Opinion
C.A. No. 07C-07-028 RBY.
Submitted: February 6, 2009.
Decided: March 4, 2009.
Upon Consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED.
Edward C. Gill, Esq., Georgetown, Delaware for Plaintiff.
Timothy S. Martin, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Denise Kimbro and Capital School District ("Defendants") move this Court to grant summary judgment in their favor. This suit concerns Plaintiff Rebecca Goode's ("Plaintiff") claim for civil damages related to an alleged malicious prosecution of her by Defendants. Because the facts of this which are not refuted fail to support legal malice or absence of probable cause, two of the six elements required to pursue this sort of claim, Defendants' Motion is well-taken, and will be GRANTED.
I. Facts and Procedural History
According to facts which are undisputed by the parties, during the morning of November 16, 2006, Plaintiff entered Defendant Kimbro's classroom at Dover High School. Defendant Kimbro was familiar with Plaintiff, as she had taught Plaintiff's son in previous semesters. Plaintiff's son, however, was not Defendant Kimbro's student on November 16, 2006. Upon seeing Plaintiff standing in front of Defendant Kimbro's desk, Defendant Kimbro, seated at her desk, asked if there was anything she could help Plaintiff with. Defendant Kimbro, whether or not objectively justified, felt intimidated by Plaintiff's position over Defendant Kimbro and became upset.
First, she felt concerned for her safety. While the objective legitimacy may be argued, the fact of its existence is not disputable. This fear was the product of two incidents involving Plaintiff. In the first, Defendant Kimbro had witnessed Plaintiff pull her son out of class and physically confront him in the hallway outside of Defendant Kimbro's classroom. That incident required two security guards and a teacher to separate Plaintiff from her son. The second incident involved a parent-2 teacher conference between Defendant Kimbro and Plaintiff, which occurred in the summer of 2006. During that conference, which was attended by several others, including the Assistant Principal, Plaintiff became upset, evidently concerning Defendant Kimbro's teaching of her son. Plaintiff rose from her seat quickly, threatening Defendant Kimbro's employment for her inadequate performance. While the various depositions presented to this Court contain detail variances, the general observation among the witnesses was that Defendant Kimbro was taken aback by Plaintiff's actions. The assistant principal stated that he had to stand as well, and at the very least stick his arm in between Plaintiff and Defendant Kimbro. This testimony is corroborated by other witnesses.
Another concern of Defendant Kimbro's was that she was not alerted about Plaintiff's presence in the school. The school has a policy allowing teachers to be notified if a person enters the school about whom that teacher has concerns. Defendant Kimbro had requested such notification when Plaintiff came to school. Her basis was that, after witnessing Plaintiff's behavior in the above mentioned situations, Defendant Kimbro was concerned that Plaintiff might harm her. On November 16, 2006, however, Defendant Kimbro was not notified about Plaintiff's presence.
Dover High School's policy allows teachers to inform the school's administration if they are concerned about any individuals who may enter the school. If so, the teacher may request to be notified when such an individual enters the campus. The teacher then has the opportunity to take precautions which they believe will insure their safety.
Plaintiff eventually left Defendant Kimbro's classroom that morning. It is unclear how long Plaintiff was in the classroom. The school's assigned police officer, Officer Ranger, stated that after reviewing the video surveillance tapes, he believed the encounter lasted approximately two minutes. When Plaintiff left, Kimbro sought out school security and the assistant principal to alert them of the incident, and to inquire about why she had not been notified of Plaintiff's presence. Following Defendant Kimbro's discussion with the Assistant Principal on November 16, the Assistant Principal alerted Plaintiff that she was not allowed in Defendant Kimbro's classroom or, notably, in the hallway outside of that classroom. Defendant Kimbro, still upset about the morning's incidents, began locking her classroom door during class time. When going to lock her door that afternoon, Defendant Kimbro noticed Plaintiff and Plaintiff's son standing near the doorway to De fenda nt Kimbr o's classroom, looking into the classroom. Plaintiff claims she was getting a drink of water from the fountain outside of Defendant Kimbro's classroom. Defendant Kimbro proceeded to lock the door, and to alert School Security. Officer Ranger began an investigation into this incident. Officer Ranger reviewed security camera footage concerning Plaintiff's presence outside of Defendant Kimbro's classroom. He also spoke with Defendant Kimbro about the incident and her concerns. When Officer Ranger asked Defendant Kimbro if she would like to press charges, Defendant Kimbro replied in the affirmative. Officer Ranger, however, did testify that his independent investigation was sufficient to justify seeking a warrant on Plaintiff. Officer Ranger went to the Justice of the Peace Court for a warrant on Plaintiff based on this information.
