Furthermore, where the police conduct an investigation in preparation for criminal prosecution or the police and the District Attorney work together to investigate a case, actual notice of the petitioner's claims can be imputed on the public entities in question. (Goodall v. City of New York, 179 AD2d 481 [1st dept 1992]; Reisse v. County of Nassau 141 AD2d 649 [2nd Dept 1988]; Hasmath v. Cameb, 5 AD3d 438 2d Dept 2004]). In addition, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Civil Complaint Review Board (CCRB) regarding the events that arose on November 25, 2006 and August 7, 2007.

Such knowledge is documented in the individual officers' memo books and official Police Department reports ( Johnson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 278 AD2d 83; Miranda v. New York City Tr. Auth., 262 AD2d 199). The same circumstances show that respondent was not prejudiced by the delay in filing the notice of claim ( see Johnson, supra; Miranda, supra; Goodall v. City of New York, 179 AD2d 481). Accordingly, we reverse the order appealed and grant petitioner's motion.

In the meantime, a late notice of claim had been filed, but rejected as untimely, on July 12, 2001. In reviewing whether the court properly exercised its discretion in granting or denying such a leave motion, we look to, inter alia, whether the claimant was mentally incapacitated, whether the municipality acquired knowledge of the essential facts regarding the cause of action within 90 days of accrual or shortly thereafter, and whether the municipality would be substantially prejudiced if the motion were to be granted (§ 50-e[5]; Ragland v. New York City Housing Authority, supra). For present purposes, the claimant's mental incapacity is sufficiently established, the Police Department had all essential facts in its possession, and under the circumstances of this case, such knowledge may be imputed to the City (Grullon v. City of New York, 222 A.D.2d 257; Goodall v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 481). Finally, the Police Department's investigation of the underlying crime for which the defendant was arrested and its continuing involvement until such time as he was released, reasonably precludes substantial prejudice arising from any impediments to an investigation of the civil claim (Grullon,supra; Santana v. City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 665). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ly prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense" ( Hilton v. Town of Richland, 216 A.D.2d 921). "[T]he presence or absence of any one of the numerous relevant factors the court must consider is not determinative" ( Salvaggio v. Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 203 A.D.2d 938, 938-939), and thus plaintiffs' failure to offer any excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim is not fatal. "One of the factors that should be accorded great weight is whether [defendant] received actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim in a timely manner" ( Matter of Canty v City of New York, 273 A.D.2d 467, 468; see, Kalenda v. Buffalo Mun. Hous. Auth., 203 A.D.2d 937; see also, Bazer v. Town of Walworth, ___ A.D.2d ___ [decided Nov. 13, 2000]). Here, plaintiffs sufficiently established that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual ( see, e.g., Wetzel Servs. Corp. v. Town of Amherst, supra; Goodall v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 481; McKenna v. City of New York, 154 A.D.2d 655, 656). Shortly after plaintiffs were arrested, 18 individuals reported the incident to the Auburn Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and two filed complaints alleging the facts constituting plaintiffs' claim. The AHRC conducted an investigation and notified the Chief of Police concerning those complaints.

The key factors in determining whether leave to serve a late notice of claim should be granted are whether the claimant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining a defense on the merits ( see, Matter of Buddenhagen v Town of Brookhaven, 212 A.D.2d 605; General Municipal Law § 50-e). The traffic accident occurred in September 1994, and the 90-day period in which to serve a notice of claim began to run upon the petitioner's appointment as administrator ( see, General Municipal Law § 50-e [a]). Although the petitioner's explanation for his delay in serving a notice of claim following his appointment as administrator is not persuasive, the absence of a reasonable excuse is not fatal to his application ( see, Goodall v City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 481; Matter of Reisse v. County of Nassau, 141 A.D.2d 649). The record establishes that the County Department of Public Works investigated the circumstances of the decedents' accident within four months of its occurrence in response to an inquiry in October 1994 from a public official about traffic accidents at the same location.

Before: Rosenberger, J. P., Ellerin, Ross, Nardelli and Mazzarelli, JJ. Plaintiff's notice of claim, correctly naming the New York City Housing Authority as defendant, was misdelivered to the Corporation Counsel. Given the short period of delay, approximately two months, and the lack of prejudice to defendant, the court properly granted the application ( see, Goodall v City of New York, 179 AD2d 481).

Thus, the respondents should have acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within the 90-day period ( see, Fahey v County of Nassau, 111 A.D.2d 214; see also, Matter of Guzman v County of Westchester, 208 A.D.2d 925). It is well settled that the absence of an acceptable excuse for the delay is not necessarily fatal to an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim ( see, Goodall v City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 481; Montaldo v Town of Harrison, 151 A.D.2d 652; Matter of Chatman v White Plains Hous. Auth., 101 A.D.2d 838; Matter of Cicio v City of New York, 98 A.D.2d 38). In any case, one of the petitioners was incarcerated, and the other petitioner was an infant, which provided some justification for the delay.

The court considered the relevant factors and properly exercised its discretion pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) (see, Matter of Sanders v. New York City Hous. Auth., 170 A.D.2d 607). The NYCHA's claim of prejudice, purportedly flowing from the two-week delay, is conclusory and not supported by the record. Indeed, the NYCHA did not rebut the petitioner's contention that the complaint she filed with its Civilian Complaint Review Board provided it with actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within the specified 90-day time period (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e; Goodall v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 481; Nouri v. City of New York, 90 A.D.2d 745). Under the circumstances, we agree with the court's determination that the delay in serving the notice of claim here did not prejudice NYCHA's ability to maintain its defense on the merits. Mangano, P.J., Balletta, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.

Additionally, it appears from a supporting deposition given in connection with a subsequent prosecution against petitioner's husband for his alleged violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a) that the Department conducted an investigation of the accident well within 90 days of its occurrence. In view of the foregoing and the fact that the Department's employee was directly involved in the collision, we find that actual knowledge of the facts constituting petitioner's claim may be imputed to respondents (see, Goodall v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 481; Matter of Gerzel v. City of New York, 117 A.D.2d 549, 550-551; Flynn v. City of Long Beach, 94 A.D.2d 713, 714; Matter of Matey v. Bethlehem Cent. School Dist., 63 A.D.2d 807). We are unpersuaded by respondents' contention that, because the police accident report attributed the cause of the accident to the failure by petitioner's husband "to yield right of way", they had no actual notice of petitioner's claim.

In the instant case, the police, and the city through its agent, the building manager, had notice of the facts preceding the shooting; and the police fully investigated the shooting, which resulted in Vidal's arrest and conviction. We thus find that the city had timely knowledge of the facts underlying petitioners' claim, and that the city will not be substantially prejudiced by the late filing of a notice of claim (see, Goodall v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 481; Matter of Smiley-Walsch v. New York City Hous. Auth., 172 A.D.2d 382). Accordingly, petitioners' motion for leave to file a late notice of claim is granted. Concur — Carro, J.P., Milonas, Kupferman, Asch and Smith, JJ.