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Gonzalez v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
May 7, 2004
No. 05-03-00140-CR (Tex. App. May. 7, 2004)

Opinion

No. 05-03-00140-CR.

Opinion Filed May 7, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-01604-M. Affirm.

Before Justices BRIDGES, FITZGERALD, and LANG-MIERS.


OPINION


Jose Margil Gonzalez appeals his conviction for capital murder. In three points of error, appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and the trial court's jury instruction concerning intent. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

Appellant was arrested and charged with the capital murder of Dennis Olson. Prior to the trial, appellant moved to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest and evidence — including his own statement — procured following the arrest. The trial court conducted a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress immediately prior to the beginning of trial. Detective Kelly Davis of the Mesquite Police Department was the officer investigating Olson's murder. He testified that he was called to the apartment where Olson had lived with his mother and step-father after Olson's mother discovered the body. Davis spoke with Olson's parents and learned that Olson's step-father owned a large gun collection, which had been stolen. The guns were kept in a locked closet in the master bedroom. The key to the cabinet was kept in a jewelry box in that bedroom. The bedroom, in turn, was kept locked; the key was kept inside a coffee cup in a hutch. The police processed the scene for fingerprints and successfully lifted prints from the jewelry box in the master bedroom. Olson's mother told Davis that her son spent time at the E-Z Mart convenience store near their home and that he had recently befriended a young man named Jose at that store. A neighbor of the family gave Davis a description of a heavy-set Hispanic man with short hair, who had been seen with Olson in the days before the murder. Davis sent officers to the E-Z Mart to try to identify employees named "Jose" and or other Hispanic males. They learned that a man named Robert Flores worked there, but he did not work again until that evening. Davis wanted to speak to Flores to see whether he knew who Jose was. He directed an investigator to watch the E-Z Mart, and later he received a call that Flores had arrived at the store with appellant. Davis was close to the store when he took the call from his investigator, and he immediately proceeded to the store. While he was driving there, he received a second call, informing him the print on the jewelry box at the crime scene belonged to a Jose Gonzalez. He arrived at the store within minutes. Appellant was outside the store by a telephone booth. He matched the description of Jose that had been given to Davis, so Davis approached appellant and asked his name. He learned appellant's name was Jose Gonzalez. Davis testified that at this point he had probable cause to arrest appellant, but he was not sure of the charge yet. He did a "pat down" of appellant for officer safety sake and discovered a metal object in appellant's pants pocket. The object was a metal business-card holder, and Davis opened it looking for identification, contraband, or small weapons. The case actually contained Olson's step-father's credit cards. At this point, Davis arrested appellant for capital murder. After his arrest, appellant was Mirandized, and he subsequently gave a four-page statement to Davis. At appellant's request, Davis wrote out the statement as appellant dictated it; then appellant signed it. In his statement, appellant confirmed the facts about his recent friendship with Olson. He had spent time at Olson's home, and Olson had shown him the gun collection. Appellant was actually staying at Olson's home in the days before the murder. On the night of the murder, Olson had gone to work, and appellant began carrying guns and other property out of the house and over to the Cadillac behind the E-Z Mart. Olson arrived home earlier than expected and discovered appellant taking property. The two men argued, and appellant confessed to holding a pillow to Olson's head and shooting him through the pillow. He claimed to have put the murder weapon (which was one of the step-father's guns) in the dumpster behind the E-Z Mart. Later in the day he carried some of the guns to the Cadillac and took others to Flores's home, although he did not tell Flores where he had gotten them. Eventually, he and Flores drove together to the E-Z Mart. After appellant gave his statement, officers went to the dumpster behind the E-Z Mart, but they did not find the gun. Appellant then told them where to look inside the back of the store, and this time they did find the weapon. Officers also found the remainder of the stolen property in the Cadillac and at Flores's home, where appellant's statement said he had brought it. Ultimately, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court assessed punishment at life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Motion to Suppress

Appellant's first point of error argues the trial court erroneously denied appellant's motion to suppress because "[t]he state failed to bring the warrantless arrest of Appellant within any provisions of Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we give deference to the trial court's determination of any historical facts and review de novo the application of the law of search and seizure. See Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). As a threshold matter, the State argues that neither appellant's written motion nor his arguments at the hearing on the motion preserved the complaints appellant makes in this Court. According to the State, the motion and argument were directed to the allegedly unjustified extent of the "pat down" to which appellant was subjected. Thus, again according to the State, the trial court was never given an opportunity to rule on the complaints raised herein, i.e., a lack of probable cause and a lack of circumstances justifying dispensing with the warrant requirement. Although the sufficiency of appellant's trial objection is certainly problematic, we nonetheless will examine the record to determine whether the warrantless arrest was appropriate in this circumstance. First, evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Detective Davis had probable cause to arrest appellant. Appellant concedes that Davis knew the following facts at the time of the arrest:
(1) Dennis Olson had been shot to death in his apartment and a number of firearms had been stolen; (2) Olson had shown the weapons to his friends; (3) Olson had recently befriended a large Hispanic man named "Jose"; (4) Jose had been seen with Olson at his apartment the weekend before the murder; (5) "Jose" hung out at the E-Z Mart nearby; (6) The guns were locked in the closet and the key was hidden in a jewelry box; (7) Jose Gonzalez's fingerprint was on the jewelry box; (8) Jose Gonzalez, a large Hispanic man, was detained outside the E-Z Mart at the pay phone.
We conclude these facts alone could allow a reasonable person to believe appellant had committed one or more of the offenses at the Olson home. See McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex.Crim. App. 2003) ("Probable cause exists where police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that a particular person has committed or is committing an offense."). When combined with the discovery of the credit cards, a reasonable person could certainly believe appellant had killed and robbed Olson. The record also indicates the arrest was in compliance with chapter 14's requirements concerning warrantless arrests. The initial police surveillance at E-Z Mart was based on knowledge of a first name and the general description of a man who had been seen with Olson. Davis was called to the scene when the suspect was questioned and a last name was learned. Davis learned that the suspect's fingerprints matched the print on the jewelry box while he was on his way to the E-Z Mart. Davis had probable cause to believe appellant had committed a crime at the Olson home. However, by this time, appellant had been alerted to the fact that the police suspected his involvement in a crime. Appellant was homeless; he was not an American citizen. We conclude Davis knew that a felony had been committed, and could reasonably have believed the offender would escape had he taken the time necessary to procure a warrant. Accordingly, he appropriately arrested appellant without a warrant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977). We overrule appellant's first point of error.

