Opinion
E067777
03-05-2018
NIESHA GOODELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRIS FIGUEROA, Defendant and Appellant.
Chris Figueroa, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWV1600730) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. James T. Warren, Judge. Affirmed. Chris Figueroa, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The trial court entered a permanent protective order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) enjoining Chris Figueroa from contact with his former girlfriend, Niesha Goodell. (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. (all unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code).)
Both Figueroa and Goodell testified that, after a breakup, Figueroa repeatedly made unwanted contact with Goodell, sending numerous text messages as well as waiting outside her work, school, and home to talk to her or attempt physical contact. These events culminated in Figueroa sending Goodell and her new boyfriend an obscene picture in a fit of pique. The trial court found Figueroa had committed acts of domestic violence, which under the statute includes harassment, and imposed a permanent restraining order effective for one year.
Figueroa argues the trial court erred by (1) abdicating its role and allowing Goodell to decide whether to impose a temporary or permanent restraining order and (2) refusing to allow evidence that Goodell's new boyfriend had persuaded her to seek the restraining order. We conclude Figueroa has not carried his burden as appellant of providing legal authorities to establish he is entitled to reversal. In any event, the trial court decided to enter a permanent restraining order on its own and did not abuse its discretion in barring evidence that Goodell's boyfriend persuaded her to pursue the order. For all these reasons, we will affirm.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Figueroa and Goodell dated (often long distance) for about nine months, until March 2016. That month, Goodell terminated the relationship and began some kind of relationship with a coworker.
During April, Figueroa was in school back east, but he continued to communicate with Goodell by text message. Figueroa said Goodell was sending him "mixed messages as if we would still be together or we wouldn't." On one occasion, Figueroa said, "we were arguing back and forth via text, and at the time I was drinking, and I was just getting very angry and upset," and he threatened to contact Goodell's employer to report she was having a relationship with a coworker.
They continued seeing each other in some fashion after he returned from school until sometime in May. According to Figueroa, they were "going back and forth after the break-up . . . we would have an argument, and it would turn the other way, and we would meet up again, and we would be sexually involved again." Goodell said Figueroa would wait for her outside her work and try to block her from getting in her car. She said he also followed her into a drive-through restaurant and a grocery store and waited for her outside her college night classes. Under cross-examination by Goodell, he admitted to occasions when he waited outside her house and followed her to work and attempted to hug and kiss her as she tried to get to her car.
Finally, in May 2016, Figueroa got frustrated because Goodell was paying attention to her phone while the two sat together in a car. Figueroa grabbed her phone to see who was sending her text messages, and Goodell grabbed onto him trying to get the phone back. Figueroa exited the car, pulling Goodell with him, and she fell into the street, and injured herself. That event terminated the relationship for good, Goodell thereafter changed her phone number, and the two did not communicate for a few months.
However, at some point Figueroa—acting without permission—accessed Goodell's college website account and obtained her new phone number. He also admitted to going on a website called USA Jobs and changing Goodell's password. On September 5, 2016, he sent Goodell multiple text messages, which he characterized as "goodbye" messages, as he was about to return east for school. Figueroa admitted Goodell responded by telling him not to contact her anymore. According to Figueroa, though, the two also talked for about three hours about their relationship and achieved "closure." He said he was confused when she later texted him to leave her alone.
Over the next few days, Goodell's new boyfriend started sending messages to Figueroa as well. Figueroa said all three were sending messages back and forth and the conversation got malicious. In the end, according to Figueroa, he wrote, "good night and God bless you," and the new boyfriend wrote back sarcastically, "God bless you, too, xo." Figueroa, angry, sent Goodell a picture of his penis with the message, "tell him I said good night."
On September 12, 2016, Goodell filed a request for a domestic violence protective order. She based the request on several of the acts recounted above—the multiple unwanted text messages, the picture of his penis, the fight over her phone, and his showing up unwanted at her work and home. Figueroa represents the trial court entered a temporary restraining order on September 12, 2016.
