. Industrial Com. 316 id. 394.) The finding of the Industrial Commission that the disability of defendant in error is due to the accidental injury and that the tuberculosis is not an independent intervening cause is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

In that case no question arose as to liability on the part of the employer for compensation. In Goodman Manf. Co. v. Industrial Com. 316 Ill. 394, Jackson v. Industrial Com. 302 id. 281, and Central Car Works v. Industrial Com. 290 id. 436, all of which have been cited in support of this contention of the defendant in error, the same rule was laid down on similar facts. In none of these cases was there any question of liability, but the question was whether the application for compensation had been filed within the time limited by the act.

The court, under section 2960, Revised Codes, may, as an aid to it, allow additional evidence to assist it in deciding whether the findings of the board were made in accordance with the "facts or the law," but even with such additional evidence before it, if the findings of the board are supported by any evidence, it is the duty of the district court sitting as a court of review to sustain said findings. ( Ex parte Paramount Coal Co., 213 Ala. 281, 104 So. 753; Owl Drug Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 71 Cal.App. 303, 234 P. 921; Smith Son v. Industrial Acc. Com., 72 Cal.App. 240, 236 P. 962; Kettering Mercantile Co. v. Fox, 77 Colo. 90, 234 P. 464; Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Com., 316 Ill. 394, 147 N.E. 394; Bunker v. Motor Wheel Corp., 231 Mich. 334, 204 N.W. 110; Rector v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 108 Okla. 122, 235 P. 183; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. State Industrial Com., 109 Okla. 65, 234 P. 765.) The principle of law requiring an injured person to minimize his damage when possible has been extended to and applied to cases coming within the Compensation Law. An injured employee cannot sit idly by and allow his disability to increase to the damage of his employer when such disability can be cured or mitigated.

Plaintiff in error furnished medical services until April, 1925, and the claim was filed two months before that time. This court has held that payments for medical services for an employee are payments of compensation under the provisions of the Compensation act. Goodman Manf. Co. v. Industrial Com. 316 Ill. 394; Jackson v. Industrial Com. 302 id. 281; Central Car Works v. Industrial Com. 290 id. 436. Plaintiff in error further contends that the proof does not sustain the award for compensation for 200 weeks because it does not show the loss of the use of the arm is complete.

While the testimony of the claimant may be sufficient to justify an award, it is the duty of the commission to weigh the evidence, and it is not justified in finding for one party merely because there is some testimony which, standing undisputed, would justify such finding, when the facts and circumstances in evidence show such testimony to be untrue. ( Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. 293 Ill. 425; Swift Co. v. Industrial Com. 302 id. 38.) While a finding of fact by the Industrial Commission will not be disturbed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, ( Goodman Manf. Co. v. Industrial Com. 316 Ill. 394,) yet it must be set aside if it is manifestly so contrary. Union Colliery Co. v. Industrial Com. 317 Ill. 428. The preponderance of the evidence was against Collins on the question of the existence of a rupture.

) Illinois courts had construed the furnishing of services under section 8(a) as payment of compensation for limitation purposes. See Goodman Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Com. (1925), 316 Ill. 394, 396, 147 N.E. 394 and cases there cited. In 1925, by amendment to section 8(a), the legislature added the provision that furnishing of "any such services or appliances by the employer shall not be construed as the payment of compensation."