Gooch v. Gooch

15 Citing cases

  1. Banks v. Evans

    347 Ark. 383 (Ark. 2002)   Cited 19 times
    In Banks v. Evans, 347 Ark. 383, 64 S.W.3d 746 (2002), the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that "one is bound to know the content of a document one signs, and if the signer has had the opportunity to read it before she signs it, she cannot escape the obligations imposed by the documents by merely stating that it was signed without reading it."

    See, e. g., Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928). In Arkansas, a premarital agreement is valid if it was freely entered into, and is free from fraud and not inequitable. Arnold v. Arnold, 261 Ark. 734, 553 S.W.2d 251 (1977); Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). Parties contemplating marriage may, by agreement, fix the rights of each in the property of the other differently than established by law.

  2. Arnold v. Spears

    343 Ark. 517 (Ark. 2001)   Cited 13 times
    Relying on Ark. R. Civ. P. 19 as well as Ark. R. Civ. P. 21, which provides that "[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and upon such terms as are just"

    Indeed, it is commonplace for chancellors to distribute property which is located outside of their counties or judicial districts. Cf. Champion v. Champion, 238 Ark. 87, 378 S.W.2d 648 (1964) (chancery court in Arkansas County ordered sale of properties in Arkansas and Monroe counties); Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984) (chancery court in Clark County ruled that neither party was to have an interest in property the other owned before marriage, including appellee's lake house in Garland County). [4, 5] The Arnolds correctly point out that we have stated, as a general matter, that a chancellor has no authority to decide the validity of an obligation to a third party who is not a party to the divorce.

  3. Simeone v. Simeone

    525 Pa. 392 (Pa. 1990)   Cited 143 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that unconscionability should be determined at time of execution, that virtually all marriages involve change in circumstances, and this should not invalidate an otherwise valid contract

    Our sister states have found such treatment too short a shrift for so fundamental a unit of society.See Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Super. 16, 477 A.2d 833 (1984); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Col.Sup.Ct. 1982); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982); Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). Thus, I believe that the door should remain open for a spouse to avoid the application of a pre-nuptial agreement where clear and convincing proof establishes that the result will be inequity and unfairness under the circumstances of the particular case and the public policy of this state.

  4. Mays v. Mullins

    547 S.W.3d 474 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018)

    See , e.g. , Oliphant v. Oliphant , 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928). In Arkansas, a premarital agreement is valid if it was freely entered into and is free from fraud and not inequitable. Arnold v. Arnold , 261 Ark. 734, 553 S.W.2d 251 (1977) ; Gooch v. Gooch , 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). Parties contemplating marriage may, by agreement, fix the rights of each in the property of the other differently than established by law.

  5. Branch v. Branch

    508 S.W.3d 911 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 2 times

    This court has upheld a premarital agreement where a husband made a generalized disclosure of his assets but did not specify the precise sources and amounts of his income. See Gooch v. Gooch , 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). Exhibits A and B constitute a fair and reasonable disclosure of Jimmy's assets.

  6. Lee v. Lee

    35 Ark. App. 192 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    Such agreements must be made in contemplation of the marriage lasting until death, rather than in contemplation of divorce. Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928); Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). However, an agreement that is not solely intended to be operative upon divorce is not void merely because it mentions or is operative upon divorce among other contingencies. Dingledine v. Dingledine, 258 Ark. 204, 523 S.W.2d 189 (1975); Babb v. Babb, 270 Ark. 289, 604 S.W.2d 574 (Ark.App. 1980).

  7. Kesterson v. Kesterson

    731 S.W.2d 786 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that an award of alimony will lie independent of a divorce proceeding, and affirming the award of spousal support while reversing the grant of divorce

    Pennybaker v. Pennybaker, 14 Ark. App. 251, 687 S.W.2d 524 (1985). We review the testimony in the light most favorable to the appellee, and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the decree, Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984), and we give due regard to the chancellor's superior opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Cox v. Cox, 17 Ark. App. 93, 704 S.W.2d 171 (1986).

  8. Reves v. Reves

    21 Ark. App. 177 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    We review the testimony in the light most favorable to the appellee, and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the decree. Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). In the case at bar the record contains testimony by the appellant which, if believed, would tend to show that he consented to give the appellee a larger share of the marital property in exchange for her agreement that he would not be required to pay child support.

  9. Stewart v. Stewart

    698 S.W.2d 516 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985)

    [5, 6] It is well settled that in order to effect a change of domicile from one place or state to another, there must be an actual abandonment of the first domicile, coupled with the intention not to return to it and there must also be a new domicile acquired by actual residence in another place or jurisdiction, coupled with the intent of making the last acquired residence a permanent home. Phillips v. Sherrod Estate, 248 Ark. 605, 453 S.W.2d 60 (1970); Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). This rule has also been adopted by the courts of Kansas. Perry v. Perry, supra.

  10. Opinion No. 2004-203

    Opinion No. 2004-203 (Ops.Ark.Atty.Gen. Sep. 2, 2004)

    Among the factors looked at to determine whether a person has requisite intent to establish a domicile in a particular place are declarations of the parties, exercise of political rights, payment of personal taxes, a house of residence and a place of business. Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (1984). These factors must be evaluated in an attempt to determine a candidate's intent as to domicile.