The Magistrate Judge issued a warrant for Plaintiff for harassment. Ulti matel y, the Attorney General entered a nollo prosequi of Plaintiff's charge on January 20, 2007. Plaintiff commenced this suit on July 20, 2007 on the grounds of malicious prosecution stemming from the aforementioned incidents.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In summary judgment situations, the facts are considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. After analyzing the undisputed facts, the Court must apply the governing law. If the law as applied to the undisputed facts lies in favor of the moving party, summary judgment is appropriate.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991).
See Super Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
See Id.
III. Analysis
A claim for malicious prosecution must satisfy six stringent elements. These elements are:
(1) There must have been a prior institution or continuation of some regular judicial proceedings against the plaintiff in this action for malicious prosecution,
(2) such former proceedings must have been by, or at the instance of, the defendant in this action for malicious prosecution,
(3) the former proceedings must have terminated in favor of the defendant therein, the plaintiff in the action for malicious prosecution,
(4) there must have been malice in instituting the former proceedings,
(5) there must have been want of probable cause for the institution of the former proceedings, AND
(6) there must have been injury or damage resulting to the plaintiff from the former proceedings.
Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, 21 A.2d 283, 284 (Del.Super. 1941).
These elements are written in the conjunctive; therefore, all elements must be satisfied for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim to survive.
Defendants take issue only with elements two (2), four (4), and five (5) in their motion for summary judgment.
Referring to element two (2), Defendants argue that the warrant was sought and the prosecution instituted by Officer Ranger, not Kimbro or Capital School District. Officer Ranger's testimony supports that, stating that the evidence he saw from the videotapes was sufficient for a harassment charge. This testimony, however, arguably was contradicted by his assurance that he brought the charges on the request of Defendant Kimbro. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff requires the Court to find that a factual dispute exists concerning Defendant Kimbro's involvement in the institution of charges. Defendants' argument concerning element two (2) fails.
Defendants' argument that Plaintiff has failed to make a showing of malice sufficient to support the fourth element of malicious prosecution has merit. Plaintiff has the burden of showing malice. Malice requires a showing of improper or wrongful motive, or of a wanton disregard for the rights of the person against whom the warrant was issued. Plaintiff makes the general allegation that malice existed. Plaintiff's reliance is placed upon the summer 2006 incident, where Plaintiff claims to have threatened Defendant Kimbro's job, based on her asserted inadequate performance in teaching Plaintiff's son. Plaintiff now claims that this threat and the possible repercussions to Defendant Kimbro were sufficient to cause Defendant Kimbro to act with malice in seeking harassment charges. Plaintiff, however, does no more than make vague and unsupported allegations as to how this actually created the required malice.
Id. at 285.
Id.
After the incidents occurring on November 16, Defendant Kimbro went to the appropriate channels to report the incidents and Plaintiff's presence. Defendant Kimbro seemed frightened, with an unusual demeanor, indicating to Officer Ranger and others that she was scared and intimidated by Plaintiff's actions. No evidence has been presented to show any form of malice on the part of Defendant Kimbro, Officer Ranger, or anyone else. All of the relevant testimony shows Defendant Kimbro's genuine concern for her safety. This rebuts the general, otherwise unsupported allegation that she maliciously insisted upon bringing charges. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to establish element four (4) of malicious prosecution.
