Further, neither sentenced inmates nor pretrial detainees are recognized members of a protected or suspect class. Gonzalez v. Hannah, No. 3:19-CV-1522 (VLB), 2020 WL 3256869, at *8 (D. Conn. June 16, 2020). On initial review, the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed for further development of the record on her claim of equal protection violation as a “class of one” based on Warden Sexton denying her the ability to sleep on the floor.
Sentenced inmates are not members of a protected or suspect class, Gonzalez v. Hannah, No. 3:19-cv-1522 (VLB), 2020 WL 3256869, at *8 (D. Conn. June 16, 2020) (citations omitted), and Plaintiff has not alleged facts to suggest that he was subject to disparate treatment from comparators due to any
Sentenced inmates are not members of a protected or suspect class, Gonzalez v. Hannah, 2020 WL 3256869, at *8 (D. Conn. June 16, 2020), and Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that he was treated differently than any other inmate. Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint fails to suggest any plausible Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation.
Sentenced inmates are not members of a protected or suspect class. Gonzalez v. Hannah, 2020 WL 3256869, at *8 (D. Conn. June 16, 2020). Likewise, Mr. Jordan has not alleged facts to suggest that he was discriminated against as a “class of one” based on intentional disparate treatment from comparators without a rational basis for the difference in treatment.
; Gonzalez v. Hannah, No. 3:19CV1522(VLB), 2020 WL 3256869, at *6 (D. Conn. June 16, 2020) (implausible that inmate's cut was objectively serious where inmate failed to allege that his cut “bled, was deep or was painful.”); Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 172, 183 (D. Conn. 2014) (cuts and abrasions on plaintiff's arms failed to constitute a “serious medical need” where he failed to allege that they “significantly interfered with his daily activities or caused him substantial or chronic pain”); Patterson v. Westchester Cty., No. 13 CIV. 0194 PAC AJP, 2014 WL 1407709, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2014) (“Unlike cases where injuries demonstrate the requisite urgency leading to ‘death, degeneration or extreme pain,' the case law holds that prisoner complaints about ligaments or other ankle problems do not establish the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard.”)
At worst, the initial misdiagnosis of Plaintiff's leg amounts to malpractice, and "[n]either 'mere negligence,' nor 'mere malpractice' by medical officials . . . will meet the second prong of the Fourteenth Amendment standard." Gonzalez v. Hannah, No. 3:19CV1522(VLB), 2020 WL 3256869, at *6 (D. Conn. June 16, 2020) (quoting Charles, 925 F.3d at 87); see Beaman v. Unger, 838 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The most that his allegations show, however, is that the two nurses and Dr. Shiekh misdiagnosed his injuries, and failed to recognize the severity of those injuries. Such allegations might conceivably show malpractice, but they do not state [a deliberate indifference] claim.").
This is plainly insufficient. See Shepard v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that an inmate's transfer or receipt of requested relief moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief despite the fact that "future transfers may occur"); Gonzalez v. Hannah, No. 19-CV-1522, 2020 WL 3256869, at *3 (D. Conn. June 16, 2020) (explaining that an inmate's transfer from a prison facility undermined his Ex parte Young claims); Goodspeed, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (explaining that the Ex parte Young exception applies only where "state officials are actively violating federal law or imminently threatening acts that the plaintiff challenges as unconstitutional," and does not apply where plaintiff simply alleges that defendants "could act" to violate federal law (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). Moreover, Defendants have made clear that they will not resume the allegedly violative conduct.