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Gonzalez v. Redwood Springs Healthcare Ctr.

United States District Court, Eastern District of California
Dec 15, 2021
1:21-cv-01416-NONE-SAB (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2021)

Opinion

1:20-cv-01260-NONE-EPG 1:20-cv-01719-NONE-SAB 1:21-cv-00871-NONE-SAB 1:21-cv-00872-NONE-SKO 1:21-cv-01303-NONE-SKO 1:21-cv-01393-NONE-SKO 1:21-cv-01416-NONE-SAB

12-15-2021

JAMIE GONZALEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. REDWOOD SPRINGS HEALTHCARE CENTER, et al., Defendants. GARY GAGLIOLO, Plaintiff, v. KAWEAH MANOR, INC., et al., Defendants. MARX FORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. REDWOOD SPRINGS HEALTHCARE CENTER, et al., Defendants. MONICA STERLING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. REDWOOD SPRINGS HEALTHCARE CENTER, et al., Defendants. JOHN MOORE, Plaintiff, v. COVENANT LIVING WEST, Defendant. JOHN MOORE, Plaintiff, v. COVENANT LIVING WEST, Defendant. DALLENE ROCCARO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COVENANT LIVING COMMUNITIES & SERVICES, Defendant.


ORDER STAYING CASE PENDING NINTH CIRCUIT RULING

The above-captioned matters are state-law actions concerning nursing homes' responses to the coronavirus pandemic. They were initially filed in California state courts and were subsequently removed to this U.S. District Court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction.

The notice of removal in each case asserts, among other things, that the state law causes of action are preempted by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d and 247d-6e (2006) (the “PREP Act”). Plaintiffs in each action have filed a motion to remand.

On October 21, 2021, the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, No. 20-56194. According to the opening brief, the issues presented to the Ninth Circuit for review in Saldana were as follows:

1. Did the district court err in its interpretation and application of the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), by failing to recognize that Defendants' response to the pandemic was at the specific direction of, and to assist, the federal government, such that Defendants were “acting under” a federal officer as contemplated by § 1442(a)(1) and Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (2007)?
2. Did the district court err in its interpretation of the PREP Act's complete preemptive effect by failing to construe the various components of the PREP Act together?
3. Did the district court err in failing to recognize that Plaintiffs' state claims raise embedded federal issues pursuant to Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005) that compel granting federal jurisdiction because of the need for uniformity in the interpretation and enforcement of federal law in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected every state in the country?
Saldana, Doc. No. 16, at 17-18.

The parties in the above-captioned matters have briefed similar issues. (See Gonzalez, Doc. No. 16 (in opposition to motion to remand, making arguments concerning PREP Act, Grable, and federal officer statute); Gagliolo, Doc. No. 21 (similar); Ford, Doc. No. 9 (similar); Sterling, Doc. No. 8 (similar); Moore, No. 1:21-cv-01303-NONE-SKO, Doc. No. 15 (similar); Moore, No. 1:21-cv-01393-NONE-SKO, Doc. No. 11 (similar); Roccaro, Doc. No. 1 (similar, in notice of removal).) Given the pending appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the court ordered the parties to show cause why these actions should not be stayed until the Ninth Circuit issues its decision in Saldana may be warranted. The parties were afforded fourteen days to respond to the order to show cause. No. party responded or otherwise objected to the entry of a stay.

The court finds there is good cause for a stay given the procedural posture of Saldana because the outcome of Saldana may narrow the issues presented in the above-captioned cases. Therefore, a stay will conserve judicial and party resources. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”); see also CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (when deciding whether to grant a stay, a court must consider factors such as “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay”). No. party objects to the stay and no prejudice or harm is apparent on this record.

Accordingly, the above-captioned cases are stayed pending the issuance of a ruling in Saldana. Fourteen days following the entry of the mandate by the Ninth Circuit in Saldana, the parties are directed to file either a stipulation regarding the lifting of the stay and setting forth appropriate deadlines or a joint status report indicating their respective positions on further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Gonzalez v. Redwood Springs Healthcare Ctr.

United States District Court, Eastern District of California
Dec 15, 2021
1:21-cv-01416-NONE-SAB (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2021)
Case details for

Gonzalez v. Redwood Springs Healthcare Ctr.

Case Details

Full title:JAMIE GONZALEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. REDWOOD SPRINGS HEALTHCARE CENTER…

Court:United States District Court, Eastern District of California

Date published: Dec 15, 2021

Citations

1:21-cv-01416-NONE-SAB (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2021)