Plaintiff's argument also fails to show adequate want of probable cause. A Magistrate Judge's issuance of a warrant is prima facie evidence that probable cause exists. Entrance of a nollo prosequi or acquittal is not sufficient to overcome the prima facie probable cause. Further, probable cause is determined at the inception of the action, not its termination. Establishing probable cause does not require the person seeking the warrant to show proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed. Instead, that person need only show through a totality of the circumstances that there is a fair probability that Plaintiff committed the crime of harassment.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cooke v. Hopkins, 1997 WL 720471 at *4 (Del.Super.), quoting State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993).
Id.
A want of probable cause sufficient to prove that element of malicious prosecution, therefore, would exist if Plaintiff had facts to demonstrate that there was, at the warrant's issuance, no fair probability that she committed the crime of harassment.
Id.
Plaintiff, though, argues that when defendants withhold or fabricate information, the prima facie case may be rebutted, citing Brown v. Cluley in support of her contention. In Brown, the defendant counterclaimed on the grounds of malicious prosecution. The Brown plaintiff went directly to the Magistrate Judge to procure a warrant against the defendant. After certain relevant information was misstated to the Magistrate Judge, a warrant was issued. The Superior Court found that the plaintiff's fabrication of information in securing the warrant from the Magistrate Judge was sufficient to rebut the prima facie probable cause. This is inapposite to the case sub judice as Kimbro reported to the school's Officer Ranger, who then conducted an independent investigation before seeking a warrant from the Magistrate Judge, irrespective of whose initiative spurred it.
Cooke, 1997 WL 720471 at *4, citing Megenhardt v. Nolan, 1990 WL 169009 (Del.Supr.), and Brown v. Cluley, 179 A.2d 93 (Del.Super. 1962).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 97-98.
Id.
Id. at 97.
In Megenhardt, the Delaware Supreme Court found the absence of want of probable cause when the police conducted an independent investigation. The independent investigation was sufficient to establish probable cause, even though it did appear in that case that the defendant misinterpreted the situation to the investigating officers, who later sought the warrant from the Magistrate Judge.
Megenhardt, 1990 WL 169009 at *2.
Id.
Plaintiff has done no more than make general allegations concerning a lack of probable cause. Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant Kimbro falsified or withheld information beyond these mere allegations. Based on the deposition testimony from Defendant Kimbro, Officer Ranger, Assistant Principal McCullough, et al, a fair probability does exist that Plaintiff could have been prosecuted for harassing Defendant Kimbro. As mentioned above, when Defendant Kimbro went to security and the principal to report Plaintiff's actions, she seemed scared and was crying. This evidence suggests that she was fearful and intimidated. Officer Ranger took Defendant Kimbro's appearance into account when determining that probable cause existed. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Kimbro instigated the proceedings. While Defendant Kimbro indicated that she wanted to institute an action against Plaintiff, it was Officer Ranger who ultimately made the decision to seek the warrant based on his independent investigation. Officer Ranger reviewed statements and videotapes of Plaintiff's actions when determining the probability that Plaintiff harassed Defendant Kimbro.
The facts in this case are in line with those from Megenhardt. The independent investigation is, therefore, sufficient to establish probable cause beyond any alleged fabrication or withheld of information. Similar to the Megenhardt court's finding, even assuming for the sake of argument that Defendant Kimbro withheld certain information from Officer Ranger, evidence exists to support a finding of probable cause. Officer Ranger's independent investigation is sufficient to overcome any withholding or fabrication of information on Defendant Kimbro's part. Plaintiff's argument and reliance on Brown do not create the want of probable cause element necessary to support a claim. Without a want of probable cause, Plaintiff's claim fails to satisfy element five (5) necessary for malicious prosecution.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff does not make a sufficient showing either of malice or of want of probable cause involved in the institution of criminal proceedings against her following the November 16, 2006 incident. Malicious prosecution actions require all 6 elements to be satisfied. Without any disputes of material facts relative to the determination regarding either one of two independently essential elements no disputes of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendants. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Stidham, 21 A.2d at 284.
SO ORDERED.