Factual Sufficiency of Evidence

Appellant's second point of error avers that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict on the element of identity. When conducting a factual sufficiency review on an issue we review all the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, 2004 WL 840227 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr. 21, 2004). When there is evidence both supporting the verdict and contrary to the verdict, we weigh all the evidence and determine whether the contrary evidence is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Id. In this case, the strongest evidence that appellant was the person responsible for the murder and robbery was his own confession. Appellant refers to facts that purport to undermine the probative value of the confession: Detective Davis did not film or record the confession, and Davis wrote out the confession himself rather than having appellant write it out. Appellant implies impropriety, but he cites to no violation of law or policy or procedure in Davis's conduct. He does not claim the confession was involuntary. Appellant concedes that his extrajudicial confession need not be corroborated on the issue of identity. See Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex.Crim. App. 1990). The confession is supported by appellant's fingerprint on the jewelry box and by appellant's possession of the deceased's step-father's credit cards. In addition, appellant was able to give the police information that led to both the murder weapon and the stolen guns, many of which were found in the car in which he slept. As to evidence potentially identifying a different criminal, appellant stresses that Olson showed off his parents' gun collection often, presumably to others besides appellant. Appellant specifically points to the fact that a number of the stolen weapons were found in Robert Flores's house. He also relies on the testimony of a witness who saw Flores working on the car's engine after appellant's arrest. We have weighed all the evidence, and we conclude the evidence purporting to undermine appellant's confession and to incriminate Flores is not strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See Zuniga, 2004 WL 840227. Instead, having reviewed all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the jury was rationally justified in finding appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Accordingly, the evidence of appellant's identity is factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict. We overrule appellant's second point of error.

Jury Instruction

Appellant's third point of error complains that the trial court inappropriately instructed the jury on the issue of intent. The court's instruction stated: "Intent may be inferred from acts done, words spoken, or both." Appellant did not object to the instruction at trial, but he argues in this Court that the instruction is an inappropriate comment on the weight of the evidence. We examine jury charge error under the standards set forth in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). When reviewing a challenge to the jury charge, we must first determine whether error actually exists in the charge. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). If we determine the charge is inadequate, we then assess whether any resulting harm requires reversal. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. If no objection is made at trial, as in this case, we will reverse only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that the appellant was denied a fair and impartial trial. See Arline, 721 S.W.2d at 351; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. We assess the actual degree of harm in light of the state of the evidence as a whole: we look to the contested issues, the weight of probative evidence, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. The Court of Criminal Appeals recently addressed an instruction similar to the challenged one in this case. In Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003), the trial court instructed the jury that "[i]ntent or knowledge may be inferred by acts done or words spoken." The court concluded that the instruction was erroneous because the instruction:
is simply unnecessary and fails to clarify the law for the jury. It is not a statutory presumption, but it is a judicial review device for assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's finding of culpable intent. It is a common-sense tool for a trial judge to use in gauging the sufficiency of the evidence at a motion for directed verdict or motion for new trial and for sufficiency review by appellate courts, but it is not an explicit tool for the jury.
Id. at 802-03. However, as the court began its harm analysis, it called the offending instruction "mild, neutral, and an obvious common-sense proposition." Id. at 803. Accordingly, even though intent was the only contested issue at trial in Brown, the court concluded that the error was "benign . . . [and] not, in any sense, harmful under Almanza." Id. at 803-04. Following the court of criminal appeals, we conclude that the trial court's instruction in this case, while erroneous, was not harmful. The instruction concerns intent, but intent was not a contested issue in appellant's case. Moreover, the record contains overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, including his fingerprint at the scene, his knowledge of the whereabouts of the stolen property, and his own confession to the crime. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude appellant has shown neither egregious harm nor denial of a fair and impartial trial. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 160. We overrule appellant's third issue.

Conclusion

We have overruled each of appellant's points of error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.


Summaries of

Gonzalez v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
May 7, 2004
No. 05-03-00140-CR (Tex. App. May. 7, 2004)
Case details for

Gonzalez v. State

Case Details

Full title:JOSE MARGIL GONZALEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: May 7, 2004

Citations

No. 05-03-00140-CR (Tex. App. May. 7, 2004)