Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0986-14T2
09-30-2015
NOEMI GONZALEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. URANIO DOS SANTOS and MARIA DOS SANTOS, Defendants-Respondents.
Douglas D. Burgess argued the cause for appellant (Icaza & Burgess, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Burgess, on the brief). Monique D. Moreira argued the cause for respondents (Jose B. Moreira, P.C., attorneys; Ms. Moreira, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges St. John and Manahan. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0044-13. Douglas D. Burgess argued the cause for appellant (Icaza & Burgess, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Burgess, on the brief). Monique D. Moreira argued the cause for respondents (Jose B. Moreira, P.C., attorneys; Ms. Moreira, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Noemi Gonzalez appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of her personal injury negligence cause of action against defendants Uranio Dos Santos and Maria Dos Santos. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We adduce the following facts and procedural history from the record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. See Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 203 (2014). Plaintiff was injured when she fell due to a wet spot on the floor of an apartment building owned by defendants. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was employed as a home health aide to one of the tenants. As part of her duties, she would dispose of the trash in the basement of the building where the accident occurred. She had performed this service on numerous occasions, had never previously fallen, nor complained to defendants concerning the basement floor surface. Plaintiff contended the floor was wet, but did not know how long it was in that condition before she fell. Mr. Dos Santos witnessed the accident from a distance of five to six feet and contended the floor was dry. However, we accept plaintiff's assertions for purposes of this opinion.
The motion judge determined that plaintiff proffered no evidence showing that defendants had any knowledge, either from plaintiff or any other source, that the floor was wet or had in the past been wet. The court also concluded there was no evidence that the water "had been there for any length of time" and therefore "it wouldn't be reasonable for [defendants] to discover it."
We start our legal analysis by reaffirming that because the motion judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint as a matter of law, our review of the court's decision is de novo. See Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). In making this determination, the court must decide whether "the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 115 (2014) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).
In a landlord-tenant premises liability matter, we said that "[a] common law cause of action for negligence has four elements: (1) a duty of care owed to plaintiff by defendant, (2) a breach of that duty by defendant, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages." Meier v. D'Ambose, 419 N.J. Super. 439, 444 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 400 (2009)), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 370 (2011). The burden of proof as to each element lies with plaintiff. Ibid.
Traditionally, "premises liability [was] 'predicated on the status of the person on the property at the time of the injury': invitee, licensee, or trespasser." Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35, 43 (2012) (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 433 (1993)). Over time, however, these rigid definitions of duty, wholly-reliant upon the injured person's status, have evolved, and our courts now define a landowner's duty in a manner consistent with principles of public policy first articulated in Hopkins. Whether the owner of property has a duty in particular circumstances, and the nature of that duty, is determined by "the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution." Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439.
It is axiomatic that "whether a defendant owes a legal duty to another and the scope of that duty are generally questions of law for the court to decide." Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014). That inquiry "is ultimately governed by fairness and public policy." Ibid. "Regardless of how the duty is defined, its 'scope . . . is determined under the totality of the circumstances, and must be reasonable under those circumstances.'" Potomac Aviation, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 413 N.J. Super. 212, 226-27 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 339 (1998)).
Addressing an owner's constructive knowledge in the context of social guests, the Supreme Court in Parks v. Rogers explained:
The Restatement [(Second) of Torts (1965)] was revised to impose liability on the land possessor if he "has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees [social guests]." The landowner is not the measure of whether a known condition of the property is dangerous. The inquiry is an objective one, whether the landowner should realize the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm.
[176 N.J. 491, 499 (2003) (citations omitted).]
Applying this standard, we conclude the record supports the motion judge's conclusion that defendants had no reason to know of the wet spot and therefore no liability to plaintiff.
Plaintiff also contends the motion judge erred because defendants violated the implied warranty of habitability and provisions of the Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law (Law), N.J.S.A. 55:13A-1 to -28.
The Supreme Court has held that residential leases carry an implied warranty or covenant of habitability. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 466 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144 (1970). Our reading of Marini and Berzito, however, convinces us that the implied warranty of habitability discussed therein is limited. Significantly, Marini only held that the breach of an implied warranty of habitability or covenant to repair could be used by a tenant in defense of an eviction action where defects have been asserted as a defense to nonpayment of rent or as a basis for withholding of rental payments. Supra, 56 N.J. at 144. Thus, in Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 55 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd o.b., 63 N.J. 577 (1973), we held that the Marini concept was not intended to overturn existing principles of law applicable to tort actions for personal injuries by tenants against landlords.
Further, although the Law imposes a duty to maintain the building, "the nexus between duty and liability is proof of negligence." Dwyer, supra, 123 N.J. Super. at 52. Negligence in this context requires not only proof the wet spot caused the injury, but also that the condition was known or should have been known by defendants prior to the occurrence, so that they had an opportunity to correct it. See ibid. Plaintiff offered no such proof.
Finally, plaintiff contends the mode of operation of the building requires that the court "shift the burden to defendants to prove they inspected and made the property safe." We find this contention to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Mindful of the undisputed material facts included in the record before us, we are satisfied plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION