Plaintiff quotes an excerpt from Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc, 186 Mich App 265, 269; 463 NW2d 254 (1990), stating "the general rule set forth in an early Michigan Supreme Court case that an application for security should be made as early as practicable,] e.g., 'with or soon after [the] answer.' Goodenough v Burton, 146 Mich 50, 52; 109 NW 52 (1906)." In Hall, the Court concluded that the defendant's motion for security was untimely when it was filed "over two years after the complaint, . . . over nine months after the first trial . . . , [and] defendant ha[d] not put forth any valid reason to support a finding that it filed the motion for security as soon as practicable.

Plaintiff's citation to Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc, 186 Mich App 265, 269; 463 NW2d 254 (1990) does not entitle him to appellate relief. The Hall Court relied on the "as early as practicable" language found in Goodenough v Burton, 146 Mich 50, 52; 109 NW 52 (1906). However, that standard from the Goodenough Court pre-dated the court rule and was not incorporated into the plain language.

Initially, we note the general rule set forth in an early Michigan Supreme Court case that "an application for security should be made as early as practicable," e.g., "with or soon after [the] answer." Goodenough v Burton, 146 Mich. 50, 52; 109 N.W. 52 (1906). For example, a motion for security accompanying a timely motion for summary disposition based on circumstances coming to light during discovery is made as soon after the answer as is practicable.

Compare Boddie v Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371; 91 S Ct 780; 28 L Ed 2d 113 (1971), with United States v Kras, 409 U.S. 434; 93 S Ct 631; 34 L Ed 2d 626 (1973), and Ortwein v Schwab, 410 U.S. 656; 93 S Ct 1172; 35 L Ed 2d 572 (1973). Our decision to review the judge's discretion in ordering the security bond might suggest the demise of Goodenough v Burton, 146 Mich. 50; 109 N.W. 52 (1906). Goodenough was never meant to prohibit an inquiry into an abuse of discretion.