Opinion
No. 00-1037-JTM
July 14, 2001
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This a hybrid Section 301 claim brought by plaintiff Hugo Gonzalez against his former employer, Great Bend Packing Co., Inc., and Teamsters Union Local 795. Gonzalez initially advanced a state breach of contract claim against the employer. The employer removed the action here as federally preempted in light of the existence of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between it and the Union representing Gonzalez. Gonzalez subsequently amended his petition to advance the hybrid Section 301 claim now before the court. The defendant packing company has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the court will grant the defendant's motion. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).
In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis inMatsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Findings of Fact
Great Bend Packing and the Union have entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement which governs the terms and conditions of Gonzalez's employment. Section 2 of the CBA prohibits discharge of an employee without just cause.
It is uncontroverted that on May 26, 1999, Gonzalez was involved in a fight with another employee, Richard Ogden. Both employees were suspended and plant managers investigated. They spoke with Gonzalez, Ogden, and four witnesses to the fight. Gonzalez told them he had struck Ogden in the face. Following the investigation, Gonzalez was notified of his termination on June 3, 1999.
Gonzalez filed a grievance on June 8, 1999. The grievance was first denied on June 10, and, after a hearing on June 23, again on or around July 30. At approximately this same time, in a telephone conversation between Gonzalez's wife and Jesse Castillo, the Union's Business Agent, she told Castillo that the couple had hired an attorney, and would be handling things on their own. Castillo told Gonzalez's wife that as a result the union would not be advancing the grievance to arbitration.
Conclusions of Law
Gonzalez's present action requires proof both that the employer discharged him in violation of the CBA and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. There are three grounds for relief advanced in support of the summary judgment motion: (1) that Gonzalez failed to comply with the statute of limitations; (2) that the Union did not breach any duty of fair representation; and (3) that the discharge did not violate the CBA's prohibition on fighting during work hours. The court finds that summary judgment must be granted.
Gonzalez's claim is subject to the six-month statute of limitations period. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983). Gonzalez concedes the application of the narrow limitations period, but argues in his response that he complied with the statute when he filed his original state court petition. This argument fails.
The statute of limitations on a hybrid Section 301 claim begins to run when the employee knows or should know of the Union's decision.DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164. Here, although Gonzalez disputes the Union representative's statement that he explicitly told Gonzalez's wife that it would not be pursuing the grievance, he concedes that on or about the first week of July the Union representative told him that the grievance was "no good." (Resp. at 2). His claim accrued, if at all, by the end of July, 1999.
However, Gonzalez did not advance any claims under the CBA until March 22, 2000, when he filed his Amended Petition which, for the first time, alleges a hybrid Section 301 claim and breach of duty by the Union. The earlier state court petition filed by Gonzalez, cannot save the current Section 301 claim because it is devoid of any claims under the CBA. Instead, the original petition is devoted solely to a state breach of contract claim that Gonzalez's termination violated his rights under an employee handbook. There is no mention of the Union; no mention of the CBA. The petition states instead:
Employees of Defendant, Great Bend Packing Company are given an "Employee Handbook" when they start employment. That "Employee Handbook" contains an Employee Code of Conduct listing 35 specific acts that constitute grounds for verbal warning and/or discharge. Defendant's Employee Handbook also contains a statement of policy, "It is not the intent of the company to discharge employees or to use indiscriminate disciplinary action but to correct the relatively few employees who abuse the rules and regulations."
Petition, at ¶ 4.
The claims of breach of duty of fair representation and violation of the CBA were not mentioned by plaintiff until well after the six-month period of limitations passed. Accordingly, the court will grant the motion for summary judgment.
A second basis for summary judgment is the failure of plaintiff to show the union breached its duty of good faith. A breach of that duty occurs when a union acts in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Considine v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1357 (10th Cir. 1994). An act in this context is arbitrary if, at the time of the act, it is so outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). Gonzalez alleges variously that the Union breached its duty by failing to keep him informed of its actions, by ceasing to pursue his grievance and failing to file an appeal, and by offering him $1000 to settle his grievance. The Union's actions in the present case do not rise to the high level of misconduct required to show breach of duty of fair representation. Although he disputes starting the fight, Gonzalez concedes he continued it. There is no evidence suggesting that the Union was irrational or acting in bad faith in deciding not to pursue the grievance. Even if (accepting Gonzalez's version of the facts) the Union representative did not explicitly tell him that the Union was abandoning the grievance, it is uncontroverted that Gonzalez was told the Union felt the grievance was "no good" and encouraged settlement. And, although the Response repeatedly suggests or implies that the $1000 offer of settlement would be a payment by the Union to get Gonzalez to drop the grievance, in fact, it is clear from the affidavits of both Gonzalez and his wife that the Union representative merely encouraged Gonzalez to accept an offer of $1000 which had been advanced as a settlement offer by Great Bend Packing.
Hugo Gonzalez's affidavit states that Castillo told him around the beginning of July "that the Packing Plant was offering me one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) if I would withdraw my grievance." (Aff., at ¶ 4). Angela Gonzalez states that Castillo asked her if they "had decided to take the thousand dollars that the Company had offered to give to Hugo." (Aff. at ¶ 2).
Finally, the court also holds under the facts that there was no violation of the CBA (even apart from the other two grounds for summary judgment). That is, the CBA prohibits both "provoking or instigating a fight" and "fighting during work hours on Company premises." (Def. Exh. A. at ¶ 27). Even if there is controversy as to who began the fight (Gonzalez states that Ogden threw a bucket at him and called him a derogatory name), it is uncontroverted that there was a fight. Gonzalez conceded in a written statement during the investigation that Ogden "came up to me and I hit him in the face." (Def. Exh. C).
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this ____ day of July, 2000, that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 13) is hereby granted. In light of these findings, the court also grants summary judgment on any claims advanced against the Union.