The trial court held a trial on January 9, 2017. Goodell and Figueroa testified about the events described above. Goodell said Figueroa's behavior made her fearful. She also testified no one else had encouraged her to seek the restraining order. Figueroa tried to introduce evidence she had pursued the restraining order because she was encouraged to do so by her new boyfriend. For example, when Goodell said someone else was reading the text messages he sent in September, the court sustained its own relevance objection to Figueroa's attempt to identify the person. Figueroa also attempted to point out a text message from the new boyfriend saying he would take Goodell to the courthouse to file for a restraining order. But the court said it would not look at the text message because the person who wrote it was not present.
The trial court found Figueroa had committed incidents of domestic violence, as defined by statute, and issued a permanent restraining order, effective for one year. After the court made its ruling, Figueroa asked the court whether it couldn't instead extend the temporary restraining order for a year rather than make it a permanent restraining order, which has more serious follow-on effects. The trial court asked Goodell whether she would agree to that solution, and she said no. The court did not change its ruling.
II
DISCUSSION
Figueroa argues the trial court improperly allowed Goodell to decide whether to impose a temporary or permanent restraining order and abused its discretion by refusing to allow evidence that Goodell's new boyfriend had persuaded her to seek a restraining order. We find no merit in these arguments.
But before we reach the merits, we also note appellant has not carried his burden of establishing he is entitled to reversal by providing pertinent legal authorities. "A touchstone legal principle governing appeals is that 'the trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct, and the appellant has the burden to prove otherwise by presenting legal authority on each point made and factual analysis." (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 580.) "In other words, it is not this court's role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. Rather, an appellant is required to present a cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of the judgment. 'When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary.'" (Id. at p. 600.) These rules apply equally to appellants who represent themselves (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638), and Figueroa has failed to meet them. His brief includes not a single citation to relevant case law. Nor does it discuss relevant law without citation. Indeed, he has failed even to cite the statutory provisions governing domestic violence restraining orders. (§ 6200 et seq.) Thus, Figueroa has forfeited the issues he appeals.
Nevertheless, we address his arguments briefly on the merits. Under the DVPA, the trial court may issue a restraining order "for the purpose specified in Section 6220, if an affidavit or testimony and any additional information provided to the court pursuant to Section 6306, shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse." (§ 6300.) The behaviors considered domestic violence that may be enjoined under section 6320 include "'molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members.' (§ 6320, subd. (a).)" (S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264, italics added.)
First, Figueroa is simply wrong in claiming the trial court abdicated its role by allowing Goodell to decide issuing a permanent restraining order was appropriate. The court found Figueroa committed acts of domestic violence and issued the order on that basis. The evidence recounted above contains substantial evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding. When Figueroa objected that extending the temporary restraining order would serve the same purpose as imposing a permanent restraining order, the trial court checked with Goodell to see whether that solution would satisfy her. By asking this question, the trial court was simply exploring the possibility of a settlement of the issue. Goodell declined the offer to compromise, and the trial court allowed its order to stand. We conclude the trial court made appropriate findings and appropriately exercised its discretion in issuing a permanent restraining order against Figueroa.
Second, Figueroa has not shown the trial court abused its discretion when it barred him from inquiring into the role, if any, Goodell's new boyfriend had in encouraging her to pursue a restraining order. Figueroa says that evidence is relevant to rebut Goodell's claim she sought protection based on her fear of continued harassment. He implies Goodell sought protection because she thought doing so would please the new boyfriend. The trial court held the evidence was not relevant to any material issue and excluded it. We cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling. (Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1426.) Figueroa's theory of Goodell's motivation was pure speculation. Figueroa asked Goodell whether anyone else had encouraged her to seek protection, and she answered no. In any event, she testified she was in fear of continued harassment. Establishing the new boyfriend wanted her to file for protection would not have shown she did not in fact fear harassment. We conclude the trial court reasonably could have concluded the evidence was not probative of any material issue or that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability its admission would unduly consume trial time. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Appellant shall bear his own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. FIELDS
J.