Opinion
No. 1 CA-SA 14-0015
01-30-2014
MANUEL ANTONIO GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE MARGARET R. MAHONEY, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.
Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix By Jaime Hindmarch and Rosemarie Pena-Lynch Counsel for Petitioner Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Diane Meloche and Neha Bhatia Counsel for Real Party In Interest
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2012-154880-001 DT
The Honorable Margaret R. Mahoney, Judge
JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Jaime Hindmarch and Rosemarie Pena-Lynch
Counsel for Petitioner
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Diane Meloche and Neha Bhatia
Counsel for Real Party In Interest
DECISION ORDER
residing Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 Manuel Antonio Gonzalez seeks special action review of the superior court's order denying his motion to remand to the grand jury for redetermination of probable cause. Denial of a motion to remand is not generally reviewable on direct appeal; relief is available only by special action. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 439-40, ¶ 31, 94 P.3d 1119, 1134-35 (2004); Francis v. Sanders, 222 Ariz. 423, 426, ¶ 9, 215 P.3d 397, 400 (App. 2009); see also Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) (stating special action jurisdiction appropriate where there is no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal"). We therefore, in an exercise of our discretion, accept jurisdiction but, for reasons that follow, deny relief.
¶2 The grand jury indicted Gonzalez on charges of child abuse, sexual conduct with a minor, and first degree felony murder. The charges arose from the death of the 21-month-old victim while in Gonzalez's care. Gonzalez moved to remand the indictment, arguing the State had failed to present evidence to the grand jury in a fair and impartial manner. The superior court denied the motion in a detailed order, and this special action followed.
¶3 The facts, as presented to the grand jury through the testimony of an investigating detective, are as follows. Gonzalez, along with the victim's aunt and their two children, lived in the same house as the victim and the victim's mother and grandmother. The victim's grandmother indicated that on several occasions when she arrived home from work, the victim would be sleeping in Gonzalez's bed, frequently with the door closed.
¶4 One day in October 2012, while the victim's mother and grandmother were at work, the victim's aunt left the house at approximately 1:00 or 1:10 p.m., leaving Gonzalez alone to care for the children. The victim's mother and grandmother had not observed any injuries to the victim's teeth or rectum when they left for work that morning. The victim's aunt had not seen any injuries to the victim's face
or torso when she left and had not noticed any injuries when changing the victim's diaper about one hour earlier.
¶5 Around 20 minutes after the victim's aunt left the house, Gonzalez took the victim to a neighbor's house to call 911. The neighbor observed that the victim's abdomen was "puffy," his diaper was colored brown, purple, or red, and there was blood coming from his mouth. Gonzalez indicated the victim had drowned and, as advised by the 911 operator, began to perform CPR. An emergency responder noted that, when he arrived at the scene, there was blood coming from the victim's mouth and the victim's "front teeth appeared to be rotted or there was some type of a problem with the teeth." He also indicated the victim's "diaper was soaked with blood."
¶6 The victim was pronounced dead at the hospital approximately 45 minutes later. An autopsy revealed multiple tears around the victim's anus and a 4.7-inch tear in the victim's rectum, consistent with an object being inserted in the rectum. The victim's four top front teeth were fractured, which had caused the bleeding in his mouth. The medical examiner indicated these injuries had happened recently, and that the rectal tear had likely caused the victim's death quite rapidly. Gonzalez gave four different versions of the incident, but offered no explanation for the victim's rectal injury. Rape kits were collected from both Gonzalez and the victim as part of the investigation, although the analysis was not complete by the time of the grand jury proceeding.
¶7 Gonzalez argues the superior court erred by denying his motion to remand because the State made an inadequate, incomplete, and misleading presentation to the grand jury by misrepresenting critical facts, thereby denying him a substantive procedural right. We review the denial of a motion to remand for an abuse of discretion. Francis, 222 Ariz. at 426, ¶ 10, 215 P.3d at 400.
¶8 The defendant may challenge the grand jury's finding of probable cause on only two grounds: (1) an insufficient number of jurors concurred in the indictment or (2) the proceeding denied the defendant a substantive procedural right. Maretick v. Jarrett, 204 Ariz. 194, 197, ¶ 11, 62 P.3d 120, 123 (2003). To secure the defendant's rights, the State has a duty to make a fair and impartial presentation to the grand jury. Trebus v. Davis, 189 Ariz. 621, 624, 944 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1997). Nevertheless, the State need not present all potentially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, but rather is only obligated to present "clearly exculpatory" evidence: "evidence of such weight that it would deter the grand jury
from finding the existence of probable cause." State v. Superior Court (Mauro), 139 Ariz. 422, 425, 678 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1984). Beyond the requirement that the State present clearly exculpatory evidence, the defendant may not challenge the nature, weight, or sufficiency of the evidence presented. Crimmins v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 39, 42-43, 668 P.2d 882, 885-86 (1983).
¶9 Gonzalez first argues the State improperly led the grand jury to infer that Gonzalez had an ongoing sexual relationship with the victim. Gonzalez claims the State misrepresented statements by the victim's grandmother that, when she arrived home from work, the victim would often be sleeping in Gonzalez's bed, frequently with the door closed. Gonzalez does not argue that this testimony is untrue, but rather that the State should also have presented the grandmother's statements that she never suspected Gonzalez had physically or sexually abused the victim. These additional statements were not clearly exculpatory. Given an accurate presentation of the victim's injuries, for which Gonzalez had offered no explanation, the grandmother's lack of suspicion of past abuse would not deter a finding of probable cause regarding the current incident. See Mauro, 139 Ariz. at 425, 678 P.2d at 1389.
¶10 Gonzalez also asserts that informing the grand jury that rape kits had been collected from Gonzalez and the victim as part of the investigation "furthered the untruthful implication that a sexual offense had occurred." The grand jury testimony truthfully stated only that rape kits had been collected and did not suggest what the forthcoming results might be. To the extent Gonzalez objects to a potential inference from truthful testimony, his argument relates to the nature, weight, or sufficiency of the evidence, which may not be challenged in this context. See Crimmins, 137 Ariz. at 42-43, 668 P.2d at 885-86.
¶11 Second, Gonzalez argues the State improperly led the grand jury to infer that Gonzalez had severely beaten the victim and that the victim had bled profusely. Gonzalez claims the State overstated the injury to the victim's teeth and omitted evidence of rotted teeth existing before the injury. But the State presented evidence of an emergency responder's observation that the victim's "front teeth appeared to be rotted or there was some type of a problem with the teeth," as well as Gonzalez's claim that the injury might have been caused when he was performing CPR.
¶12 Similarly, Gonzalez claims the State mischaracterized the victim's diaper as "soaked with blood." The State presented evidence that the neighbor characterized the diaper as colored brown, purple, or red,
that a bloody diaper was retrieved from the hospital, and that the victim suffered a 4.7-inch tear into his rectum, which Gonzalez does not challenge. To the extent Gonzalez argues these truthful presentations created a prejudicial inference, the nature, weight, and sufficiency of the evidence is beyond the scope of our review. See id.
¶13 Accordingly, the superior court did not err by denying Gonzalez's motion to remand. We therefore accept jurisdiction but deny relief.